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The theme 'the public understanding of morality' is introduced 
through a comparison with the idea of the public understanding of 
science. The argument proper starts in Part I with an overview of 
diversity of values in contemporary society. It is argued that it is 
important for education to promote the understanding of this 
diversity, but that this does not preclude an attempt at the same 
time to promote a shared understanding of morality. 
Consideration of the work of the 'National Forum for Values in 
Education and the Community' is used to show a way of narrowing 
down the whole field of values to a particular conception of 
morality. 
Part 11 looks further into this idea of 'morality in the narrow 
sense' and considers what kind of language - one of norms or one 
of virtues - is appropriate for articulating it. The discussion is 
made more concrete by reference to attitudes to violence. It is 
concluded that while both kinds of language are important, a 
language of norms has a certain priority in the articulation of 
morality in the narrow sense. 
Part III defends the idea of a morality of norms against some 
recent criticisms, and considers the public, including the 
educational, role of moral norms. Part IV tries to show how the 
understanding of morality which has been outlined can have some 
motivational force and be seen to have some authority. It is 
argued that the promotion of an understanding of morality, 
conceived in the way outlined, can appropriately be seen as a task 
for citizenship ed ucation. In an Epilogue it is suggested that the 
promotion of the public understanding of morality is a 
contribution to the moral development of society. 
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Preface 
'It is important that as few people as possible should think about 
morality - consequently it is very important that morality should 
not one day become interesting. ' 
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, section 228 (Nietzsche 1973) 
In the past few years I have written a number of pieces on or 
related to moral education. 1 Some of these have since been 
published, others are in the pipeline, some I shall probably no 
longer use in their original form. Many of these pieces have been 
written in response to specific requests for conference papers or 
chapters for edited volumes. They have therefore been one-off 
pieces, each intended to stand by itself. 
However, I often saw what I was doing as fitting into certain 
continuing wider concerns. Among these were: that a certain 
strand of thought about morality - one which emphasised 
principles, reason, and a sense of obligation - was being too easily 
downplayed in much recent writing on moral education; that much 
recent thinking about moral education was too individualistic, 
paying too little attention to the social dimensions of morality; and 
(academic concerns apart) that teachers were getting far too little 
preparation for their role in moral education. 
In some cases in the last three years or so I have written one or 
other of these pieces with the idea in mind that it could form a 
chapter of the doctoral thesis for which I was registered. But 
alongside this there was an occasional doubt as to whether the 
various pieces did actually fit together. 
What particularly raised this doubt in my own mind was a piece I 
wrote for the Essay Competition run by the Philosophy of 
Education Society of Great Britain. The theme that year was: 
I My first forays into the topics of this thesis were still earlier: 
Haydon(1986) and (1987b). I would not now entirely endorse the 
position I took then, and have only briefly referred to one of those 
pieces in this thesis. 
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Education, Law and Morality. I took advantage of the anonymity 
of the judging process (at least in its early stages, I presume) to 
argue a certain case without being sure how far I wanted to 
endorse it. I supported the idea that morality should be seen as 
analogous to law, conscious in doing this that I was arguing against 
a very widespread tendency in recent moral philosophy, and 
philosophical writing on moral education, to reject lawlike 
conceptions of morality. 
(No prize was awarded in the Essay Competition that year; the 
judges concluded that no essay had sufficiently addressed all 
three elements of the theme. In the case of my own piece I have 
no problem agreeing. My essay said a lot about morality, not 
much about law, and still less about education. In this thesis there 
is still a lot about morality and not much about law, but I trust 
there will be rather more about education. If that is not apparent 
from the list of contents, it is because education is in my mind, 
and often referred to, throughout. ) 
Although I was able to submit an anonymous essay without being 
sure whether I agreed with it, it was still true that I had written 
it; and that I had said or written other things which hardly 
seemed consistent. In my own teaching in a course on moral 
education I had treated the idea that morality is a system of rules 
as a starting point to be put on one side before moving on to more 
interesting matters, about caring and virtues for instance. And I 
had written in a TES article that 'because these are the values of 
your society' is no answer to the pupil who asks how we can know 
that something is right. (For that I was charged by the journalist 
Melanie Phillips with being a relativist whose lack of clear 
guidance was likely to lead pupils into Nazism - see Chapter 11 
below. ) But here in the competition essay I was arguing not only 
that morality can be seen as a system of rules but also that the 
authority that these rules carry is the authority of society. 
Meanwhile I had also been invited to be a member of the Forum 
for Values in Education and the Community set up by the School 
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Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA). 2 This Forum came 
up with a list of values which it claimed were shared across the 
whole community. Predictably, many philosophers of education 
were sceptical about the whole procedure; to quote from a volume 
which I shall often refer to in this thesis: 'the Forum sells morality 
and moral education short by appearing to rely on empirical 
evidence for claims that can only rest on ethical and philosophical 
argument' (TRAW p. 142; see below). But I went along with the 
Forum's statement of Values; I even defended it in various 
seminars. I went along too with some of the official educational 
jargon, giving talks to PGCE students about spiritual, moral, social 
and cultural development - though always, I liked to think, with a 
certain critical distance. 
Well, perhaps I was just being postmodernist, changing hats and 
keeping an ironic detachment. But was there actually a consistent 
position behind all of this? Perhaps the only way to find out was 
to see if I could put it all together into a thesis. At one time I 
thought that the various pieces I had written could simply form so 
many chapters of the thesis. I had even toyed with the idea that 
perhaps, given postmodernism, a thesis didn't have to present a 
linear argument. Perhaps it could be a juxtaposition of different 
perspectives, open to the reader to take them in any order. 
Convention, howeverý has won out (at least as regards the form of 
the thesis). Simply juxtaposing different pieces might well have 
left the reader wondering why I thought they fitted together at 
all. 3 There is a good deal here of pieces I have already written for 
other purposes, but there has been a lot of rewriting and new 
writing too. I have avoided very much direct overlap with my 
own Teaching about Values: A New Approach (Haydon 1997), but 
2Acronyms and abbreviations used in this thesis are listed in the 
Glossary. 
3 It would also have failed to meet the criteria for a London University 
PhD. The relevant part of the regulations states: 
'The thesis shall .... be an 
integrated whole and present a coherent 
argument; 
[A series o f papers, whether published or otherwise, is not acceptable as 
a thesis; work already published .... may be included only if it forms an 
integral part of the thesis and is in the same format as the rest of the 
thesis... '] 
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I refer to it (abbreviated as TA 1ý in cases where points made only 
briefly here are ones which I have taken further there. 
More or less concurrently with the bulk of the work on this thesis 
I was preparing a monograph for the Philosophy of Education 
Society of Great Britain4. In that I asked whether and how schools 
should be trying, through moral education, to respond to a 
perceived problem of violence in society. 5 Originally I thought the 
monograph on violence would be a quite separate work from this 
thesis; in the event there is considerable overlap between the two, 
partly through time constraints in preparing the monograph, and 
partly because of convergence in my own thinking on the themes 
of the two pieces of work. What I have said about violence in the 
monograph is less developed than I would like it to be; I would 
have hesitated to put it forward as part of a doctoral thesis on 
violence. I did, however, find it interesting to explore the kind of 
language that is used in public discourse about violence; and since 
that exploration, underdeveloped though it is, serves as an 
illustration of a more general theme pursued here, I have 
incorporated some of the material on violence into this thesis. 
Overall, then, though I have not done the 
amount of material in this thesis which is 
already published or written prior to 1998 
of newly written material. (I append at th 
note on my sources within my own work 
awaiting publication. ) 
calculations, I think the 
recycled from work 
is less than the amount 
e end a more detailed 
either published or 
As regards my subject matter, if this has to be encapsulated in a 
single brief phrase (for purposes of library classification, for 
instance) then a phrase I have already used, 'moral education, 
will be the least misleading label available, but I could also make 
a case for the label 'citizenship education'. The notion of moral 
4 Values, Virtues and Violence: Education and the Public Understanding 
of Morality. Published as a Special Issue of the Journal of Philosophy of 
Education Vol. 33,1, 1999 (Haydon 1999a) and forthcoming as a book 
from Blackwell. 
5 My interest in this question stemmed in part from some earlier work I 
did on peace education for the Oxford Project for Peace St udies. 
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education will probably carry certain baggage in the reader's 
view, and by the end of the thesis he or she may well feel that I 
have simply left some of that baggage by the roadside, while 
picking up other assorted items along the way. I shall have to 
define my own field of concern. I label this field by the phrase 
I public understanding of morality', and I shall also use later the 
term 'moral development of society'. I am emphasising certain 
public and social aspects of morality, and arguing that schools 
have an important role in promoting these; citizenship education 
would be an appropriate area of the curriculum in which to 
promote them. Pragmatically, since citizenship education is going 
to be a part of the National Curriculum for England, while moral 
education is not (at least not under that name), my ideas are more 
likely to make a difference if presented under the former label. 6 
For the moment, I shall say that my concern is primarily with 
cognitive aspects of moral education and - what is not the same - 
of education about morality. I take it that any full account of 
moral education must pay attention to aspects of people's 
experience which are not only cognitive in character. So in 
concentrating on cognitive aspects I am in this respect narrowing 
my focus, acknowledging that there is much that needs to be said 
about moral education that I am not attempting to say in this 
thesis. But I am also in a different way attempting to broaden the 
focus of attention beyond that of much writing on moral 
education. I believe that the conditions of life in a plural 
democratic society make cognitive demands on citizens in the area 
of morality (a deliberately vague phrase which awaits unpacking) 
which are not always recognised but which need to be taken very 
seriously within education: the implications of this may also go 
beyond formal education in the sense of schooling. 
The term 'morality' is not itself, of course, unproblematic. There 
are various forms of scepticism abroad about morality; some of 
6 My experience at a conference on citizenship education at the 
Institute of Education in July 1999, at which I presented some of my 
thinking about the public understanding of morality, suggested that 
many teachers may agree with me that citizenship education must not 
lose sight of (ideas abotit) morality. 
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these might undermine the idea that there can be such a thing as 
the public understanding of morality. I can best respond to such 
problems by taking them up in the course of my discussion of the 
kind of understanding that is desirable. The bulk of the thesis, in 
fact, attempts to unpack a notion of morality, 'in the narrow 
sense', which is, so to speak, suitable for public consumption and 
for educational use. 
That aim impinges on my choice of literature, in which I have 
been pragmatically selective. I have not neglected the recent and 
important turn within much moral philosophy towards virtue 
ethics and an ethic of care, but for my purposes there is a good 
deal of older work - that is, work published in the seventies and 
eighties - which is still relevant and on which I have drawn. 
Again, as regards the philosophical literature on moral education I 
have not tried to give a comprehensive review but have referred 
to trends which are common within that literature. I have found 
one recent collection of papers particularly useful as a reference 
point, as it seems to me pretty representative of mainstream 
writing on moral education within recent British philosophy of 
education: Teaching Right and Wrong, edited by Standish and 
Smith (referred to frequently as TRAW). 
This thesis is intended as a contribution to the literature of 
philosophy of education and also, though secondarily, to that of 
moral philosophy. In so far as I claim to have made an original 
contribution, it is in relation to the philosophy of education 
literature. Here to some degree I am trying to counter the 
tendency in much recent philosophical writing on moral education 
- influenced by MacIntyre and other neo-Aristotelians - to turn to 
virtue ethics. I am not, however, trying to overturn that 
tendency; it is rather a matter of redressing the balance. 
It should be clear by now that the quotation from Nietzsche (who 
will make only a few more appearances in this thesis) at the head 
of the Preface is not so much a motto for my thesis as an anti- 
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Motto. 7 It expresses almost the opposite of what I want to argue. 
It is important especially now, in a plural, democratic, late 
modern society that as many people as possible should think 
about morality. And, despite Nietzsche, I think morality is 
interesting and that education should treat it as such, and not try 
to avoid the topic. 
Outline of argument 
In the Prologue I present a comparison between two ideas: the 
public understanding of science and the public understanding of 
morality. Though nothing in the rest of the thesis is intended to 
turn on this comparison, it serves to introduce and raise questions 
about the understanding of morality which the general public has 
or might have. Should education be trying to promote a shared 
understanding of morality? And if so, what particular 
understanding is that to be? 
In Part I emphasise the context of value-diversity in which 
thinking about moral education, and values education more 
generally, has to go on. I argue that it is important for education 
to promote understanding of this diversity, but I also ask whether 
there could at the same time be a shared understanding of 
morality. Referring to the SCAA Forum (mentioned above) I 
show one way in which one might distinguish seeking a common 
morality from simply seeking common values. 
In Part 11 1 first, in Chapter Four, outline a particular - and 
familiar - conception of morality which is putatively a conception 
which could be widely shared: morality in the narrow sense, or 
morality(n). I then consider what kind of language is appropriate 
for the articulation of morality(n) as a publicly shared conception 
of morality. This discussion arises largely from the recent 
advocacy in the literature of the merits of an ethics of virtue 
rather than an ethics of norms. (It is also interesting to consider 
whether a language confined to rights-talk could do the job of 
7 Long after I first used this quotation in a draft of this Preface, 
Anthony O'Hear used the same quotation in the Booknotes section of 
Philosophy (Vol. 73, no. 285, July 1998, p. 525). Unlike myself, I think 
O'Hear is inclined to agree with Nietzsche's point. 
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morality(n), but since this discussion is not central to my main 
argument I have put it in an Appendix. ) Having shown some of 
the problems with virtue- language, I try to illustrate with 
reference to the particular example of our discourse about 
violence that we cannot dispense with either a language of norms 
or a language of virtues. 
At this stage it still seems to me that a language of norms has a 
certain priority in the articulation of morality(n). But since norms 
- or rules and principles - have come in for heavy criticism in the 
recent pro-virtue literature, a positive defence of their role is 
needed. This is the task of Part 111.1 reply to a number of 
objections to rules, consider the role that rules and principles can 
play in moral thought and discourse, and attempt an overview of 
the public functions of moral norms. 
I take the arguments of Parts 11 and III to be sufficient to allow 
me, in the remainder of the thesis, to assume a language of norms, 
even though some of the questions remaining would arise for 
morality(n) in whatever language it is articulated. In Part IV I 
consider a group of questions which need to be answered if 
morality(n) is to be understood (not just as an intellectual 
construct but) as a social institution which can be effective. Why 
should anyone take notice of it, as it bears on their own conduct? 
Does it incorporate any understanding of moral motivation? Can it 
be seen as having any authority? And how far can we suppose 
that there could be agreement on its content? In answering these 
questions I begin to show the role that schools can have in 
promoting and maintaining morality(n), arguing that there is a 
role here for citizenship education in particular. 
In the Epilogue, as a less pragmatic conclusion, I try to show how 
education which promotes the public understanding of morality 
can be seen as contributing to the moral development of society. 
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Glossary of acronyms and abbreviations 
Education as a field of study is beset with acronyms which its 
academic practitioners need to know (though moral philosophers 
do not). Clearly one way of making an original contribution to 
knowledge in this field is to add a few more. Here is my 
annotated list of acronyms and abbreviations which occur in this 
thesis. Only those marked with an asterisk are my inventions; the 
rest are genuine (i. e. someone else's invention). 
WEE The Department for Education and 
Employment 
ERA The Education Reform Act of 1988 (applying 
to England and Wales). 
GTC The General Teaching Council, a professional 
body for teachers, established in recent 
legislation, and due to begin its work in 
September 2000. 
*morality(n) This is simply a short way of writing the 
words 'morality (in the narrow sense)'. What 
this means is explained in the text (see 
especially Chapter 4). 
NCC National Curriculum Council (defunct): set up 
to oversee the National Curriculum which was 
established by ERA. 
OFSTED The Office for Standards in Education - the 
agency overseeing the inspection of schools. 
PGCE Postgraduate Certificate in Education: A one- 
year course by which graduates enter the 
teaching profession - often without any 
systematic preparation for their role in 
values education. 
PSE Personal and Social Education: a recognised 
area of the curriculum in most British schools, 
not always separately timetabled, not 
statutory, not taught by specialists, not 
assessed, and (therefore? ) not always taken 
seriously. 
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PSHE Personal, Social and Health Education: as 
above, plus the explicit incorporation of health 
education. At the time of writing 'PSHE' may 
well be the commoner term, and is likely to 
become standard following QCA and WEE 
documents published in1999 which stress the 
importance of PSHE (though without laying 
down statutory requirements for it). 
*PUM The public understanding of morality (by 
analogy with PUS). 
*(The) PUMA An imaginary beast: The Public Understanding 
of Morality Authority, charged with the 
promotion of PUM. Given the complications of 
distinguishing, in an earlier draft, what I was 
arguing in my own right from what I was 
arguing that the PUMA would argue, its role 
in this thesis is vestigial. 
PUS The public understanding of science (I was 
sceptical about this acronym but have 
seen it in print). 
QCA The Qualifications and Curriculum Authority: 
successor to SCAA. Has continued SCAA's 
work on values education, piloting materials 
in schools. 
RE Religious Education, which some people think 
is the main part of the curriculum in which 
morality should be addressed. 
SCAA The School Curriculum and Assessment 
Authority (defunct). Successor to NCC and the 
School Examinations and Assessment Council 
(SEAQ (defunct). In 1996 SCAA set up the 
National Forum for Values in Education and 
the Community - thereby arguably doing 
something to promote PUM. Succeeded by 
QCA in 1997. 
SCAA Forum The National Forum for Values in Education 
and the Community - as above. This produced 
in 1997 a Statement of Values (sometimes 
referred to below as the SCAA Forum 
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Statement). This, with its Preamble, is 
included here as Appendix 3, and is also 
included, with an introduction by Nick Tate 
and Marianne Talbot, in TRAW. 
SMSC Spiritual, moral, social and cultural 
(development): areas of education which ERA, 
and further legislation of 1992, has required 
teachers and OFSTED to attend to. 
*TA V My own Teaching about Values: A New 
Approach (Haydon 1997). In the present 
thesis I have tried to avoid reproducing 
material from that, but have sometimes 
noted points of contact. 
TES The Times Educational Supplement 
*TRA W Teaching Right and Wrong, Richard Smith & 
Paul Standish (eds), Trentham 1997. A 
recent collection which I often refer to, as 
being a good example of recent British 
philosophical writing about moral education. 
My review of this is included here as 
Appendix 1. 
TTA The Teacher Training Agency: oversees the 
professional training (or education? - see next 
entry) received by entrants into teaching, and 
has funding powers to back up its 
prescriptions. 
UCET Universities Council for the Education of 
Teachers: a body representing the University 
Education Departments which are engaged in 
the professional education (or training? - see 
previous entry) of teachers. 
VEC The Values Education Council of the United 
Kingdom: an umbrella organisation for a 
variety of existing organisations concerned 
with moral education, citizenship education 
and the like. Established 1995. 
*VVV My own Values, Virtues and Violence (Haydon 
I 999a) 
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Prologue: the public understanding of science and 
the public understanding of morality 
I have formed the phrase 'the public understanding of morality' 
by analogy with 'the public understanding of science'. The latter is 
a well-established idea, having led to the establishment of at least 
two University Chairs in the subject (in the Universities of Oxford 
and London) and to regular attempts, not just within educational 
institutions but also in the media, to contribute to such 
understanding. The arguments I want to make in this thesis do 
not depend on any comparison between the public understanding 
of science (PUS) and the public understanding of morality (PUM), 
and everything that comes after this Prologue is intended to stand 
independently of such a comparison. Nevertheless, a comparison 
in this Prologue between the ideas of PUS and PUM will help to 
bring out my area of interest in the thesis. I do not want to say 
that every aspect of the meaning of PUS can be transferred to 
PUM without alteration: there will be disanalogies as well as 
analogies. Even if the reader is not persuaded that the analogies 
are at all strong, I can retain the phrase 'the public understanding 
of morality' as a useful shorthand label. 
Active concern about the public understanding of science rests on 
the beliefs, not only that such understanding is important, but also 
that currently the general public's understanding of science is 
inadequate. Similarly, my investigations in this thesis presuppose 
both that the public understanding of morality is important, and 
that in its current state it is inadequate. As regards inadequacies 
in the understanding of science, one could say that public 
conceptions of science are currently in a confused state, where the 
confusion may be largely a matter of different people having 
different views, but may also in part be a matter of some people 
individually having inconsistent attitudes. There is sometimes a 
considerable faith in science; more often perhaps an unthinking 
acceptance. But there is also considerable scepticism, distrust of 
experts and sometimes hostility, along with a sometimes credulous 
belief in or 'going-along -with' all sorts of pseudo-science or anti- 
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science. (Examples of all kinds can be found in television 
documentaries and magazine programmes. ) 
For morality, there is sometimes an apparently naive belief that 
the answers are perfectly clear (as when confident appeal is made 
to 'absolutes') but also again considerable scepticism, a belief that 
it is all up to the individual, distrust of any claims to moral 
authority, and sometimes the view that morality is of no 
importance alongside the real business of politics, economics or 
whatever. My claim that the public understanding of morality is 
inadequate does not rest on a claim that any particular one of 
these beliefs or attitudes is false; it is rather the claim that this 
confused state of affairs itself is inadequate in a democracy of 
more-or-less educated persons - since to the extent that there is 
this confusion, a society is less able to function as a democracy of 
educated persons. In case that is not enough already to establish 
the claim of importance, I shall come back briefly below to the 
importance of both PUS and PUM; but for the most part I shall 
rely on my arguments in the body of the thesis about the form 
and content of PUM to establish that its current state falls far 
short of what is desirable. 
The idea of comparing PUS and PUM may give rise to an initial 
misunderstanding which I need to clear out of the way. Science is 
often taken not least perhaps in the perception of some of the 
lay public as an area in which objectivity and knowledge are 
above all to be found. It might seem, then, that in order to make 
my comparison stand up I would also have to treat morality as an 
area of objectivity and knowledge - that I would have to defend 
some kind of realist theory of morality. Many people have, of 
course, taken such a view of morality; but at the beginning of a 
thesis it can hardly be adequate either to presume such a view, or 
to set out to defend it in a few paragraphs. Fortunately I do not 
have to do either, because my interest in this Prologue is in 
comparing science and morality as ongoing areas of human 
discourse. 
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Here it might still seem important to know whether some area of 
human discourse has reference to objects existing independently 
of that discourse or not. Science is still perhaps standardly - 
though not without dispute - taken to be referring to objects 
independent of science itself: cells, rocks, planets and so on. And 
the disputes in moral philosophy have often been about whether 
morality has reference to some kind of objects - perhaps values - 
existing independently of moral discourse. Does it make sense to 
address morality as an area of discourse without trying to settle 
such metaethical questions? 
I think it does, because even if values could somehow exist 
independently of discourse, they could not make a difference to 
our lives except through thought and language. 1 To put it in a 
way which admittedly would have to be unpacked at greater 
length in a different kind of thesis (a metaethical one) values do 
not literally push or pull us: our conceptions of values move us. 
Falstaff in Shakespeare's Henry IV (Part 1) was in a sense right 
when he said 'What is honour? a word., though we should expand 
this to say that honour is a concept which can only exist because 
there are language-using beings whose form of life has a place for 
such concepts. This is in no way to deny the force that a value 
such as honour (or justice, or respect for life, or recognition of 
human rights) can have in the world. As Falstaff was well aware 
beneath his cynicism, values can move people to act in ways 
which the biologically -given motivations which we share with 
other animals, by themselves, never could. 
So, values have their effective existence within the realm of 
human discourse. This means that there is a sense in which the 
continued existence of a value depends on its continuing to feature 
in discourse. A notion such as 'human rights', as moral 
philosophers including MacIntyre (1981, p. 67) have pointed out, 
has a history; it is quite a recent and geographically local 
invention (going back only a few centuries, and coming from 
1 Moral discourse does not, of course, refer only to objects whose 
existence is in dispute; it also describes and evaluates things which 
clearly do exist, even if not independently of human understanding: 
actions, emotions and so on. 
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Western Europe), but by now it seems to be pretty firmly 
established in moral and political discourse. On the other hand, in 
certain cultures the concept of honour has ceased to have an 
effective existence. 2 Much the same perhaps applies to chastity. 
What all this is leading to is that talk about values is not incidental 
to their existence; it is their life-blood. 
There is more to be said about the ways in which both science and 
morality function as forms of discourse. Certainly I am taking it 
that PUS is not meant to involve only an understanding of the 
objects which science studies, but also an understanding of the 
activity of science itself; and similarly I take PUM to be at least in 
part an understanding of the human ar ea of discourse and concern 
which we call 'morality. On that basis I can begin to make the 
comparison more detailed. 
Science as a compartment of human thought (if we can allow for 
compartments which may have rather fluid boundaries) depends 
on interpersonal communication and understanding. It is not 
possible that in the history of human thought there could have 
been just one and only one person doing science. I take this to be 
a thoroughly familiar thought, which is common ground among 
modern commentators on science (at least from Popper and Kuhn 
onwards). There is not, so far, anything special to science here; 
the broader point is about any disciplined field of thought and 
inquiry; in a certain sense, it has to be public. The point is 
familiar within philosophy of education and is perhaps especially 
associated with Hirst's (1974) forms of knowledge thesis, but it 
does not commit one to that particular thesis. 
But the fact that a disciplined form of thought and inquiry has to 
be public in the sense of involving interpersonal communication, 
understanding, criticism and so on, does not imply that it must be 
public in the sense of being understood, let alone participated in, 
by the general public. Sub-atomic particle physics is a public form 
of knowledge (in what we might call the epistemo logical sense) 
2 On honour cf. Berger (1983). Further aspects of the diversity of values 
will be taken up in Chapter 1. 
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within which only a small percentage of the population is capable 
of operating. 
There is nothing epistemologically incoherent in the idea of a form 
of knowledge being in fact only accessible to a few; but it is not an 
epistemological worry which motivates the concern for PUS. The 
motivation involves practical concerns which may themselves in 
part be moral ones. One such concern is for the health of science 
itself. While science does not have a direct epistemological 
dependence on its being understood within a wide rather than a 
narrow public, its continuing existence does depend on the 
continuation of scientific education to a sufficient level for a 
sufficient number of people; and the continuation both of scientific 
education and scientific research may depend practically on the 
degree of understanding of a wide public, since (within a 
democratic political system) science ultimately depends on public 
support for much of its funding. But there is also a concern in the 
other direction, a concern about the public good (where 'public' is 
understood in the broad sense). The public is affected by much 
that goes on under the name of science (while many of the 
practical effects which the public associates with scientific 
advance are directly an outcome of developments in technology 
rather than science as such, the public is not wrong in recognising 
that a great deal of modern technology is dependent on science). 
In some cases the effects on the broader public are matters of its 
material conditions of life (a concern for these underlies at least 
some of the concerns about despoliation of the environment); in 
other cases, as sometimes with advances in medical techniques, 
the effects, quite apart from any material benefits or harms, raise 
moral worries. 
Whatever kind of effect we have in mind, there is a political 
argument for citizens being empowered to make decisions over 
issues that can powerfully affect them; and empowerment, over 
many issues in the modern world, requires an understanding of 
science. So part of the idea behind PUS is that science is too 
important to be the preserve only of experts; the general public 
needs an understanding of science too. I want to say that the 
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same goes for morality; the moral aspects of life are both so all- 
pervasive for individuals, and so inescapable at the public level, 
that morality also is too important to be left to experts. 
At this point it might seem to the reader that the analogy has 
already broken down; it is, after all, something of a commonplace 
in modern liberal philosophical thinking that there are no moral 
3 experts. Nevertheless, there is a kind of understanding of 
morality which is to a large extent now the preserve of experts, 
and ought to be less so. I shall try to bring that out by pursuing 
the PUS/PUM analogy further. 
Morality as a public form of thought 
One difficulty in pursuing the analogy is that I cannot assume an 
uncontested notion of morality at the beginning of my argument. 
At this stage I have to proceed, so far as possible, on the basis of 
assumptions (my own) about the nature of morality which I shall 
only later focus attention on directly. First, then, I have already 
said that I am approaching morality as an area or form of human 
discourse. This would, of course, be controversial if I were 
claiming that there is nothing to morality but human discourse, 
but I am not making that claim. Even apart from the metaethical 
questions about realism, I do not want to deny that there is much 
that we may be concerned with when we speak of morality - most 
particularly, how people behave, as well as aspects of their 
attitudes and responses to others - which is hardly captured, and 
certainly not covered exhaustively, by reference to public 
language. Nevertheless, treating morality as a public form of 
thought does not exclude many, if any, of the positions that are 
likely to be encountered in current debates in moral philosophy 
and in philosophical writing about moral education. 
1) It does not exclude the claim that the public, linguistic, aspects 
of morality rest on certain capacities or tendencies which are pre- 
linguistic (plausibly, ones which have evolved by natural 
selection). That there may be a pre-linguistic, perhaps pre-human, 
3 Within philosophy of education, cf. e. g. White, J. (1973), and White, P. 
(1983). 
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basis no more undermines the nature of morality as a public form 
of discourse than would the parallel claim about science 
undermine its similar nature. Science, too, plausibly rests on 
certain pre-linguistic capacities and tendencies (e. g. perceptual 
capacities and, possibly, a tendency to try to make sense of 
experience and to investigate the new which may well not be 
peculiar to the human species). But a pre-linguistic basis for 
science would not itself be science, and a pre-linguistic basis for 
morality would not be morality. There is an innocuous sense in 
which both science and morality can plausibly be seen as cultural 
constructs on the basis of biologically -given human capacitieS. 4 
(There are also, of course, other senses in which the claims that 
these are cultural constructs may be far from anodyne. ) 
2) Treating morality as unintelligible without reference to 
language, hence to something publicly shared, does not commit me 
to some particular position within many of the current debates in 
moral philosophy. For instance, the current state of debate is 
often represented as a controversy between, on the one hand, 
theories which give a large role to rational, articulated thought in 
terms of rules or principles, and on the other, conceptions which 
put weight on perception, affect and motivation, often crystallised 
around the notion of virtues. I shall come back to this supposed 
dichotomy in Part II; but for the moment, lest it should appear 
that in emphasising public language I am lending weight to the 
'rules and principles' side of the debate, it is worth pointing out 
that the 'virtue theorists' (overlapping with communitarians) have 
to emphasise the public, shared nature of the ethical life. Both 
sides in this sparring are seeing morality as a phenomenon of 
social, language-using beings (as is very clearly the case with 
Aristotle), albeit when they have occasion to focus directly on 
language they may pick out different functions of language and 
highlight different vocabularies. 
4 See many of the writings of Mary Midgley. As this paragraph 
suggests, I would myself wish to take a broadly naturalistic view of 
morality (in common with many recent writers, such as Gibbard and 
Blackburn), but my arguments for the promotion of a shared public 
understanding of morality are not intended to rule out other views. 
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Indeed, if either side in this debate were able to claim that 
morality is not a public form of thought it would be the 'principles' 
side, or at least one tendency within that side of the debate. One 
might understand Kant to be saying that there is innate in each 
human individual (qua rational) the capacity to think and to act 
morally; that this capacity does not have to be learned from 
experience (indeed could not be learned from experience, but only 
by the exercise of reason); and that the capacity can be exercised 
by an individual even if all around him or her are failing to 
exercise it. Thus morality is not necessarily social, in that a single 
individual can think morally and can consciously act, or fail to act, 
morally. Now, such a thesis is certainly controversial, in more 
than one way, and recent thinkers who have considered 
themselves to be in certain ways Kantian have moved towards a 
more explicitly social interpretation of morality. 5 But for current 
purposes I think all we need to note is that an individual, in order 
to think morally, has to have the language in which to think, and 
that language must have been acquired, which presupposes a 
social environment in which the language is used. (A point which 
I shall not argue further here because I think it will hardly be 
controversial, but which might be supported in different ways 
both by empirical psychological arguments and by broadly 
Wittgensteinian philosophical arguments). 
3) If treating morality as a public form of thought does not 
commit me to a particular position within current debates in 
moral philosophy, the same goes for philosophical debates about 
moral education. The term 'public forms of thought' may indeed 
call to mind for certain readers Hirst's theory of the forms of 
knowledge, as I have already acknowledged, but it fits equally 
well with his later, recent, view about social practices (e. g. Hirst 
1993,1998); and the reference to language may call to mind some 
of the philosophical writings about moral education of say, R. M. 
Hare or John Wilson. It should already be clear that my general 
approach does not carry with it a commitment to particular views 
such as these. 
Hare, Rawls and Habermas are three of the best-known cases. 
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There is, however, one suggestion carried by phrases such as 'a 
public form of thought' or 'an area or form of discourse' which I do 
need explicitly to disclaim. It is carried more by the word 'a' than 
by anything else in the phrases. 'A public form of thought' 
suggests that morality is a distinct compartment of human affairs. 
This may not be right. Perhaps we should be talking about a large 
set of forms of thought; perhaps whatever form of thought we 
might pick out under the term 'morality' will be found to overlap 
with other existing forms of thought. I do not want to align 
myself with the early Hirstian claim that moral understanding is a 
distinct form of knowledge; or, for instance, with Hare's early 
claim that there is such a thing as the language of morals (Cf. 
Stout 1988 p. 60). 1 shall later argue that we can distinguish what 
some have called 'morality in the narrow sense' from the broader 
field of the ethical. It might turn out that morality in the narrow 
sense is something like a distinct form of public language (a 
distinct discourse, in one of the meanings of that term); but if so, 
that will not exhaust the forms of discourse which are in some 
sense moral or ethical. For the moment, in referring to morality as 
a public form of thought I do not mean to imply sharp boundaries 
or a lack of interpenetration between different areas of human 
thought. 
So far, then, no reason has emerged for not treating morality, like 
science, as a public form of thought (so long as 'a' is not 
emphasised). Since my thesis is concerned with the public 
understanding of morality, it might appear that already I have 
established enough. A public form of thought cannot exist without 
understanding (as I have already said about science); so the public 
understanding of morality must already exist. 6 But in that case, 
what is going to be the subject-matter of this thesis? 
6 Even if we leave aside the possibility of tacit, non-linguistic understanding, 
the fact that the public discourse of morality involves language should be 
enough to establish that it must involve understanding - at some level - since 
human use of language depends on persons understanding the sounds they are 
uttering, at least as the normal case, where purely reactive parrot-fashion 
utterances are the exception. 
That we can make some sort of sense of the notion of understanding here, even 
if we are not able adequately to articulate it, seems to be one of the points at 
issue in the debate over artificial intelligence and machine consciousness 
between John Searle and his opponents. I take it that Searle's Chinese room is 
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Some detailed comparisons 
Here the comparison with science may be helpful again. From the 
fact that science, as a public form of thought, depends on intra- 
and interpersonal understanding, nothing directly follows about 
the extent to which the public understanding of science (where 
'public' = 'the general public') is a reality. To assess how far the 
general public has an understanding of science we would need to 
make a number of distinctions, including at least the following: 
(1) There is a distinction in type Of understanding, on the 
dimension of theoretical/practical. Practising scientists can do 
their science; lay persons will in some cases be able to understand 
what is done without being able to do it themselves. 
(2) There is a related distinction between verbal and non-verbal 
understanding. Though the focus in this thesis throughout will be 
on what is or can be verbalised, tacit, non-verbal understanding 
needs to be recognised also. In science this will include (in 
different ways in different branches of science) motor skills in 
manipulating equipment, and skills of judgement in interpreting 
evidence. 
(3) There is the distinction between knowing (or accepting) that 
something is so, and understanding why it is so. Within any 
sphere of science, much at a given time will be taken as 
established; in effect, as 'fact', even though philosophically such 
claims can be questioned. What is taken as established fact can be 
used in further work, and the individual using it does not 
an example of a device which responds to language with language but without 
understanding. We could imagine a purpose built 'morality room' (or 
computer; perhaps even a hand-held 'personal moral organiser'). If the input 
to the room on a particular occasion consisted of the sentence: 'I am proposing 
to borrow money from my friend and shall promise to pay it back though I 
know I shall never be able to' and the response from the room were 'You ought 
not to do that' I would say that there is no genuine moral thinking going on 
here, because the device which receives the input and produces the output 
does not understand the terms used. I suppose some proponents of hard Al 
would differ; but nothing in the overall argument of this thesis tu rns on that 
point. 
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necessarily have to understand the basis on which it is 
established. Much of the understanding which lay persons have of 
science will be of this nature. 
(4) There are distinctions between different spheres within 
science. Scientists have their specialisms. The situation of certain 
lay persons will be analogous. Even among informed intelligent 
general readers, some may have some grasp of the debates around 
quantum theory but little notion of evolutionary explanation, and 
vice versa. 
(5) There is a distinction (again without a sharp boundary) 
between the understanding required to work within a field, or 
indeed to understand findings within that field; and the 
understanding of the nature of the whole enterprise. Most 
practising scientists are not philosophers of, historians of or 
sociologists of science; philosophers, historians and sociologists of 
science are not usually practitioners of science. Practising 
scientists do not necessarily have an overall view of the nature of 
science. 
Cutting across all of these distinctions, there will be the general 
distinction in degree of understanding; there are always likely to 
be shades of difference between having a full understanding of X 
and having no understanding of X. 
All of these distinctions feed into the attempt to distinguish 
between different publics. It remains true that we can distinguish 
between the body of scientists, among whom the 'public form of 
thought' which is science actually operates, and the general or lay 
public, who may or may not understand what is going on. But we 
can also see now that there is going to be room for more fine- 
grained distinctions. So the questions of how much understanding 
of science the general public has, and how much it needs, are 
clearly going to be complex ones to address. I am not going to 
address them any further in this thesis. But analogous questions 
can be raised about morality, and I see no reason in advance to 
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suppose that these are less complex. To begin with, let me see 
how far the same distinctions apply. 
(1) The distinction between practical and theoretical 
understanding seems to apply to morality, but with a difference. 
We are likely to think that fewer people can do science than can 
have some scientific understanding; the practitioners are in the 
minority. In morality, perhaps it is the other way round; more or 
less everyone, we may think, can in some sense 'do' morality, 
think and act morally; theoretical understanding may be harder to 
come by. This difference may be partly accounted for by the next 
distinction. 
Distinction (2), between verbal and non-verbal understanding, 
clearly applies in some sense to morality. Indeed it is a familiar 
theme in recent moral philosophy (anticipated by Aristotle) that 
the understanding involved in morality is not exhausted by the 
kind of articulated verbal understanding displayed in rehearsing 
rules or principles to oneself or in proposing solutions to moral 
dilemmas (cf. Blum 1994). Appraisal of a situation, empathy with 
another, and the practical wisdom exercised in seeing what is to 
be done, are often not verbally articulated. In the case of science, 
it is likely to be only the practitioners, not the lay persons, who 
have a non-verbal understanding of their subject-matter. In 
morality perhaps it is different. It may be that many people - 
ordinary moral agents - have practical moral capacities even 
though their ability to verbalise about these is limited. 
However, we should not simply assume that this is so. How many 
people are strong on moral sensitivity and practical wisdom? 
Perhaps not all that many. In any case, part of the burden of this 
thesis will be that in contemporary conditions sensitivity and 
practical wisdom, however vital, are not all that is needed; there is 
a need for a more articulated understanding also. 
Distinction (3) seems also to have an analogue. Corresponding to 
knowledge (or acceptance) of established scientific fact will be, 
presumably, knowledge (or acceptance) that, say, something is 
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wrong. Here the whole question of whether morality has the kind 
of objectivity that can permit talk of knowledge may seem to raise 
problems; however, for the purposes of this present comparison I 
think these need not detain us. What is taken to be established in 
science is not in principle beyond dispute; the distinction between 
taking something as so, and being able to say why it is so, remains. 
Similarly the distinction between taking it that murder is wrong, 
and being able to say why it is wrong. And, as with science, one 
can ask how far it is important to be able to say why something is 
SO. If the lay person accepts that the universe started with a big 
bang, does she have to be able to give the evidence and reasoning 
behind this conclusion? Perhaps the answer is that for some 
purposes it may not matter, for others it may. We can ask a 
similar question in the moral sphere. Will it be all right, for 
instance, if the lay person accepts that she should tolerate other 
people of whose lifestyles she disapproves, without being able to 
say why? I am interested, among other things, in how much and 
what kind of understanding the general public needs of such 
matters. 
Distinction (4) may at first sight seem not to apply. Some people 
think of morality as a seamless web. Yet it does seem possible to 
speak of different areas of morality: interpersonal morality; 
political morality; professional ethics, and so on. Perhaps someone 
who is accomplished in some areas is not necessarily accomplished 
in others. 
Distinction (5) seems clearly to apply. People who can in some 
sense 'do' morality, or think and act morally, do not necessarily 
have an overview of the whole 'business' of morality. There are 
people who make morality a special object of study - philosophers 
in the West from Ancient Greece onwards, then theologians, and 
more recently in addition a variety of psychologists, sociologists 
and anthropologists. Such people may indeed have a degree and 
kind of understanding of morality which the general public does 
not have. (This does not, just by itself, imply that the degree and 
kind of understanding which the 'experts' have is more worth 
having; still less does it imply that the 'experts', even within the 
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terms of the language they themselves use, are morally better 
people. ) As in the case of science, there is unlikely to be a sharp 
difference in understanding between those who study the nature 
of morality and everyone else. Nevertheless, there is a sense in 
which there are, if not moral experts, experts about morality - 
including people who have studied moral philosophy. That is why 
it makes sense to argue, for morality as for science, that 
understanding of the area is too important to be the preserve of 
the experts. 
Enough understanding, but not too much? 
Within science, we might reasonably expect that there would be 
some positive correlation between having the capacity to practise 
within some area of science, and having a synoptic overview of 
the nature of science as such: that it would tend to be that the 
people who are highly competent at working with scientific ideas 
(perhaps in a particular field) will also have a higher than average 
understanding of the nature of science. (Of course, there will be 
exceptions). In the case of morality, it is not clear that there will 
be such a correlation, and the idea is not infrequently encountered 
that the study of the nature of morality may be a corrupting 
influence on the practice of morality and the everyday practical 
kind of understanding of moral ideas which that practice involves 
(e. g. Baier, A. 1985 pp. 207 ff. ). There is a possibility - to put it 
no more strongly at this stage - that too much reflection on the 
practice will undermine the practice itself. (This seems to have 
been part of what Nietzsche had in mind in the passage quoted in 
the Preface; a related point is made by Williams, 1985, Ch. 9). 
Here is perhaps an important difference between the position of 
those who argue for PUS, and the position of those, like myself, 
who want to argue for pUM. 7 The advocates of PUS may well have 
confidence in the positive value of science, and confidence also 
that an increase in the public understanding of science will be 
good for science. One may be less confident that an increase in the 
public understanding of morality will be good for morality. 
71 very much favour PUS too, but I am not practically engaged in 
arguing for it. 
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Consider now a comparison between a certain kind of science 
education and a certain kind of moral education. On one view of 
science education, it is necessary for everyone to be introduced to 
a selection of what I have called above the 'established facts' of 
science. The selection of facts may be made on broadly 
instrumental terms, with a view perhaps to what is necessary for 
an understanding of contemporary society, and perhaps also to 
what is necessary if an individual is to function as an economic 
unit within that society. On this picture a deeper, and more 
reflective and critical, understanding of the nature of science itself 
will hardly be necessary for the majority of people. In fact it 
might even be counterproductive, as introducing a degree of 
scepticism about claims built on scientific expertise. Perhaps it is 
better that the majority of people, who are always likely to 
remain non-scientists, should take what scientists say on trust. (I 
shall label this the naive view of science education). 
Most science educators (in my experience and reading, though that 
may not constitute a representative sample) would not subscribe 
to such a view. Nor would the advocates of PUS. If one is serious 
about education - indeed, if one is serious about understanding - 
one will accept that education and understanding bring with them 
the possibility of a reflective critical stance. Once there is 
reflection on the nature of science, then there will be room for 
alternative interpretations of it, and for debate between these. 
For instance, there are voices from within the sociology and 
history of science which might encourage a degree of scepticism 
about the objectivity of scientific claims, which may not be at all 
what most working scientists would endorse. 
A campaign for the public understanding of science cannot 
realistically consist in the transmission, without challenge, of the 
understanding of science which is held by working scientists 
themselves - even if there is no disagreement among them. Once 
the attempt is made to equip a wider public for a reflective 
understanding of the nature of science, the debates about its 
nature cannot be closed off from that public. Presumably the 
30 
advocates of PUS think that this wider reflective and critical 
consciousness about science is welcome or, if not welcome, at least 
a price worth paying. 
To summarise, the ends aimed at in the promotion of the public 
understanding of science are not so clear that they can be taken 
for granted, so that only means need be considered. In particular, 
there is the question of finding the balance between, on the one 
hand, promoting an understanding of the diversity of existing 
conceptions and views of science, with all the controversies 
around them, and, on the other hand, promoting one common 
understanding of science. And in so far as it is decided that one 
common understanding of science should be promoted, there is 
the question of what this understanding will be, how it will be 
arrived at, and what kind of authority will be claimed for it. Will 
it, for instance, be put across as indubitably the correct 
understanding of science, or as one simply fastened on for 
pragmatic reasons? 
I do not, for my purposes, need to pursue these questions. But 
it is my contention that any proposal to promote the public 
understanding of morality would have to consider similar 
questions. Should education be seeking to promote an 
understanding of the existing diversity of views about morality? 
Should it as well - or instead - be trying to promote one common 
view of morality? If the latter, what view is this to be? These, 
roughly, are the questions I shall take up in this thesis. 
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Part I 
Diversity, understanding and the 
common values 
search for 
Part I emphasises the context of value-diversity in which thinking 
about moral education, and values education more generally, has 
to go on. I argue that it is important for education to promote 
understanding of this diversity, but I also ask whether there could 
at the same time be a shared understanding of morality. 
Referring to the SCAA Forum I show one way in which one might 




Diversity of values 
Diversity of values is something frequently referred to in 
discussions of education in contemporary society, but less often 
analysed. Yet it is not possible to go far in asking what form 
education should take in relation to values without considering 
this diversity. As a preliminary to all that will follow, I shall here 
take an overview of diversity of values, and begin to look at ways 
in which education has responded to it. I shall be concerned above 
all with cautioning against an over-simple conception of the 
nature of the diversity with which we have to deal. 
One relevant kind of diversity is in terminology. For instance (to 
use an example which will become especially relevant as the 
argument proceeds) there is in educational discourse now 
considerable confusion around the terms 'moral education' and 
t values education' (cf. TAV p. 119). Sometimes they may be used 
interchangeably; sometimes they may be used with an 
acknowledgement, tacit or explicit, that 'values education' is the 
wider term, but also with a sense that moral education is central; 
but also sometimes the term 'values education' may be used 
without any sense that there is within it some more particular 
field of 'moral education' to be marked out. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the whole field of values is broader 
than the field of morality (which in turn may be understood in 
broader or narrower ways, as we shall see later). If we are 
focusing on diversity in values then part of the diversity is that 
there are different kinds of values, not all of which are in any way 
constitutive of morality; it is appropriate, then, to start with the 
term 'values' in this chapter. In any case, there are pragmatic 
reasons for starting with the language of values. One reason is 
just that the term 'values' is becoming increasingly common in 
educational discourse (as in the title of the National Forum for 
Values in Education and the Community, of which I shall have 
more to say later); it is unlikely now to go away. Another is that 
for certain practical purposes the very breadth and vagueness of 
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the term 'values' may be desirable; if, for instance, one wants to 
get people from diverse backgrounds talking to see if they can 
find common ground, one may do so with less appearance of 
prejudicing the outcome if one initially uses the language of 
'values' rather than that of 'morality'. This remains true even if, 
as I shall argue later, morality is precisely what such a discussion 
is likely to converge on. There is a case for structuring a search 
for consensus around the notion of morality, but this needs to be a 
worked-out notion of what morality involves, not just the word. 
Against an over-simple view of diversity 
In considering diversity of values, perhaps the first and most 
important point to be made - which the rest of this chapter will be 
illustrating - is just that it is important not to oversimplify the 
phenomena. Under this heading there are several mistakes to be 
avoided: not only the possible conflation of values and morality, 
but also the ideas, for instance, that value-pluralism comes only 
with multiculturalism, or that it is always a matter of different 
people holding different values. Then also there is the thought 
that diversity of values is a matter only of diversity in the content 
of values, when in fact it also involves differences over the 
interpretation or significance of values. For instance, if two people 
hold incompatible values, this is a first-order instance of diversity. 
There may also be different interpretations of the diversity: for 
instance, one interpretation may have it that, of these two people 
holding incompatible values, one must be right and the other 
wrong; on another interpretation there may be no such distinction 
to be made. The situation is still more complex because the 
distinction between first-order phenomena and second-order 
interpretation is not clear-cut; interpretation already enters into 
the phenomena. When someone says 'this is good' or 'this is 
wrong', some understanding or other of what it is for something to 
be good or to be wrong is already entering tacitly into the thought 
that is articulated in these words. 
Perhaps, though, the best starting-point for a discussion of 
diversity is the simple acknowledgment that values themselves 
are plural. We can see this, first, because we can speak of 
34 
different kinds of values; we may, for instance, distinguish moral 
values from economic values or aesthetic values, political values, 
prudential values or spiritual values. In this kind of classificationg 
'moral', 'aesthetic' and the like figure as adjectives; but a less 
mysterious way of understanding what is at issue here may be to 
treat these distinguishing terms as adverbial, as qualifying the 
way in which we value things. It is not only that there are 
different kinds of thing which we can value - works of art, human 
action, bodily and mental states, forms of social organisation - but 
that we can value things - even the same thing - in different 
ways. To see a work of art as beautiful, to see it as expressing 
something important about human nature, or to see it as a 
valuable investment, are different ways of valuing it. 
The plurality, not just of values, but of kinds of value means that 
(even if a common human nature is assumed) there is room for 
one person to differ from another in the way they balance one 
value against another, and in which kinds of values they tend to 
be most concerned with. Equally, whole societies may tend to 
weight and balance various values in distinctive ways - and this is 
one of the ways in which one culture differs from another. So at 
this admittedly rather abstract level, people who speak of 
universal human values, and people who stress cultural 
differences in values, can both be right. Since there are some 
common factors in the nature of the human species and in human 
needs, vulnerabilities and tendencies - such as the need to eat, 
and vulnerability to physical injury, and perhaps something like a 
tendency to seek meaning in experience - it would be surprising 
if some common values had not come to be recognised (cf., e. g., 
Hampshire 1983, Nussbaum 1993). But equally, the world of 
possible values - the whole range of things that can matter to 
human beings - is so large and complex that it would be surprising 
if different cultures, stressing and weighting values in different 
ways, had not developed. And this is without yet mentioning the 
different ways of interpreting the nature of values, where again 
one kind of interpretation (e. g. a religiously -based one) may be 
predominant in one culture, another in another. 
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In attempting to understand diversity we need constantly to 
move back and forth between recognising commonalities and 
recognising the scope for diversity on the basis of the 
commonalities. Thus, within all the diversity of kinds of values, 
most if not all cultures will make some kind of distinction between 
moral values and other kinds of values. But they will not all draw 
the lines in the same places - Western liberal secular cultures, for 
instance, have gone further than most in drawing lines between 
morality and religion, between morality and law, between 
morality and politics. So anyone who has their own way of 
drawing the lines - even if to them it seems obvious - runs the 
risk of insensitivity to others who do not draw them in the same 
way. Related to this is the fact that, even if people are in the habit 
of thinking of morality as a relatively distinct area, there is room 
for different interpretations of what makes a consideration a 
moral one - of what it is for something to matter morally. 
Consider the following ideas. Moral values are ideals about how 
every person should live his or her life; they are aspirations for 
every individual, regardless of whether others are or are not 
living up to these same ideals, but by the same token we should 
not worry too much if we do not live up to them. Or, moral values 
are constraints on what each of us in society is allowed to do, and 
their point is that we should not unduly interfere with each other; 
these minimal constraints - not killing or injuring each other, not 
breaking contracts, and so on - are not too difficult to live up to, 
and provided we respect them, we are each of us free to live in 
whatever way we like. Or, moral values are whatever values 
anyone takes to be most central and most important in his or her 
own life - hence my moral values may be quite different from 
yours, but we should each of us strive to live according to our own 
moral values. Or, moral values are universal truths about what is 
required if human life is to go well. Or, moral values correspond 
to the commands of an omniscient and omnipotent deity, and it is 
not for mere mortals to ask the reason for them. In a society like 
Britain at the turn of the twenty-first century, none of these ideas 
is entirely unfamiliar. But they are by no means all compatible 
with each other. 
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It would not be an exaggeration to say, in Britain at the turn of the 
twenty-first century, that as a society we are confused about 
morality. We are not sure what kind of phenomenon it is; we are 
not even sure whether we want it or not. Perhaps as a response 
to perceived diversity, there is a tendency towards what we might 
call the 'personalisation' of morality (though the term 'relativism' 
is often, misleadingly, used); this is the idea that morality in the 
end comes down to individual choice or how the individual feels 
about it. Yet at the same time there are appeals to moral 
considerations within public discourse which assume some sort of 
public agreement. Thus during 1999 the British Prime Minister 
has made explicit use of moral language (including the word 
(moral') in relation to the Kosovo war and also in relation to the 
attempt to end poverty in Britain; in the latter context he called 
for a shared moral purpose for Britain. But he also used very 
similar language in response to news reports of pregnancies of 
twelve-year old girls - which is just the kind of case in which 
many people think that what they would call 'moralising', or 
'being judgmental' is the last thing that will improve the situation. 
Any explicit appeal to morality in public discourse seems to 
presuppose that there is something objectivel or at least 
interpersonally agreed to be appealed to: something like, 
metaphorically speaking, a framework or grid to which people are 
expected to conform. But this is at the same time an idea which 
people may react against. Particularly when the moral claims 
made concern something as intimate as sexual behaviour, they can 
easily be construed as attempts to impose or repress. Then some 
people become suspicious of the very idea of morality. Standish 
in TRAW puts the point this way: 
'For many the very word 'morality' has become tainted, suggesting 
the stiff correctness of Victorian behaviour, sexual repression (if 
not hang-ups), timid subjection to conformity, and a certain 
11 use the term informally. I agree with R. M. Hare (1981) that the terms 
6objective' and 'subjective' have led to much confusion in the context of 
morality. I said something about these terms in TAV pp. 35-37. 
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starchiness of tone ....... People do avoid speaking of morality - as if 
something were amiss with it, as with an outmoded ceremony. ' 
(TRA W p. 50; see also TAV pp. 61 ff.; Hare 1992). 2 
Confusion and scepticism about morality puts teachers (who are 
not professionally immune from confusion and scepticism in the 
wider society) in a difficult position. It would be possible to 
argue that the professional response should be to avoid talking 
about morality. It is already the case that the term 'moral 
education', though still common in academic discourse, does not 
figure largely in teachers' own discourse about their role. 
Especially in the light of recent official documentation, teachers 
will be using categories such as TSHE' and 'Citizenship education', 
and within these categories they are very likely to talk about 
'values'; but they might manage largely to avoid talking about 
morality. 
There is indeed something to be said for this strategy, and it is not 
without support within the academic literature. One could, for 
instance, read John White's (1990) arguments, influenced by 
Williams (1985), for going 'beyond moral education' to the 
cultivation of altruistic dispositions, as supporting the playing- 
down of morality. The same could be said for much of the 
literature within philosophy of education which has been 
influenced by virtue ethics and the ethics of care. Neverthless, I 
shall reject the strategy of ignoring morality in education (and 
hoping that it, or at any rate confusion and worries about it, will 
go away). There are at least two reasons for rejecting this 
strategy. One is that, despite the conflicting tendencies in the 
wider society, talk of morality is unlikely actually to go away; in 
which case education, I would claim, has some responsibility to 
2 Very different attitudes to morality can co-exist even within a purely 
secular society. The fact that moral values are for some people 
intimately tied up with religious ones introduces a further dimension of 
diversity. It is one that I consider important, and which I have given 
some attention to in TAV and in Haydon (1999c). It does not figure 
largely in the arguments of this thesis. However, it is important to my 
arguments here that religious believers should be able to recognise the 
relevance - even if in their view not the centrality - to morality of 
questions about harm and benefit within society which can also be 
addressed in secular terms. Otherwise there would not be the possibility 
of convergance on what I shall call 'morality in the narrow sense'. 
38 
address the matter and to prepare students for the confused 
situation they will find. Another is that I think there is good 
reason for trying to maintain and reinforce morality, at least 
when it is understood in a certain way, and that education has an 
important role to play in its maintenance and reinforcement. 
This, though, is to anticipate later arguments. So far I have given 
no argument for any one w ay of narrowing down the whole field 
of values to a focus on any particular conception of morality. And 
it would still be premature to do that, because w ithin my overall 
argument, as well as arguing for just such a focus, I also want to 
stress the importance of an understanding of the diversity across 
the wider field. So for the moment I shall return to diversity of 
values in general. 
Responses to diversity 
It is possible to view the fact of diversity itself in either a positive 
or negative light. It can be seen positively as a valued part of the 
richness of human life; or negatively as a source of conflict (and 
these two views are not incompatible). The balance of views held 
by a person may depend in part on how far that person sees a 
prospect of some common ground being found within the 
diversity. It will be, I think, fairly widely acknowledged that 
some sort of common ground of values is needed in human life, at 
least within one society. Pessimists may see diversity in itself as 
ruling out any common ground; others may see an understanding 
of the diversity precisely as the first step towards finding the 
common ground. 
Much of the later discussion in this thesis will be about the nature 
of possible common ground. Here I shall distinguish two broad 
ways in which it is possible to see the task of seeking a common 
ground. We may see the task as seeking to find, to recognise, or to 
recover some deep truth about the way that human nature or 
rationality workS3; or we may see the task as a pragmatic one of 
making accommodations at a quite superficial level to deep 
3 'Human nature or rationality': in academic terms, of course, the first 
is 








These different views of the task 
different ways of seeing the phenomena of 
, or as running deep. 
There is one way of thinking, with roots both in religious and in 
scientific thought, which says that the differences between people 
are of little significance. What people have in common is much 
more important than the differences between them. We are all 
created equal (for Christians, because we are created in God's 
image); if we are scratched, we all bleed (Shakespeare's Shylock 
in The Merchant of Venice); we are all capable of rational thought 
(Enlightenment thinking, above all in Kant); and we share with 
each other (and with chimpanzees too) all but a tiny fraction of 
our DNA (modern evolutionary biology). With all this in common, 
the ways in which we differ from each other must be only 
superficial. If we were cakes, we would all be made of the same 
ingredients to the same recipe; only the icing on the top would 
come in different patterns. 
But there is another way of thinking which effectively turns this 
upside down. It is true that there are commonalities in a biological 
sense, and that what differs is only our interpretations of our 
living and the values we put on things; but this does not mean 
that the differences are trivial. To the contrary, it is in our 
interpretations that we live our lives. The commonalities across 
human lives are, precisely, the features of biological life which we 
share with other animals, and in that way they are not, from a 
human perspective, what is important. What matters to us is the 
world of human meaning, and that does not come all of a piece; it 
always, necessarily, comes in some particular form - we speak a 
particular language, are born in a particular part of the world, and 
so on. Of course the basic facts of biology are significant to us - 
but the point is that the significance is not a biological given. It is 
always an interpretation, and interpretations differ. Other animals 
are born and eat and copulate and die, and so do we; but other 
animals just do these things without (so far as we can tell) 
interpreting them; whereas we weave complex structures of 
meaning and interpretation around the events of our lives. And 
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since, in our life as we experience it, nothing is deeper than these 
interpretations (since it is within these structures of interpretation 
that we sometimes find thoughts and experiences 'deep' or 
'profound'), so we have to say that the differences in these 
interpretations are deep differences. (All the cakes are basically 
made of flour; but there are so many other varying ingredients, 
and so many different recipes, that the fact that they are all made 
of flour seems merely trivial). 4 
A related point, important for current educational debate'5 is that 
what matters to us - to each of us individually - is our identity, 
and that our identity is constituted by things which we may have 
in common with certain others, but rarely by what we have in 
common with everyone. It may be part of my identity that I was 
born in England, am male, am an academic, and so on, but that I 
am human or that I need to eat to survive, is hardly part of my 
identity. From a scientific perspective my being human - or 
indeed being mammalian, or being vertebrate - must be the 
foundation of all the rest, but so far as my identity is concerned, it 
is likely to be part of the background that is simply taken for 
granted. 
Similar points apply to values that are shared and values that 
differentiate people. It is not surprising, for instance, that for all 
human beings being killed is generally something to be avoided, 
and hence it is not surprising that the idea that 'killing is wrong' is 
a very generally shared moral value. But the belief that killing is 
wrong is unlikely to be experienced as a part of someone's 
4 On the issues in this paragraph cf. Gray (1995). Gray, interpreting Berlin, 
argues that for the Enlightenment, 'c ultural difference was not of the essence 
of humanity, but something ephemeral, or at least evanescent, a phase in 
human development, not constitutive of humanity itself. ' (p. 107) In contrast, 
he argues: 
'In this real world, individuals are constituted by their particularities, 
what is most essentially constitutive of them is what is most contingent 
and accidental - their place and time of birth, their first language and 
family lineage, the cultural tradition by which they are formed and 
whose power over them is confirmed in the very act of rebellion against 
it. ' (pp. 107-8) 
5 It bears particularly on the debate over the desirability of culturally 
mixed schools in a plural society, as against culturally distinct schools 
for different cultural groups. 
1 
identity, unless it plays a particularly prominent role in someone's 
beliefs - if, for instance, she is a pacifist. Being a pacifist is 
something that sets a person apart from many others, and may 
create a common bond with certain others who do share the 
position; so it is quite intelligible that being a pacifist might come 
to be counted - by herself or by others - as part of a person's 
identity. 
Again, while we do not find that some cultures are distinguished 
by their thinking that killing is wrong while others hold no such 
belief, 6 we do find that different cultures contain different ways 
in which the positive value of life and the negative value of death 
are woven into wider interpretations; in the context, for instance, 
of religious beliefs about service to God and the attainment of 
happiness in an afterlife, death can take on a very positive 
significance. 7 There is a profundity here in meanings which are 
not shared by everyone; the mere biological fact of mortality, 
which we share not only with each other but with all animals, may 
seem trivial by comparison. On the other hand, for much of 
secular, post-Enlightenment thinking, there is nothing more 
profound than suffering and the fact of death; and structures of 
values such as equality and the right to life are built on just these 
common factors. 
So the different ways of looking at diversity, seeing it either as 
superficial or as deep, apply to differences in values as much as to 
any other differences. On one view, differences in the values 
people hold are superficial variations on the surface of a deeper 
truth, which is that there are universal and rational values 
applying to all. Politically, this view fits with an emphasis on 
human rights, universal and equal for all, as a bedrock. On the 
other view, values go deep in people's psyche - we all see the 
world through our values, but these are not the same values for 
6 Once we insert the X in 'killing X is wrong' then there are some 
notable variations. Consider Jains at one end of the spectrum, and at the 
other the headhunters described by von Furer-Haimendorf (1967). 
71 am grateful to Steve Bramall for his arguments, contra 
Nussbaum(1993), that death is not a common factor in the human 
condition. 
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all - and so, by inversion, the 'universal' values, such as equality 
and human rights, are at best a pragmatic fiction which we can 
attempt to maintain for the sake of an uneasy coexistence. On this 
second view, the politics of equal rights does not constitute a 
sufficient recognition of the value of every person, precisely 
because it does not recognise the importance of the differences 
which go deep into people's identity; we need in addition a 
'politics of difference' (Young 1990) or 'politics of recognition' 
(Gutmann 1992). 
So there are conflicting interpretations of the undeniable 
phenomena both of perceived commonality and of perceived 
difference. Faced with two such different interpretations as these, 
we may wish to ask which is right. But the question may itself be 
mistaken. There need not even be any disagreement on 'the facts' 
between one who sees the commonalities as deep and one who 
sees the differences as deep; they can both agree on what is 
common and what is different. They are looking at the same facts 
from different perspectives. 
Yet it may be thought that in the context of education we have to 
decide between these interpretations, because they would appear 
to have different practical implications. On the first view, it would 
be a task of education to enable everyone to see the deep truth 
about the universality of certain facts about the human condition, 
and hence of certain values which are important for human life; in 
the face of these, actual variations in beliefs and values will seem 
trivial, and it would be wrong to put too much weight on them. On 
the second view, it will be a task of education to be sure that the 
differences which run deep in people's lives are recognised and 
respected; to promote one particular set of values would be to ride 
insensitively over the beliefs of many while seeking to impose the 
values of a few. 
But further reflection may suggest that this contrast is overdrawn. 
The first view, even as it does seek to promote common values, 
cannot neglect the fact that differences exist, because among the 
common values that it is necessary to promote will be 
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understanding and tolerance and respect for the differences. And 
the second view does not mean that nothing that is common 
should be taught, because even if we do not think there are deep 
truths in common, we still need, if only for pragmatic reasons, to 
promote some common language, some comm on way of living 
together. Either way, then, there is reason to think that education 
has to deal with both diversity and common ality. 8 
Education and diversity 
In what way has education in Britain in the late twentieth century 
in fact approached matters of the diversity of values? A short 
answer might be: 'with a good deal of confusion, and certainly 
with no overall coherent view. It is not very helpful, for 
instance, that the idea of diversity of values is in many minds 
associated with multiculturalism. 9 It is also not very helpful that 
values are often seen in education as the preserve either of 
religious education or of PSHE; for both these parts or aspects of 
the curriculum, as they have actually often been practised, 1 0 may 
put a particular slant on the approach which is taken to values. 
Linking a concern with values too much with religion in an 
educational context may give too much weight to what is only one 
way of interpreting values within the overall diversity, and it may 
thus give the impression that values are to be taken less seriously 
outside of a religious context. PSHE in practice has often put a lot 
of weight on the individual's choice of values, but in doing this it 
may tend to suggest that individual choice is the only viable 
response to diversity, thus playing down the possibility of finding 
8 This conclusion holds good, I think, at a sufficient level of generality; 
but it still allows the question referred to in note 5 above to be 
controversial. Culturally mixed schools, and separate schools, may both 
be advocated as ways in which a society's educational provision can 
'deal with both diversity and commonality'. I would argue, however, 
that any individual's education, whether it takes place in a mixed or a 
separate school, cannot be adequate if it does not enable that individual 
to 'deal with both diversity and commonality'. 
9 The paper from which this chapter is partially drawn (Haydon 1999c) 
was perhaps concerned most of all, in the context of a volume on 
'Education, Values and Diversity', to make the point that diversity in 
values is not to be equated with plurality of cultures. Cf. also TA V p. 109. 
10 In neither case is the bias mentioned in any way inherent in the 
particular curriculum area; so this is not a criticism of PSHE, or of RE, as 
such- 
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common ground. 1 1 Again, if values are seen as particularly the 
preserve of one or other or both of these two areas, the 
impression may be left that values do not come into other areas. 
This may lead to a tendency to overlook aesthetic values (cf. TA V 
p. 119) as well as all the other ways in which values can enter into 
any part of the curriculum. 
Against this background, it should perhaps be seen, in a long term 
perspective, as a move in the right direction that legislation in 
1992 forced schools to try to take an overview of their concern 
with pupils' values. It did this in a particular way which certainly 
raised problems of its own, which teachers have been grappling 
with since. Following and supplementing the ERA of 1988, the 
1992 Education Act laid on OFSTED the duty to inspect the 
provision which schools made for the spiritual, moral, social and 
cultural development (SMSC) of their pupils. A number of 
documents were quick to note that what held these various areas 
of development together was the directness of their concern with 
values. It was not that the traditional academic concerns of the 
curriculum, as well as physical education, did not have anything to 
do with values (cf. TRAW 140). But there was a perception that 
while pupils' mental and physical development was being 
addressed by certain recognised aspects of the curriculum, there 
were important concerns about values which the established parts 
of the curriculum were not in fact reaching. 
Some people have had problems with the notion of development 
in this context. In my view, this bit of terminology is not nearly 
as problematic as some others. The term 'development' is often 
used in ordinary language to mean little more than 'a change for 
the better'. 1 2 Even if we are quite unclear what is intended by the 
11 Smith and Standish write in the context of the SCAA Forum on Values: 
'Talk of 'values'... plays into the hands of instinctive subjectivists (so 
often called 'relativists') since 'values' have the air of something 
personal to the individual. ' (TRAW p. 141) It is not clear that this 
connotation is written into the meaning of the word 'values', but it may 
well have been encouraged by the actual practice of PSHE in Britain 
(and 'values clarification' in the USA) in recent years. 
12 There is also an evaluatively neutral sense of the term; teachers could 
take note of the development of a laddish culture among their male 
students without at all approving of it. Or to take an example which 
I 
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term 'spiritual', we know that 'spiritual development' is intended 
to denote some sort of change towards a better state. 
We might ask whether just any kind of change for the better can 
be counted as development. Perhaps the change has to be seen as 
gradual and cumulative, while some theoretical accounts would 
write in further restrictions. But there is no need for conceptual 
legislation here. It is possible to refer to any kind of change 
(except possibly very sudden change) as development if you (the 
speaker) consider it to be an improvement; and this must be at 
least the starting point for discussion in educational contexts of 
what would constitute moral or spiritual development 
Since education can hardly not be concerned to bring about, or at 
least open the way for, changes for the better, then if education is 
to be concerned with the 'moral, spiritual, social and cultural' at 
all, it will rightly be concerned with development (in at least a 
loose sense) in these areas. The term 'development' also helps to 
guard against the simplistic idea, often to be found in some 
sections of the media, that the task for schools so far as values are 
concerned is simply one of inculcation, since the idea of 
development in an educational context can readily accommodate 
ideas of coming to appreciate, coming to understand, coming 
gradually to have a clearer, broader, deeper, view. 
The more important question is about the categorisation of forms 
of development. Given the vast diversity of values, which I have 
tried at least to indicate above, some sort of categorisation seems 
unavoidable for practical purposes. A school which claimed to be 
concerned with values and backed this up just by claiming to 
teach pupils the value of money and the value of exam results 
could hardly claim to be recognising the whole range of important 
values. A categorisation gives reminders to the school that make 
it more difficult to overlook certain important kinds of value, and 
it can in practice help a school to formulate an approach and to 
keep track of what it is doing. The legislation, through OFSTED, is 
shall mention in the Epilogue, a sociologist would normally 
be making 
no evaluation in speaking of secularisation as one aspect of the 
development of many modern societies. 
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in effect saying: in so far as the school is concerned with pupils' 
development in relation to values, it should not omit any of these 
categories. 
This leaves the question: was this the best set of categories? It is 
clearly not the only possible categorisation. Nor is it clear where it 
came from. I have not seen in any of the official or semi-official 
documentation an explanation as to why the four categories of 
spiritual, moral, social and cultural were chosen; the fact that the 
category 'social' was only added in the 1992 legislation, while the 
other three appear (along with 'mental' and 'physical') in the 1988 
Act, also suggests that there was not from the beginning any clear 
policy behind the categorisation. 
There are other categories that could have been included. 
Aesthetic development does not figure, though from the QCA 
guidance on SMSC developmentl 3 it appears that this is to be 
covered by 'cultural development'. Perhaps more significantly, 
'emotional' (or affective) development does not appear. Some of 
the attempts to make sense of the problematic category of 
spiritual development seem to have been trying to take account of 
the emotions; but development of the emotions has also often 
been seen to be part of moral development. The term 'religious 
development' would certainly have provoked many objections, but 
might have had the merit of a clearer focus than 'spiritual 
development'; it might even have been possible to argue that 
religious development, unlike the others, should be seen as 
optional. Then it might have been possible to absorb everything 
which various people want to put under spiritual development 
into one of the other forms of development without remainder. 
And so on. 
That paragraph was meant only to illustrate that the modern 
quadrivium of SMSC is by no means obviously the best 
categorisation. The fact remains, however, that any categorisation 
can at least function as a reminder not to lump all values together 
13 This documentation was sent to a number of schools (and to interested 
individuals) as part of a pilot study beginning in Autumn 1997, and 
intended to last for two years. 
47 
into one basket. To that extent any categorisation is an 
acknowledgement of diversity among values; that is, of the 
intrapersonal diversity that can exist within any one individual. 
The categorisation does not by itself imply anything about 
interpersonal diversity, except that the scope for interpersonal 
variation will be very great, since there is no reason in advance to 
suppose that any of the categories picked out will be immune to 
interpersonal variation. 
In principle, then, a search for common values could result in a set 
of values, held in common, which cut across the categories of 
spiritual, moral, social, cultural - and for that matter affective, 
aesthetic, or whatever. Nevertheless, I want to argue that a 
search for common values, as often conceived, is in effect a search 
for common moral values. I shall not, however, pursue that 
argument until Chapter 3, where I shall discuss in particular the 
work (in which I was personally involved) of the National Forum 
for Values in Education and the Community, set up by SCAA in 
1996. First, in the next chapter, I want to take up a wider issue 
which is of importance for education. Even supposing that there 
can be agreement on some common set of values, does that mean 
that education can neglect values which are not held in common; 
or is it important for education to promote knowledge and 
understanding of values in all their diversity? 
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Chapter Two 
Why promote understanding of diversity? 
In the last chapter I drew attention to the diversity of values, 
even speaking intrapersonally. For a full picture of the diversity 
of values we have to add the interpersonal diversity which cuts 
across the intrapersonal. If education has to try to promote in 
everyone an understanding of this diversity in all its aspects, that 
is a daunting challenge. 
But is it a challenge that education has to face? There have from 
time to time been suggestions that what education above all needs 
to do is to promote adherence to certain values which can be, or 
which are in fact, held in common. In the bulk of this thesis I 
shall be supporting something which, while not exactly that view, 
will sound something like it. If I were to do nothing but this, I 
would risk suggesting to the reader that I think the promotion of 
some common set of values is sufficient; that if education can do 
this, it can leave the interpersonal diversity outside of that 
common set of values to look after itself. 
In fact I do not think this; I believe that in addition to promoting a 
common understanding, education does need to try to promote 
understanding of the diversity and complexity of values. In this 
chapter I shall explain why. 
Possibly to philosophers of education it will seem obvious that 
education should be casting its net wide as regards the 
understanding it is trying to promote. But this is unlikely to seem 
obvious to everyone in a plural society. For instance, parents who 
have tried their best to instil in their children the values which 
they believe to be right may be suspicious of an education which 
goes out of its way both to show their children that there are 
many people who don't share these values, and to show them that 
there is something to be said for the other people's point of view. 
Now suppose that we can find some set of common values which 
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sensible strategy to stick to doing that, and to leave everything in 
the field of values on which people don't agree as a private matter 
which is not the concern of schools? 
I shall argue that this is not a good strategy. My argument will 
begin from a comparison between my question about values 
education and certain questions recently much debated within 
political philosophy. Both my question and the questions in 
political philosophy arise in the context of a society which is 
heterogeneous in its beliefs and values. 
There is a strong strand in recent liberal political philosophy 
which holds, roughly speaking, that common membership of a 
liberal state, sharing in a common political system, is possible only 
to the extent that the functioning of the system abstracts from the 
differences within the population. In contrast to some earlier 
liberal theories, more recent ones have tended to assume a 
smaller area of genuine agreement in beliefs and values. Where 
once, for instance, advocates of religious toleration still saw 
atheism as beyond the pale, for modern liberalism the political 
system does not need to and should not assume either theism or 
atheism. For Rawls (1993), both theism and atheism would be 
part of different comprehensive doctrines; political liberalism is 
not a comprehensive doctrine, but is that set of principles, of an 
explicitly political sort, on which different comprehensive views 
can converge. This 'overlapping consensus' will be philosophically 
minimalist, since it will not include shared metaphysical or 
theological underpinnings; the idea is, rather, that the agreed 
principles may be supported on different grounds from within 
different traditions. 
Some other modern accounts explicitly see the principles of 
political liberalism as nothing but a modus vivendi (Larmore 
1987), an accommodation for practical purposes which its 
adherents 'go along with' rather than 'believe in'; here acceptance 
of the agreed principles need not even be motivated by anything 
within the comprehensive doctrine of each adherent. While in 
certain contexts the difference between the overlapping consensus 
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and the modus vivendi views may be significant, they converge in 
that on either view actual progress in practical contexts (e. g. in the 
formulation and implementation of policies for citizenship 
education) depends on a consensus actually being found to exist 
'on the ground'. For most of my argument below I shall refer to 
all such approaches as 'empirical consensus' approaches. 
It is important to see how different the empirical consensus view 
is from many earlier philosophical theories of the state, which in a 
variety of ways tried to lay down the correct principles for human 
beings as social/political animals. Such theories could be 
comprehensive in Rawls's sense; they did have their deep 
underpinnings, metaphysical, theological or whatever; and by 
implication those who did not share the same metaphysical or 
theological premises were mistaken. I shall refer to such theories 
collectively as 'authoritative answer' views. An 'authoritative 
answer9 view need not be non-liberal. On the contrary, some 
liberals have argued that liberalism is the authoritative answer 
(thus espousing what Rawls calls 'comprehensive liberalism' in 
contrast to 'political liberalism'). However, what many modern 
liberals are doing is saying that the underlying philosophical 
debates, the search for the authoritative answer, should not be 
part of the public sphere at all. They do not, of course, mean that 
these things should not be talked about and argued over; but they 
do mean that such debates are not to be treated as relevant to the 
choice and implementation of the guiding principles of the society 
at the political level (cf. Benhabib 1992 Ch. 3). 
To a certain extent there is an analogy between these two kinds of 
defence of liberalism, and two approaches to values education. 
Aligning with the authoritative answer view is the idea that 
values education above all should be education in the right values 
(which we could call the authoritative answer view of values 
education). This is a view, of course, which can only be put into 
practice by those who believe they know what the right values 
are. This means already that the authoritative answer view faces 
problems in a context of diversity. Not only is there not 
unanimity on what the right values are, but there is disagreement 
51 
on what it means to call certain values the right ones, and on what 
kind of enquiry - philosophical, theological, or even 
anthropological or biological - is relevant to establishing any such 
claim. 
An alternative is a strategy which aligns with the empirical 
consensus approach to liberalism. That is, that people should get 
together to discover where they do in fact have agreement on 
values; one should stress 'in fact' because the point is to find 
values on which people can agree at the level of content. 
Whatever these agreed values turn out to be, these will form at 
least the core of values education. This I shall call the empirical 
consensus view of values education. 
Attention to such a view has from time to time crystallised around 
some particular event or publication. Thus in the mid-eighties the 
Swann Report (DES 1985) called for a recognition of plurality 
within 'a common framework of values'. 1 Up until the time when 
I wrote the article from which parts of this chapter are drawn, 
there had not been any systematic attempt actually to draw up a 
common list of values for educational purposes. I was, then, 
speculating when I wrote in 1995 
'it is not unrealistic to expect that a workable level of agreement 
could be found, so long as the values in question are characterised 
rather broadly. One would imagine, for instance, that a list of 
agreed values would contain such items as 'respect for persons' 
and 'toleration of religious differences'. Whether the cross- 
cultural agreement would survive the effort of cashing out such 
ideas in the detail necessary if more than lip service is to be paid 
to them is a further question. ' (Haydon 1995 p. 56) 
Since I first wrote that paragraph, an exercise has been carried 
out which was in many ways an attempted implementation of the 
empirical consensus strategy. I refer to the work initiated by 
SCAA in 1996, including the SCAA Forum on Values (see 
11 and a number of colleagues discussed this call in Haydon (1987a); I 
shall refer briefly below to the position I then took. As mentioned 
in 
the Preface (n. 1), 1 would not now endorse everything in my own 
contribution to that volume. 
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Appendices 2 and 3). That Forum did come up with a list of 
agreed values, and two of the items on that list were 'we should 
respect others, including children' and 'we should respect religious 
and cultural diversity'. I shall have more to say below, especially 
in the next chapter, about the SCAA approach; for the moment it is 
worth noting that both Swann and SCAA, in referring to what 
needs to be held in common, use the terminology 'values', not 
6 morality'. 
Before returning to that point in the next chapter I shall continue 
my argument from the 1995 article, becau se I still want to argue, 
as I did then, that even if the appr oach through shared values 
found empirically is successful in its own aims, there is also a need 
for an education which will not rest content with consensus, but 
will deliberately seek an awareness and understanding of 
differences. 
An important feature of the empirical consensus approach, 
without which it would not be a realistic aim at all, is that while 
different groups might agree on what is to be put on the list, they 
will not necessarily agree on the underlying reasons for the values 
included (a point common to both the overlapping consensus and 
the modus vivendi views). 2 Take, for instance, two responses to 
the idea in the Swann Report that Britain ought to be a pluralistic 
society in which diversity flourishes within a framework of shared 
values. Where is such a framework of shared values to come 
from? In Haydon (1987b) I myself argued for what I would now 
call a version of the empirical consensus approach, allowing scope 
for compromise and negotiation in the process of arriving at a 
consensus. This pragmatic approach aligns with the modus 
vivendi view. A British Muslim, in his own response to Swann, 
said 
6multi-culturalism must rest on an affirmation of shared moral 
certainties: it cannot just be about differences. We have a lot in 
common and must work to bring this out .... the emphasis on 
2A similar point is made in the Preamble to the SCAA Forum Statement 
of Values: 'Agreement on the values outlined below is compatible with 
disagreement on their sources' -a point to which I shall return. 
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common values .... needs far more emphasis than it has received 
hitherto' (Modood 1992, p. 4). 
Modood's use of the phrase 'shared moral certainties' shows that 
his is not a modus vivendi approach. For Modood, I think, we 
would agree on certain values because they are moral certainties; 
and he must consider that different traditions (including at least 
Christianity and Islam) can licence the certainty. So this seems to 
be a version of the overlapping consensus view. My own 
approach, rooted in a more sceptical philosophical tradition, was 
not certain that there are moral certainties, but it would hold that 
if we can agree, even without claims of certainty, that is enough to 
be going on with. 
For practical purposes, though, the two responses to Swann seem 
to converge, since both would hold that 'we must work to bring 
[the consensus] out9. A difference over the status of particular 
values - as certainties or as practical accommodatio ns - is itself a 
philosophical or theological difference which need not stand in the 
way of the empirical consensus strategy. 
If there is a possibility that the empirical consensus strategy can 
work, I think there must be a strong motivation to do one's best to 
put it into practice and leave it at that. Let values education be an 
initiation into agreed values, it might be said, and let us be careful 
to guard against the cognitively richer kind of education that, in 
the name of understanding, autonomy and reflection, would make 
people all the more aware of the differences between them in 
terms not only of the content of values but also of their 
significance. It is, as I pointed out in the last chapter, part of the 
pluralism of our society that people differ about the significance of 
their values: whether they are purely secular responses to the 
mundane problems of living, whether they are God-given 
commands, and so on. Even though an agreement on central 
values in terms of content may be possible, it is much less likely 
that there would spontaneously be agreement on the underlying 
nature and grounds of values in general, or of some class of values 
labelled 'moral'. In this case (the argument might continue) to 
introduce people to the fact that there is such variety at this level 
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is to risk inducing doubt, scepticism and weakened motivation 
even in those who - apart from their schooling - have been 
brought up in a coherent tradition. Viewed in this light, an 
education for knowledge and understanding about values and 
their diversity can seem a Pandora's box which for the sake of 
peaceful co-existence we had better not open. 
Most of this thesis will be about convergence on a shared 
understanding of morality. Nevertheless, I think that within 
education we have to open Pandora's box, for at least two reasons. 
One is that a consensus which contingently happens to exist, or to 
be brought out, at a particular time, is not necessarily a basis for 
moral education or citizenship education at all. I shall be arguing 
that we do need some articulated basis of agreement, and that a 
particular understanding of morality should be able to provide 
that basis. In fact, a shared understanding of the nature of 
morality will in a sense be more important than an agreement on 
its content. So we cannot exclude questions about the nature of 
morality from education. 
My second reason for believing we have to open Pandora's box is 
the one to which the rest of this chapter will be devoted. I do not 
align myself with that version of the empirical consensus view 
which would hold that all matters of values outside of an 
empirical consensus should not be the concern of public education 
at all. That strategy would, on the face of it, make the task of 
educators easier; it would be saying to teachers 'any values on 
which there is not consensus - and any questions about the nature 
of values and so on on which there is not consensus - are not your 
concern (they can be left to families, churches, and so on). Your 
task is just to transmit the values on which we all agree. ' I shall 
try to show why this will not do. 
Why not just empirical consensus? 
A first move, whi ch I mention only to go beyond it, is the liberal 
claim that values education conceived as initiation into common 
values would be a misnomer, because this would not be education 
at all but at best inculcation, at worst indoctrination. Education, it 
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may be said, must involve understanding, thinking for oneself, 
critical reflection. I do not want to put weight on this move 
because it is possible for people to say 'So far as values are 
concerned, education is not after all what we want; the priority is 
that people across society should come to hold and share the right 
sort of values'. In the face of that claim, it will avail liberals 
nothing to invoke ideas like 'autonomy' or 'indoctrination' as if 
they settled the issue. For these are themselves values which are 
not universally shared. If it is said that education must above all 
aim at autonomy and avoid indoctrination, this may be no more 
than another version of the authoritative answer view. 
A defence of the role of autonomy and the avoidance of 
indoctrination within schooling in a plural society will need to be 
made in some way that can carry weight for adherents of 
different comprehensive doctrines. I suspect that at some 
sufficiently general level it might be possible to achieve 
agreement across traditions that critical reflection does have value 
(i. e. at a level of sufficient abstraction there might be an 
'overlapping consensus' on the value of critical reflection). From 
this it might be possible to mount an argument for the conclusion 
that inculcation without critical reflection must always and 
everywhere be rejected. It is doubtful, however, whether such an 
argument at the level of a general and universal principle would 
go through. We can expect that those who wish to reject critical 
reflection (or too much critical reflection) on matters of values will 
make a more nuanced response. They do not have to resist critical 
thinking per se, but only in this area. That does not appear to be 
an incoherent position. For instance, the scientific and 
mathematical achievements of the Islamic world are evidence for 
the compatibility of critical thought on some matters with faith on 
others. (I do not want to be read here as suggesting that science 
and religion are in separate compartments; that would be a 
modernist liberal view and, if my understanding is correct, alien 
to the Islamic worldview, which rather sees such exercises of 
human thought as science and mathematics as going on within an 
over-arching framework which is not itself to be subjected to the 
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same kind of scrutiny that might be appropriate within the 
subordinate activities. ) 
What is needed, to establish a case for the promotion of 
understanding and critical reflection about values in a plural 
society, is a more pragmatic argument. This argument will not 
claim that the pursuit of knowledge, understanding and critical 
reflection over a broad front is an essential condition either of a 
good life sans phrase, or of a morally good life (to use a distinction 
which may not itself be available in all traditions). We need not 
dispute that there can be a good life, and that moral goodness can 
be realised within it, without critical reflection. We certainly 
cannot argue that critical reflection in itself makes people morally 
better. What we can do is ask in what kind of social context an 
unreflective life and the goodness that could be realised in it is 
possible (cf. the arguments for autonomy offered by Raz 1986, p. 
391, and White 1990 pp. 103-4). 
An unreflective good life is more likely to be possible in a society 
which is relatively homogeneous (so that there is less sense of 
alternatives), tradition -directed (so that there is less often any 
doubt about what is to be done) and socially and politically 
hierarchical (so that there are for most individuals fewer choices 
that have to be made on their on responsibility). In so far as a 
modern plural democracy differs from this pattern, the need for 
understanding and reflection is the greater. The argument can be 
spelled out by looking in turn at the implications of a society's 
being (or trying to be) democratic and of its being plural rather 
than homogeneous in its beliefs and values. 
Whether it is, out of any particular historical context, always 
better that a society be democratic is not to the point here. Views 
about the ideal society are among the matters on which cultural 
groups may legitimately differ. In so far as a society is democratic 
any cultural group has reason for participating in democratic 
processes, on pain of their voice, and hence their values and 
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interests, being passed over in the public forum. 3 If a cultural 
group is to have a voice in democratic processes, this can only be 
through individual members of it having and exercising a voice. 
It is true that even within a one-person one-vote system the 
influence of a minority group, at a national level, does not depend 
on individual members of that group exercising their vote 
autonomously; for one can imagine authoritative leaders within a 
minority group telling its members how to vote; the group as a 
whole would then have a voice proportional to its numerical 
strength. However, in so far as democracy is a matter not just of 
voting, but of arguing, campaigning, being on committees and so 
on - much of which goes on at local level - the voice of a minority 
community is likely to be the stronger, the more its individual 
members are able to exercise their own capacities within the 
system. 
Such an argument does not show that it is impossible for an 
individual to realise a good life within a more complex society 
without engagement in the public life of reflection and discussion. 
For a given individual may in effect withdraw from, or never 
become involved in, the political life of the society. But for at least 
two reasons such a life can hardly be a model for all members of 
any but very exceptional communities within a plural society. 
First, it cannot be acceptable to any culture which sees 
participation in the wider society as a moral duty in itself. If that 
is a moral duty in a democratic society (even if in others it might 
not be), then the demands on a good life in a democratic society 
are to that extent different. Secondly, although some members of 
a given cultural tradition may live a life of withdrawal (in the 
way, for instance, that in most religions there are monastic 
communities or the equivalent), the viability of such a form of life 
in a complex society is to some degree dependent on its being 
supported or at least tolerated within the wider moral culture of 
the society; and support or toleration within the public moral 
culture may need to be maintained, in part, through the 
3 Lest this sound complacent, I want to acknowledge that the extent to 
which cultural minorities may not be adequately represented 
is one of 
the respects in which many existing democracies are 
deficient. 
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participation of at least some members of the minorities which 
would stand to lose most through the absence of toleration. 
In a democratic society, then, there is reason for people in general 
(whatever their cultural background) to acquire the kinds of 
capacities which make engagement in public decision-making 
possible. (If some people are to be exceptions to this rule there is 
an issue about whether they themselves decide to be so, or 
whether someone else makes that decision about them; I shall not 
enter into that issue here. It will at any rate not be for a public 
education system to decide in advance that certain individuals are 
to be excluded from its general aims. ) The relevant capacities 
involve knowledge, understanding and critical reflection. Often 
these capacities must be exercised on moral issues, because so 
many of the issues that come up for decision within the public 
forum, through democratic processes, either are themselves, or 
involve, moral issues. 
Since I have already suggested that some sort of empirical 
consensus may be available, it might be thought that this would 
be sufficient for democratic decision-making, which could proceed 
on the basis of agreed values, so that the issues in question would 
be those of means rather than ends, and critical reflection would 
not have to be exercised at the level of values themselves. This 
would be un realistic, however. For any consensus that may be 
available or could be achieved, though it may be a sufficient basis 
for a certain amount of education into specific normative views or 
dispositions (especially where these concern everyday personal 
interactions), is likely to be at too general a level to resolve many 
of the issues that need to be settled publicly in a democracy. 
Agreed value s- whether articulated in terms of norms for conduct 
or of virtues - can act as reference points in discussion while still 
leaving much 4 to be argued over. 
The argument from diversity interacts with that from democracy. 
To be able to argue a case in the public forum it is not enough to 
4 Later I shall argue that articulation in terms of norms for conduct may 
serve this function better than articulation in terms of virtues - see Part 
11. 
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know and to be able to articulate one's own position (which may 
be the position of one's tradition); it is not enough even to be able 
to offer reasons for one's position which might weigh with 
someone who does not share the same tradition; very often it is 
also necessary to understand something of the opposing positions, 
in order to be able to counter objections which will come from 
them. However, to express the argument in this way is perhaps to 
suggest an excessively adversarial model of democratic discussion. 
It can also involve, not an attempt by one side to win over the 
others, but a joint seeking for acceptable solutions - and that, all 
the more, requires an understanding of different points of view as 
well as, often, a certain imaginative capacity to find solutions 
which may be different from those originally put forward. 
The importance of tolerance within a plural society supports a 
similar conclusion. I have already suggested that tolerance of 
diversity5 would itself be one of the values which a pragmatic 
consensus would incorporate (even if part of the reason for this 
would be simply that no cultural minority could afford to claim 
tolerance for itself without extending tolerance to others); but 
tolerance is likely to be unstable to the extent that it is not 
accompanied by understanding. To understand, in the relevant 
sense, is at least to see how someone else could hold their view 
without being mad or evil. Where this kind of understanding is 
absent, democracy, if it can exist at all, will be reduced to a 
numbers game, and those who are unwilling (not entirely 
unreasonably) to let issues of values be decided on behalf of 
society by a counting of heads will sometimes resort to more 
drastic methods. 
It may have been a deficiency on the part of some liberals in their 
response to the affair of Salman Rushdie and The Satanic Verses 
that they had too little understanding of the way the book was 
perceived by many Muslims. If we assume that those liberals who 
5 There is, of course, a question about the limits of tolerance. The rest of 
the thesis will be relevan t to this. In so far as there is provisional 
agreement on the content of what I shall later call morality in the 
narrow sense, it will be by reference to this that the limits of tolerance 
can be set. I have said more on tolerance in TA V Chapter 
5. 
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entered into the debate were knowledgeable people capable of 
critical reflection, this example shows that knowledge and critical 
reflection do not guarantee understanding. It does not show, 
however, that knowledge and critical reflection are not necessary 
for understanding, and they surely are. In this case, for instance, 
it would have been relevant knowledge that veneration of the 
Prophet is particularly strong among the rural peasantry of South 
Asia, from which the majority of British Muslims take their family 
origins (Modood 1992, pp. 72-73). 
Such knowledge on its own, though, will be of no avail unless it is 
put together with other relevant knowledge and understanding, 
and an appropriate conclusion drawn. The premises may include 
acknowledgement of some relevant norms: as that, for instance, it 
is bad for offence to be caused to people's religious sensibilities 
(the kind of norm which might be included in a broad social 
consensus). However, simple acknowledgement of such a norm 
leaves much of the important understanding still to come: a 
clearer understanding, for instance, of the nature and significance 
of the offence caused to Muslims by passages of The Satanic 
VerseS. 6 
So even convinced secular liberals may need to reflect critically 
and make some effort (which will be in part an effort of self- 
education) in order to understand others. They may need to 
modify some of their cherished assumptions; but this does not 
apply only to them. The religious person to whom it is simply 
obvious that abortion equates with murder will not, without 
critical reflection, even understand the point of view of one to 
whom it is entirely a matter of a woman's right to choose - and 
vice versa; and the same applies mutatis mutandis to the 
heterosexual person to whom the very idea of a homosexual act is 
anathema, and the homosexual who feels that others wish to deny 
him something that is central to his identity. 
6The category of blasphemy is not necessarily the most appropriate one 
to use. See TA V 141-2. 
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Greater understanding will not generate moral conclusions by 
itself. It may make an issue seem more problematic than it was - 
in a sense, it will make it no longer the same problem - and still 
further thought will be needed if an answer to the problem in its 
new light is to be found. Although someone might respond that 
we have quite enough problems as it is, without raising new ones 
though education, I have been arguing th at to hope to avoid such 
problems, in the kind of society we are in, is unrealistic and 
pragmatically undesirable. Education is essential in facing them. 
For many people the necessary education may in part be self- 
education in later life; but it would sure ly be foolish for a society 
to choose to rely on the contingencies of that, when there is so 
much that could be done within formal education. 
I am arguing, then, that there is a need for education, not just in 
values, but about valueS7; I would argue more particularly, though 
this is to anticipate my later argument, that this applies especially 
to moral values. Such an education will give people some 
knowledge and understanding not just of the variety of value 
positions in the world, but of the various ways in which values 
enter into people's lives. It will give them some knowledge, too, 
of the kinds of arguments and appeals that are used by various 
people to support evaluative, and especially moral, positions; 
hence, unavoidably, it will give them some knowledge of the 
existence of various sorts of scepticism about morality. 
I do not intend here to go into the details of the content of such an 
education. But it is worth noting that if education is to deliver the 
sort of knowledge and understanding needed, it does not follow 
that a curriculum has to be drawn up in advance to incorporate 
some predetermined range of knowledge and understanding. An 
equivalent effect might be achieved (at least in schools which are 
themselves representative of a plurality of points of view and 
traditions) by a culture of openness in which different voices can 
be heard - from different disciplines, different cultures, 
different 
7 Monica Taylor, editor of The Journal of Moral Education, has 
commented to me that she would have preferred my Teaching about 
Values to have been called Teaching Values. My arguments here 
perhaps show why I do not want to dispense with the 'about. 
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individual teachers, parents and pupils - and in which pupils are 
enabled and encouraged to reflect critically on them, not only 
individually but also in discussion. 8 
In a society in which cultures cannot be kept in isolated 
compartments, away from the influence of mass media and a 
pervasive popular culture, individuals will hear many of these 
voices, albeit sometimes in crude and distorted forms, regardless 
of the intentions of educators. It is surely better that educators 
should accept the responsibility at least of enabling people to 
understand these voices better and to assess their worth. If this is 
to open Pandora's box, so be it. 
In the context of this thesis, the importance of this chapter is to 
stress that nothing I say below will be denying the importance of 
an education which casts its net wide in seeking to promote an 
understanding of values in all their diversity, including the 
diversity of conceptions of morality and its content. It is 
important to stress this because I shall be going on to focus on a 
possible shared understanding of morality and its content. My 
point is not that educators should fasten in advance - in the spirit 
of the 'authoritative answer' - on a conception of morality and its 
content as the right one, and inculcate that to the exclusion of all 
else. Rather, I want to argue that within an awareness and 
understanding of diversity, it should be possible for people to 
coincide in acknowledging one conception of morality (among 
others), and in seeking agreement on content in the light of that 
acknowledgement. In arguing this, I shall be denying that just 
any overlap in values which happens to hold should be taken as a 
basis for moral education; in that respect, I shall also be departing 
from a simple empirical consensus view. 
On the importance of discussion see TAV pp. 142-6 and Haydon (1999d) 
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Chapter Three 
From values to morality 
The SCAA Forum 
I hope I have made clear that in arguing that values education 
does need to aim at a broad awareness of and understanding of 
differences, I have not rejected the search for something held in 
common. On the contrary, I agree with those who hold that (in the 
Swann Report phrase) 'a framework of shared values' is necessary 
in a plural society. I also want to argue, though, that what is 
needed is not just any values that happen to be shared. What is 
needed, one might say, is a shared morality - at least in one sense 
of that difficult term. At the same time, to aim for a shared 
morality may seem over-ambitious in a plural society. It will be 
important for my argument to distinguish two possible objects of 
agreement. One is a particular understanding of the nature of 
morality, on which agreement, provided it is approached in a 
pragmatic spirit, should not be impossible. The other is the 
detailed content of that morality, on which no more than a 
provisional and shifting agreement is to be expected. 
That the idea of a shared morality lies behind some of the 
recommendations of bodies like the Swann Committee and the 
SCAA Forum is not often said explicitly and probably not always 
realised even implicitly. No doubt this is at least in part because 
of the sort of suspicion about the idea of morality to which I 
referred in Chapter 1. Given that sort of suspicion, many people 
may be more comfotable in talking about values; and when they 
are talking about shared values, they may not realise that there is 
still a further issue about the importance of shared values. 
Just from the idea that a value is shared - if that is taken to mean 
that a similar value is held by many people, perhaps by the 
majority of the community - it does not follow that this is a moral 
value. If, for instance, it were to be found by an opinion poll that 
90% of the population of Britain think that it is a pity that Geri left 
the Spice Girls and that Gazza was left out of England's World Cup 
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squad' this might well say something about the values of the 
English people but not necessarily anything about their moral 
values. And without further argument there would be no reason 
to think that it matters whether values of this sort are or are not 
shared. 
In fact, a search for shared values, in a context of education and 
pluralism, is unlikely ever to be just a search for any values that 
happen to be held in common. It will be a search motivated by 
certain purposes, though the purposes may not be made explicit, 
and may indeed to some degree be confused. 2 I shall try to 
illustrate the point by reference to the SCAA Forum. Here the 
reader may need a certain amount of background knowledge, 
which I have included in two appendices. Appendix 2 gives a 
brief review of the workings of the SCAA Forum, concentrating on 
points which are particularly relevant to the argument I am 
developing here. This brief review is based mainly on materials 
already in the public domain, but I have also drawn on personal 
experience, since I was myself a member of the Forum. Appendix 
3 presents the outcome of the Forum's work on the first part of its 
remit: the Statement of Values, including its Preamble. 
The essential information at this point is that the members of the 
Forum were asked at the outset to see if they could find values on 
which they all agreed (and on which they thought the rest of 
society would agree). They were not told to seek a common 
morality. But there was a context in the background, and in some 
of the written materials provided, which did tend to point in a 
1 Since any topical reference would be likely to become rapidly dated, I 
have let these anachronistic references remain, from a first draft in 
June 1998, as an indication of how ephemeral certain sorts of value 
claim can be. 
2 While I am going to argue that the purposes behind the setting up of 
the SCAA Forum meant that it was a common morality that was being 
sought, I am not arguing that the same purpose would underlie any 
search for common values. One can imagine, for instance, that a 
focus 
on nationality (which has also been one of the concerns of Nick Tate, 
who was Chief Executive of SCAA) might motivate a search for common 
values, and in that case values relating to popular culture or to sport 
might well be relevant. 
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certain direction, though not (as we shall see further) 
unambiguously so. 
The background context was a concern about people's 
behaviour. The underlying concern was not, for instance, 'too 
many people like the Spice Girls and too few people appreciate 
Bach: what can we do about people's aesthetic values? '; or 'too 
many of the people who say they believe in God lack sufficient 
respect for God; and of the others, too many people think it doesn't 
matter whether they believe in God or not' - which arguably could 
indicate a concern about religious values. Or even if such concerns 
as these were present in the minds of some members of the 
Forum, far more prominent was a thought like 'It's terrible that 
Philip Lawrence has been murdered by a youth outside his own 
3 school; what can we do about this sort of thing? '. In other words, 
more generally, there was the idea that, for all the attention that 
schools had been giving to academic matters, something must be 
going wrong in education if it didn't influence for the better 
people's behaviour towards each other. 
With this background, it is not surprising that the language used 
(from an early stage of the drafting) to express values was a 
language about conduct, talking of what was to be done or not to 
be done. There are possible exceptions in the Statement as 
agreed, such as 'respect' or 'care for', but in the context it is 
natural to take these terms as referring to actions, not just 
attitudes. It is not surprising, too, that values were expressed 
prescriptively, in terms of what people should do; it is not seen as 
a matter of indifference whether people act in certain ways or not. 
And the prescriptions are expressed as things we should do, 
where 'we' means all of us. 
Here, I suggest, we see three common marks of morality; or at 
least of what I shall refer to below as 'morality in the narrow 
sense': that morality (a) concerns conduct rather than (or rather 
3 See Appendix 2 for the relevant chronology. 
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than merely) belief, attitude and the like; 4 (b) is prescriptive, 
telling us what we are to do (unlike, say, aesthetics which does not 
- unless it is already merging into morality - carry demands that 
we should do or refrain from doing anything in particular5); and 
(c) is seen as applying not just to one or the other of us but to 
everyone. 
So far these marks of moral values still leave room for the notion 
of an individual's moral values, perhaps even idiosyncratic ones; 
something may be a moral value which I hold if I think that it 
makes demands on people's action and that it does this for 
everyone, even if others do not in fact recognise this. But we also 
have the notion of morality as a system of values existing within 
society6 and tending to produce a degree of conformity in the 
actions of different persons within society, and hence to some 
degree reducing the conflict which might ensue if persons acted 
only on non-moral reasons. Arguably the existence of morality as 
a social system is prior to our being able to conceive of such a 
thing as an individual morality. In any case, morality is an 
existent phenomenon which makes a difference to the life of a 
society, and it cannot do this if it does not contain at least some 
considerable degree of agreement on values across a society. So 
we can take it as a further mark of moral values, in their social 
manifestation, that they are fairly widely shared. And this 
appears to be true of the values in the Forum's list: not only were 
they put forward as being values which the Forum members both 
agreed on and thought to be more widely agreed on, but SCAA 
also claimed empirical evidence (gleaned through a professional 
4 This is, of course, is not uncontroversial. I shall not leave it 
unquestioned in my discussion of morality(n); the chapter on 
motivation will be especially relevant. 
5 It may appear that aesthetic reasons can underpin prescriptions for 
action. E. g. 'If doing a given dance-step in a given way is aesthetically 
better than doing it in some different way, isn't it reasonable to 
conclude that the first way is the way the step should be done ... ?, (Slote 
1996 p. 108; his italics). The obvious answer to this is the Kantian one, 
that any imperative deriving from this aesthetic judgement is 
hypothetical; there is nothing to say anyone has to be doing this dance- 
step in the first place. The issue would bear more discussion, but 
i s not 
particularly germane to my thesis. 
6 See, for example (among many other sources) Cooper (1970) and 
Strawson (1974). 
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public opinion survey) of a widespread consensus on them. (There 
is a further question, to which I shall return in Chapter 9, of how 
far agreement at a verbal level may mask underlying 
disagreement. ) 
We can say, then, something about the way in which the Forum 
interpreted its task of finding common values (if we cannot say 
how far this interpretation was present in the minds of individual 
members at the beginning, we can still say it was the collective 
interpretation that emerged). What the Forum worked towards 
was to draw up an itemised statement of what people should do, 
where the items in the statement were meant to apply to 
everyone, and where there was meant to be wide agreement on 
the items across society. If this is what the Forum was doing, then 
in effect at least it was looking, not just for any values which 
might be shared, but for a shared morality, because this is the sort 
of thing a morality is - at least on one plausible understanding of 
the nature of morality. 
I have already said, though, that the background context from 
which the Forum began was not unambiguously one that would 
point towards this interpretation of its task. As a step towards 
clarifying what is involved in the idea of a common morality, I 
want to look at factors in the background context that made the 
Forum's task less clear than it might otherwise have been. 
The Forum's remit contained reference not only to 'values on 
which there is agreement across society' but also to the OFSTED 
categories (referred to above in Chapter 1) of spiritual, moral, 
social and cultural development. So there was explicit reference 
to something other than the moral; and more particularly within 
the written material provided to members there was reference to 
"moral and spiritual development'. In fact in the educational 
rhetoric for several years prior to the setting up of the Forum the 
terms 'spiritual and moral' had often been coupled (far more 
frequently than any of the other possible pairings out of 'spiritual, 
moral, social and cultural'). They were explicitly 
linked in a 
discussion paper firs t issued by the NCC (1993; reissued as SCAA 
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1995); then in Nick Tate's keynote speech at the conference 
convened by SCAA in January 1996 which immediately preceded 
the setting up of the Forum; and in a number of the position 
papers prepared for that conference. 
Did this linking of the spiritual and the moral influence the 
workings of the Forum? Anecdotally, I can recall that in the group 
of about a dozen of which I was a member, there were one or two 
people who thought, at least at the first meeting, that the 
important thing was to find agreement on spiritual values - 
perhaps on the ground that these were seen as fundamental. In 
the Forum's final list (see Appendix 3), specifically in the context 
of 'the self', one can see a number of items, such as 'we should 
clarify the meaning and purpose in our lives and decide, on the 
basis of this, how we believe that our lives should be lived' and 
'we should strive, throughout life, for knowledge, wisdom and 
understanding' which arguably figure in the list because notions of 
spirituality, rather than of morality, were uppermost in some 
minds. 
Development: moral and spiritual compared 
I think it will help to differentiate the notion of morality which I 
wish to pursue if I can drive something of a wedge between these 
two notions which in educational contexts have been so often 
linked in recent years. 7 First, why has a link between them often 
been perceived? In part it may be no more than a hangover from 
the once very common assumption that moral education was best 
treated within the context of religious education. But it seems 
since ERA to have become fairly widely accepted - and 
acknowledged in documents from NCC, SCAA and OFSTED - that 
spiritual development, however it may be characterised in 
positive terms, does not have to take a specifically religious form, 
and that its promotion within education does not have to be 
confined to RE. Spirituality is often seen as a matter of something 
7 Interestingly, if one were approaching the questions of this thesis 
only from a background of moral philosophy one might see no need to 
raise any question of the relation between the moral and the spiritual. 
One could do (I did) moral philosophy (or perhaps I should say Oxford 




like a person's attitude or mindset towards life and the world, or 
the sense which individuals have of their place in some wider 
scheme of things - and I use 'sense' here to ac commodate both 
cognitive and affective aspects of experience. 8 Some people, for 
instance, may be able to give an intellectualised account of their 
place in the universe, o thers may feel at one wi th the world, or 
may feel alienated from it without being able to rationalise this; 
while for some, reason and feeling may concur in an integrated 
way. For some people religion will provide the basis of their 
spiritual condition, but this does not mean that people without 
religion will lack any spiritual condition. 
Apart, then, from historical factors, why should it be thought that 
there is a special link between spiritual development and 
morality? In Nick Tate's speech and many of the position papers 
prepared for the January 1996 conference, out of which the Forum 
was born, there seems to be something like the following 
connection. There is a concern with people's conduct, as pointed 
out above, and a concern to find common values. But it is 
acknowledged that the recognition of a common set of values, 
even where this takes the form of a moral code, does not by itself 
guarantee anything about how people will behave. This means 
that some attention has to be paid to people's motivation. And the 
idea of the spiritual seems to be introduced in order to provide a 
necessary motivational context. People's motivation in taking 
moral values seriously is seen as an aspect of their spiritual 
condition. 
If we are interested in the existence of a shared morality we can 
hardly be uninterested in whether people have any motivation to 
follow it (a point to which I shall return in Chapter 10). 
Neverthele ss, the attempt to look to the idea of spirituality for the 
necessary motivation brings problems with it. It is liable to lead 
81 am not attempting to offer a definition. I am reporting my sense of 
the current state of the debate. It would be possible to compare and 
contrast acc ounts of spirituality as found both in official 
documents and 
in recent academic commentary. However, (a) this 
has been done 
before, e. g. by Kevin Mott-Thornton in a London University thesis and 
by Jonathan Long in an Oxford University thesis; and (b) it would divert 
me too far from the mainstream of my a rgument. 
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to the thought that as people develop spiritually, so they will 
develop morally; and it may further be thought that if there is a 
certain pattern of moral development which is to be encouraged, 
so too there will be a certain pattern of spiritual development 
which will go along with it. But any such assumption may well be 
mistaken; at any rate I shall argue that it is an important 
difference between moral and spiritual development that while 
there may indeed be a particular, generally desirable pattern of 
moral development (at least if we have in mind morality in the 
narrow sense), there is no such particular pattern of spiritual 
development; there simply are many different ways in which 
spirituality may develop. (An alternative way of putting this 
might be that in the case of spirituality there is no way of 
delineating such a thing as 'spirituality in the narrow sense' in 
contrast to some wider and more multifarious range of 
possibilities). 
Besides, if, as I have suggested, society's concern with moral 
development is at bottom a concern with people's behaviour, a 
concern with spiritual development which was taken as backing 
up moral development would be an instrumental concern. For my 
own part (and the arguments of the next chapter may give 
backing to this) it seems to me legitimate that there should be 
certain social expectations as to how people should behave, 
embodied in something like a moral code. But it is far from clear 
that society has a legitimate expectation that adherence to such a 
code should flow from one sort of spiritual condition or another; it 
is not clear that society has a legitimate interest in people's 
spiritual condition at all (I do not need to hold this as a universal 
truth; it will be enough if it holds of modern, plural, more-or-less 
liberal societies). 
This does not preclude the possibility that the education of any 
individual may have something to do, or even ought to have 
something to do, with that individual's spiritual development. 
That is presumably because spiritual development is of value in 
its own right, and not just as a means towards good behaviour. If 
a common educational policy for moral development does need, as 
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I'm sure it does, to pay attention to motivational factors, perhaps 
it should do this directly, as an aspect of moral development, 
while keeping as clear as possible a distinction between moral and 
spiritual development. Too close a coupling, in educational 
rhetoric, of the moral and the spiritual risks making it more 
difficult to find or construct a shared understanding of morality 
across a society in which a variety of religious traditions co-exist 
with secular outlooks. This is not because the idea of the spiritual 
has to be tied to religion. It is because, even if we recognise a 
secular sense of spirituality, we also have to recognise that the 
idea of spirituality allows for a much greater range of individual 
variation than does that of morality. 
It will not, however, do to say simply - though I have been 
tempted by this - that while spirituality is an individual matter, 
morality is social. For there is a sense in which both must be 
social. The beliefs and attitudes involved in either must draw on 
some culturally available stock of concepts and understandings 
(for both moral and spiritual development must in part be species 
of conceptual development). And this means that for any given 
individual there may indeed be considerable overlap between the 
spiritual and the moral development of that person. But if we 
make comparisons across individuals it appears that the possible 
forms of moral development are more limited than those of 
spiritual development. In a modern plural society, with centuries 
behind it of the most diverse thought about the human condition 
and about the universe - theistic and atheistic, scientific, literary 
and artistic - the stock of ideas on which spiritual development 
can draw is so vast that there is no reason in advance to expect 
that the spiritual development of different individuals will take 
similar forms - rather the reverse. By contrast, in the case of 
moral development the possibilities are limited by the public 
social reality and function of morality (on which I shall have more 
to say). 
I would suggest too that the role of the affective is more central 
in 
spiritual development than in moral. While some notions of 
spirituality may go too far towards making it largely a matter of 
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an individual's emotional repertoire (notions, for instance, which 
do little more than gesture towards awe and wonder), I doubt 
whether we could make any sense of the spiritual without 
reference to the life of the emotions. The affective will also be 
important in the moral development of an individual; but this 
thesis will be arguing that the more cognitive, linguistically 
expressed aspect of morality can be transferred onto the public 
social plane and still, as it were, have a life of its own, whereas 
this seems not to be possible for spirituality. It is for the same 
reasons that formal (and mass) education can more readily get a 
grip on moral development than on spiritual. 9 
Because of the social reality and function of morality we are 
constrained to look for common elements in moral development 
which we do not have to expect in spiritual development. 
Consider a minimal but evaluatively positive notion of 
development, which only requires that it be a change for the 
better. To apply this notion, to say that someone has developed, 
requires some standpoint from which to judge whether a change is 
a change for the better. And if notions such as moral and spiritual 
development are to be useful in public discourse, there will have 
to be a standpoint which is at least fairly widely shared. While it 
is true for both moral and spiritual development that any 
standpoint which could be adopted will be drawing on a culturally 
available set of materials, it is also true that there is more likely to 
be agreement on a standpoint from which the notion of moral 
development can be applied than on any from which the notion of 
spiritual development can be applied. 
Suppose we say, rather formally, that the moral development of 
an individual implies an improvement in the individual's moral 
condition (whatever that may be) and similarly that the spiritual 
development of an individual implies an improvement in the 
individual's spiritual condition (whatever that may be). Although 
in each case I have inserted 'whatever that may be' in order to 
indicate that there is room for differences of interpretation, the 
notion of an individual's moral condition lends itself to an 
For a rather different view on these matters see Mott-Thornton (1998). 
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interpretation in terms of adherence or otherwise to recognised 
values. That is (to put it in a schematic way which will admittedly 
appear crude) if values a, b, and c are among the values which are 
central to the morality of a given society, one might say that a 
member of that society has progressed in his or her moral 
development just in so far as he or she has come to share the 
values a, b and c. Development here is being judged from the 
standpoint of values widely shared, which have (to quote the 
Preamble to the SCAA Forum's Statement) 'the authority of 
consensus'. 10 
There is a sense in which this way of looking at moral 
development makes the judgement of development culture- 
relative. I think that if there is to be a common public policy for 
moral education and moral development, reference to at least 
some shared values is unavoidable. (It is true that in such terms 
one could speak of moral development from a Nazi perspective; 
but the objection to that is the objection to Nazi values, not an 
objection to a way of conceiving of moral development. ) In fact 
most if not all- accounts of moral development do turn out to have 
some substantive content built into the standpoint from which 
development is judged. Aristotle's certainly did; Kohlberg's 
scheme judges moral development to have progressed further to 
the extent that people adopt a morality of universal rights (which 
is the liberal morality of a certain kind of society); theorists of 
caring judge moral development to have progressed further to the 
extent that people have come to exercise care and responsibility. 
On any such account of moral development, then, there can be a 
common policy for moral development just in so far as there are 
certain shared moral values, from the standpoint of which the 
degree of development can be assessed (these shared values may 
include the ideas that it is a good thing for people to be able to 
think for themselves and that it is a bad thing for people to be 
indoctrinated). Admittedly such a conception of moral 
development could be applied in rather crude behavioural terms, 
10 Chapter II will in effect be considering what we can make of this 
notion of authority. 
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and I would not want to endorse it in that form. But it is in any 
case significant that a standpoint which judges moral development 
in terms of adherence to shared values is available and is usable 
in public discourse. Not only that, but such a standpoint does 
reflect some of the public concerns which lie behind calls for more 
effective moral education in schools. 
In contrast there is no such publicly available and agreed 
standpoint for speaking of spiritual development. This is actually 
for two interlocking reasons: both that the notion of spiritual 
condition does not lend itself to interpretation in terms of 
observable behaviour, and that even apart from observable marks 
there is no shared sense of what constitutes a spiritually better 
condition. This second point depends on the pluralism of our 
society; there have been societies in which it would have been just 
as widely agreed that becoming an atheist is not an improvement 
in spiritual condition as that becoming a murderer is not an 
improvement in moral condition. But in modern plural societies 
there is so much room for disagreement in interpretations of an 
improvement in spiritual condition (as well as for disagreement 
over whether there is anything that counts as a spiritual 
condition) that the prospect of a publicly agreed standpoint for 
judging spiritual development is remote. 
I have been concerned to distinguish moral from spiritual 
development. What of the other two OFSTED categories, cultural 
and social development? For completeness here I shall suggest, 
without extended argument, that moral development can be 
distinguished also from both of these - except where there is 
indeed an overlap. 
Cultural development on the most natural interpretation of the 
phrase will include development in knowledge and understanding 
of culture, and in a plural society it would be natural to interpret 
the relevant knowledge and understanding as being especially 
though not exclusively that of the individual's own culture. Of 
course, problems immediately arise as to what is to be interpreted 
as 'the culture' of any young person in contemporary England. But 
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on one plausible model of a plural society, it will not matter, and 
may indeed be something to be celebrated, if individuals' cultural 
development proceeds in different directions, and with different 
content, provided that a minimal common basis of moral 
development is there. The common basis itself, though, will have 
to include some understanding of cultural diversity, for the 
reasons I have already given in the previous chapter. 
For social development something similar seems to apply. Of 
course, many moral prescriptions relate to how a person is to 
behave in society, but once these are included in the sphere of 
moral development, what else is left for social development to be? 
It will involve the acquisition of certain skills - what are, indeed, 
often called social skills - and it will involve the acquisition of 
knowledge about society. But it is not clear that there are values 
involved in social development which are prescriptive or 
obligatory on everyone, and which would not already be covered 
under a listing of moral values. Accepting one's responsibilities 
and recognising other people's rights, for instance - which in the 
QCA guidance are mentioned under 'social development' - are 
likely to be included in a listing of moral prescriptions. In 
contrast, being an outgoing, sociable sort of person is not a part of 
morality in at least one sense of the term, because it is not 
obligatory on everyone; indeed recognising people's rights would 
normally include recognising that they are within their rights if 
they choose not to live in an outgoing sociable kind of wayl I (see 
Appendix 4 for more on the language of rights). 
To conclude this admittedly limited consideration of moral and 
spiritual development, I am suggesting that we should distinguish 
1 IAt this point I am taking a somewhat Kantian rather than Aristotelian 
approach - indeed the example of sociability is not a bad one for 
illustrating the difference, since something very like sociability figures 
in Aristotle's list of virtues, while Kant in the Groundwork explicitly 
uses the example of a thoroughly unsociable person who can 
nevertheless be a shining example of the fulfilment of moral obligation. 
We have to remember that we are talking here about something which 
might come to be prescribed as common policy by a government agency 
- within a state which is very far from Aristotle's kind of Polity. For this 
context, I think I do want to defend a rather Kantian conception of the 
moral values that should be promoted as common, and this will come 
through in my arguments below in favour of a language of norms. 
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moral values - as values which are seen as prescriptive for 
everyone within a society - from other values which may be 
involved in certain patterns of spiritual (and indeed social or 
cultural) development but which will not be prescriptive for 
everyone. On this basis we would be able to identify a certain 
common pattern of moral development, in terms of content, while 
we would not be able to identify a common pattern - common in 
the sense that everyone ought to be encouraged to follow it - for 
spiritual, cultural or social development. And we could then use 
the question, 'Do we think that everyone will be more developed 
to the extent that they come to hold this or that valueT, as one 
way of distinguishing whether it is moral development or some 
other kind of development that we are talking about. 
Taking stock 
To take stock at the end of this first Part, I want to agree with 
those who argue that values education - to use the broader term 
again - should be informed by a sense of values held in common 
(as well as by awareness of diversity). But I also want to say that 
the mere fact of being held in common is not in itself of 
fundamental importance. We need to consider why we are 
interested in certain values being held in common; and this 
consideration will lead us, I suggest, to realise that one of the 
things we are interested in is a shared morality, in one sense of 
that term. If common values are to be seen as prescriptive, then 
the search for such will make more sense if it is informed by a 
shared understanding of the nature of morality. Then that 
understanding of morality will be more basic than any particular 
content agreed on at a given time. We should not expect full 
consensus on the content of morality at any one time, because the 
underlying sense of the nature of morality will allow for some 
disagreement in specifics. Correspondingly, the educational task 
of promoting a shared understanding of morality will be more 
basic than promoting adherence to particular values which are 
taken to be shared. 
But is this a realistic conception of one of the tasks of education in 
the face of the diversity of understandings - including conceptions 
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of morality - which I have already stressed? Recalling some of 
my points in Chapter 2, we could adopt an alternative conception 
of the educational task; we could say that we should concentrate 
on reinforcing agreement where we find it, even if it is at a 
superficial level, and let underlying understandings of morality 
look after themselves. In part, I have already shown in Chapter 2 
why I think that response is unsatisfactory. I want to add that 
the very diversity of understandings creates possibilities for 
misunderstanding, and sheer talking at cross-purposes, which 
education has a responsibility to try to mitigate. This is a point I 
shall take up again in Chapter 13, when I shall argue that there is 
good reason for citizenship education to take on the task of 
promoting a certain shared understanding of morality. 
Clearly it is a presupposition of this argument that there is 
available a way of understanding morality which could be shared 
across a plural society. I think that there is; it is the idea of 
morality in the narrow sense which I shall address throughout the 
bulk of this thesis. It is not an unfamiliar way of thinking of 
morality - indeed if it were not a way of thinking which is already 
quite widespread it would be less likely to be able to play the role 
which I envisage for it. At the same time, since I want to argue 
that education should explicitly bring out and focus on this way of 
seeing morality, it is important to my argument to show that this 
conception of morality is viable and is potentially widely 
intelligible. That is why the bulk of this thesis is concerned with 
unpacking the idea of morality in the narrow sense. What is its 
function? In what sort of terms can it be articulated? Can it be 
seen as having any kind of authority? I want to pursue such 
questions in a way which avoids philosophical naivete, but at the 
same time I want my unpacking of the idea to be one which is 
intelligible, or could readily be made intelligible, to a 
philosophically unsophisticated audience - for if this is not 
possible, there will be little point in recommending that teachers 
should have a firm grasp of morality in the narrow sense. 
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Part 11 
Morality(n) and its languages 
In Chapter Four I outline a particular - and familiar - conception 
of morality - morality in the narrow sense, or morality(n) - which 
is a putatively a conception which could be widely shared. I go on 
to consider how such a morality is to be articulated. To use a 
language of norms seems to me most natural, but since there has 
been much recent advocacy in the literature of the merits of 
virtue ethics, I begin in Chapter 5 to consider how far a language 
of virtues could function as the language in which morality(n) is 
articulated. Since that discussion is rather abstract, I supplement 
it in Chapter 6 by considering the ways we talk about one 
particular area of public moral concern - violence. 
Two further discussions arising from Part 2 have been put in the 
Appendices since they are not central to my main argument. 
Appendix 4 considers whether a language confined to talk of 
rights could do the job of morality(n). Then, on the assumption 
that morality(n) is to be articulated primarily in terms of norms, 
but not in terms of rights alone, Appendix 5 begins to consider 
what the norms relating to violence might be - which is closely 
related to the question of what we understand violence to be. 
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Chapter Four 
Morality in the narrow sense 
Morality and law 
I have suggested that in looking for shared values which were 
seen as having force for people's conduct, the SCAA Forum was in 
effect looking for a shared morality. This does not imply that a 
shared understanding was achieved on what kind of thing 
morality is - no such agreement was explicitly aimed at - but it 
does point in the direction in which such an agreement might be 
found. The key is to be found, I think, in the idea that morality 
has a social function, and in a certain understanding of what that 
function is. 
In pursuing that line of thought, it will be best to forestall certain 
objections at the beginning. Id o not intend what I say about the 
function of morality to capture everything which the notion of 
morality means to many of the people to whom that notion is 
important. I shall have more to say about what the notion of 
morality which I am developing leaves out. For the moment, it is 
best to refer to the notion I am discussing in a terminology first 
used, to my knowledge, by John Mackie: 'morality in the narrow 
sense', which I shall henceforth usually abbreviate to morality(n). 
Briefly, the suggestion is that morality has a similar function to 
that of law. Better put, there seems to be a function which 
morality and law offer different, though related, means of 
fulfilling. The plausibility of this can be shown by telling a story 
of the common origins of law and morality(n). Whether this story 
is anthropologically accurate is beyond my competence to judge; 
but if it sounds plausible, that fact by itself demonstrates the 
plausibility of an analysis of morality(n) which likens it to law. 
We can, like Hart (1961 p. 89) in The Concept of Law, think of a 
community (perhaps of hunter-gatherers) in which there are 
common expectations about conduct but no systematic way, either 
in form or content, in which one class of expectations is 
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differentiated from another. 1 Where there is divergence from a 
certain expectation there may be disapproval in some form - it 
might be in facial expression or body language - and this will be 
among the ways in which ways of doing things are learned and 
hence maintained from one generation to another. 
Simply in talking of expectations, of a shared sense of what is 
done and what is not done, we are not yet talking of morality as 
opposed to law - or indeed to etiquette, say, or religious 
observance. But we are already referring to the roots of both 
morality and law as the social practices or institutions which, later, 
they would become; and since we are already talking of ways of 
doing things which are not instinctive, but have to be learned, we 
are talking of the roots of education too. 
Though there is no single function which the expectations about 
conduct in such a community would have performed, some of 
them will in fact have tended to help the affairs of the community 
to run smoothly, by protecting its members against their 
vulnerability both to external dangers and to other members of 
the same society (Hart ibid. Ch. 9). For example, once weapons 
are in use, there are likely to be norms about maintaining them in 
effective condition; and also, since weapons which could be used in 
hunting will be potentially lethal to members of the group, there 
are likely to be norms about safe and non-malicious use too. In 
the conduct of the hunt, co-operation and co-ordination of the 
actions of members of the group will be vital (the consequences of 
lack of co-operation and co-ordination will not just be 
inconvenience, but at times could be violent death or starvation). 
So expectations about co-operation and co-ordination will develop 
and will need to be taken very seriously. Then again, there are 
likely to be norms about how an animal killed is to be used by the 
group, whether divided up or not, and so on. So a variety of 
expectations will tend either to protect members of the 
1 Hart (ibid. ) speaks of 
differentiation of law at 
be already to have read 
conception from a later 
whether morality(n) has 
obligations. 
the norms of conduct, even prior to the 
A morality, as 'rules of obligation', but this may 
back into the description of the situation a 
way of thinking. I shall be considering below 
to be articulated in terms of rules and 
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community or to protect the way of life of the community itself 
against things which can go wrong. 2 
We can make sense of the existence of such expectations 
independently of the distinction between law and morality. 
Perhaps in time it will happen that if someone takes a larger than 
usual share of the kill, there are mutterings of disapproval but 
nothing more; whereas if one member of the group turns their 
weapon on another, the first member is brought before a 
gathering which prescribes a penalty. Then with hindsight, we 
might say that fairness in division is a moral expectation but the 
prohibition on violence within the group is (also) legal. There still 
need not be any significant difference in the way that the 
expectations are initially learned by children; they will learn that 
certain things are done and certain things not done before they 
have any clear or differentiated sense of what happens, in the 
adult world, when one expectation or another is violated. 3 
Much in the picture sketched so far can be carried over, I suggest, 
to education in expected ways of behaving even in a modern 
complex society. Children today learn all kinds of ways in which 
things are done, and also learn that certain things are not to be 
done; and they are likely to acquire such vocabulary as 'ought not 
to' and 'wrong' - as part of the repertoire they recognise, even if 
they do not use it themselves - well before they acquire the terms 
'morality' and 'law', or are able to differentiate between what is 
morally wrong and what is legally wrong. 4 Perhaps, too, for many 
2 Contrary to the way some might interpret talk of morality(n), such an 
account does not commit one to a Hobbesian individualism or to 
anachronistically reading into the consciousness of the members of the 
community any specifically modern conception of 'the individual'. 
3 Notice that once the morality/law distinction is made, it need not be a 
distinction in content. It is to be expected that moral and legal norms 
will overlap considerably in what they prescribe or proscribe 
(deliberate killing of another member of the group is one obvious 
example; cf. Hart (1961) Ch. 9 for some others). How far the similarity 
between law and morality extends will turn to a large extent on matters 
of form rather than content. 
4 It is possible, though I shall not pursue the point, that the 
psychological emergence of certain distinctions in individual 
consciousness parallels their historical emergence in human societies; 
cf. Habermas's (1979) way of applying the developmental theories of 
Piaget and Kohlberg to the evolution of society. 
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adults the idea that children should be taught what is right and 
what is wrong - where this in turn is conceived in terms of 
adherence to norms - is used in a blanket way with little weight 
given to the morality/law distinction. When an event like the 
murder of Philip Lawrence leads to calls that schools must do 
more to stamp in and reinforce a sense of right and wrong, this 
popular reaction may see little need to distinguish between moral 
and legal right and wrong. Perhaps this is correct, in the sense 
that society's need for certain sorts of conduct to be ruled out is 
more basic than the division between morality and law. (It is 
significant in this respect that when Maclntyre (1981 p. 141) 
argues that any community needs, in addition to virtues, a 
recognition of certain offences as beyond the pale, he uses for the 
later kind of 'evaluative practice' the phrase 'a morality of laws'. ) 
What we have so far, then, is the notion that any society needs a 
basic framework of expectations (and that these, of course, need to 
be sustained from generation to generation). The need for this 
framework is in a sense prior to the distinction between morality 
and law. (One of the clearest statements of this idea is in Hobbes, 
where 'the state of nature' is the name for the human condition 
prior to both morality and law. In Hobbes, moral rules by 
themselves would be of no avail if they were not backed up by 
political sovereignty and so, in effect, treated precisely as laws. ) 
The notion of the basic framework is also in Hart, as mentioned 
above; and within philosophy of education it is recognised by John 
White (e. g. 1990, p. 37; TRAW p. 22) among others. 
One matter on which theorists differ is just how the distinction 
between morality and law is to be made; granted it may seem 
obvious to us now, in a modern Western society, what is law and 
what is not, but even if it is obvious there is still a task for 
philosophy in explicating the rationale of the distinction; and once 
theorists try to give that explication, it can turn out, as in the 
writings of Ronald Dworkin, that the distinction is not so clear 
after all. 
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Here I shall not enter into discussion of what makes certain norms 
law, rather than (merely, as some might say) moral expectations. 
I shall assume that the distinction can be made in a sufficiently 
clear way for it to make sense (in modern societies, but not in the 
kind of community in the story above) to talk about an analogy 
between morality and law. If we claim such an analogy we are 
saying that law and morality are not (now) the same thing, but 
that there are important similarities between them. For instance, 
morality has often been seen, like law, as containing many 
prohibitions on certain kinds of act; and violations of the 
prohibitions have sometimes been seen in both cases as liable to 
call forth some sort of sanction (even though, in the case of 
morality, it may be only a sanction of public disappr oval). 
To refer to such similarities is not, in logic, to endorse any 
particular story of the origins of morality and of law, though some 
story of common origins may in fact explain the similarities. Even 
if a story of common roots is true, many distinctions will have 
developed over time, so that it is now normal in common practice 
and usage to distinguish law and morality. Whatever the 
analogies, then, there are certainly also going to be disanalogies. 
For instance, if both law and morality involve sanctions of a kind, 
the sanctions of morality may be unenforceable, and may indeed 
be internal (as in Mill's Utilitarianism Ch. 3). There are certainly 
going to be points at which an analogy between law and morality 
cannot be sustained; this means that pointing out particular points 
of difference will not in itself be an argument against the analogy. 
There is also an important ambiguity to be considered at this 
point. While it is clear that there has been much argument in 
recent moral philosophy against construing morality on a model of 
law - from writers as varied as Anscombe (1997, 
first 
published1958) and Bauman (1993), and in philosophy of 
education John White (1990 pp. 40-42) - many of the objections 
have been against the idea, not of morality as analogous to the 
positive law of states, but of morality as a system of law which 
is 
universal, and independent of and authoritative over the positive 
law of states. Construing morality in this latter way retains some 
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points of analogy between morality and law but also sets up clear 
differences. It makes it evident, for instance, that morality 
applies much more widely than just to the citizens of a state; and 
it can set law and morality against each other, in that morality can 
be appealed to in criticism of the law. 
In effect, then, there are two versions of the analogy between 
morality and law. Many of the criticisms of such an analogy in the 
literature such as general criticisms of the role of rules in 
morality will apply to both versions, but some will apply to one 
only. Criticisms of natural law and Kantian conceptions of 
morality will not necessarily have force against morality 
construed as much closer to positive law. Anscombe, for instance, 
puts weight on the point that (if we no longer have God as law- 
giver in the picture) there can be nothing in the role of legislator 
for a universal moral law. If the Kantian conception of the 
autonomous self as law-giver is also rejected (see K. Baier (1973) 
pp. 101-4, as well as Anscombe), then there can be no moral law. 
Here, however, I shall consciously be pursuing an analogy 
between morality and the positive law of states (one also 
remarked by Griffin 1996). On this, objections of Anscombe's kind 
largely miss the mark. Law in the positive sense (which is surely, 
at least now, the standard sense, whether or not it was the original 
sense of the word) clearly does not lack a legislator (which need 
not be a single person), and, since it does exist, is clearly not 
impossible. What if anything stands in the role of legislator in the 
case of morality(n) will be taken up in Chapter 11. 
Morality and the wider ethical sphere 
For all that has been said so far, once we look further away from 
matters of function and form, and bring into our sights matters of 
individual feelings, attitudes, perceptions, ideals (the list could go 
on), it becomes clear (and has been emphasised in much recent 
moral philosophy) that there are many aspects of morality that 
cannot be captured in the analogy with law. That is why we need 
something like the notion of morality in the narrow sense, which 
seems to correspond approximately to that area of morality which 
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does share its function (though not necessarily, as we shall see in 
the next chapter, its form) with that of law. 
This notion of morality in the narrow sense has come in for a 
certain amount of criticism from moral philosophers in recent 
years. However, most of the criticism has been of one of two 
kinds. (What I say in this paragraph and the next will be far from 
satisfying to philosophers of education or moral philosophers who 
in recent years have been convinced by writers such as Charles 
Taylor and Bernard Williams that there is something seriously 
amiss with narrow notions of morality. I therefore add more in 
the next section. ) Some criticism has been of particular ways of 
unpacking the form of morality(n); for instance, seeing it very 
much in terms of obligations. The question of the form that 
morality(n) should take is one I have still to consider, so this kind 
of criticism will be addressed as the argument proceeds. 
Other criticisms have been directed against the idea that 
morality(n) is all there is to morality - or to ethics, which is often 
now taken as the broader term. But this is not a criticism that 
applies to the position I am arguing here. I not only acknowledge, 
but I would myself stress, that the sphere of the moral or the 
ethical can and does extend well beyond morality(n). It can 
encompass individual's deepest concerns about how they should 
live their lives and about what sort of persons they are to be; thus 
it can involve various sorts of evaluation: evaluations of actions, of 
attitudes, of personal qualities, of individual lifestyles, even of 
whole cultures. Roughly speaking, the further the sphere of 
morality or ethics is extended, and the more kinds of evaluation it 
takes in, the more room there is for differences and disagreements 
within that sphere. 5 My aim here is to delineate a minimal 
conception which could, despite wider variations, be shared. 
I want to try, then, to construe morality(n) in a positive light, and 
to see whether, in making sense of the notion, we are committed 
to interpretations which will not stand up to criticism. I also want 
5 And in the light of the previous chapter we could add 'the more 
difficult it becomes to distinguish morality from spirituality'. 
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to see morality(n) here, taking up the discussion from Chapter 2, 
as the morality which we can expect to be shared across a society 
of diversity (without wishing that formulation to be taken as a 
definition). If we can find empirical consensus in the area of 
morality at all, we are more likely to find it in relation to 
morality(n) than over the whole field of morality or ethics more 
widely construed. Consensus may be all the more likely if the 
search is guided by a shared understanding of the idea of 
morality(n) itself. But that is to anticipate. For the moment, it is 
also worth noting that the idea of morality(n) fits well with the 
idea, common in recent Anglo-American liberal theory, as well as 
in Habermas, that there is both more need for and more scope for 
agreement on the right than the good, and that in a certain sense 
an ethic of the right must have priority in a liberal society. Thus 
Habermas distinguishes moral questions from what he calls 
evaluative or ethical questions 'which fall into the general 
category of issues of the good life' (t990 p. 17 8). 
I have no quarrel with the widespread views that education 
should be concerned with enabling people to live, if possible, a 
good life; that a good life for one will not, in details, be the same as 
a good life for another; hence that, in modern plural societies 
especially, much of the purpose of education will be enable 
individuals to find for themselves and to pursue a good life; and 
that (to put it rather crudely) individuals in doing this will have to 
integrate whatever allegiance they may have to shared moral 
values with other values which are important to them. But what I 
am concerned about here is whether we can still, recognising all 
this, keep open the possibility of a shared morality which actually 
helps to make the pursuit of a good life possible. 
Notice that this position not only recognises that the field of values 
is wider than that of morality. It also in a sense makes certain 
values more fundamental than morality; these are the values 
which morality itself subserves. Philosophers such as Hobbes, and 
more recently Mackie and Geoffrey Warnock, did see certain 
things clearly, even if their focus was a narrow one (some might 
say blinkered). They saw that human beings 
do value, and would 
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be likely in almost all circumstances to value, freedom from pain 
and injury, from assault and danger of death, from hunger and 
isolation. They may have been wrong in supposing (if they did 
suppose) that in all conceivable circumstances morality(n) would 
be necessary if these values were to be realised; maybe, as more 
optimistic views of the human condition would have it, fellow- 
feeling and altruism could eliminate the need for morality(n) as 
we know it. But that does not alter the point that morality(n) can 
be seen as one way at least in which human communities may to a 
degree obtain and protect something of what they value. To that 
extent the popular perception of morality as something which 
schools should promote in order to protect people from anti-social 
behaviour is fully in line with a long-standing philosophical 
conception of morality. 6 
Criticisms of a narrow notion of morality 
There have been influential critics in recent years of morality(n) - 
at least this is what I have often taken them to be criticising. I 
have in mind especially Bernard Williams and Charles Taylor. A 
number of writers in philosophy of education, including John 
White, have been influenced by Williams and Taylor. Williams, as 
is well known, criticised 'morality, the peculiar institution', in 
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy; and Taylor (1995) has 
expressed his broad agreement with Williams, having previously 
in his own right contributed to the critique of morality(n) in 
Sources of the Self (Taylor 1989b). 
Here I do not need to take up all of the many points raised by 
Williams and Taylor. I do need to say enough to show that there 
is still point in being concerned with morality(n) even after their 
criticisms. To do this, it is important to distinguish criticism of 
morality(n) itself - that is, of the institution or practice - from 
criticisms of philosophers' interpretations of morality. (Note that 
the last word of the previous sentence is not 'morality(n). ) It is 
explicit in Mackie's account of morality(n), and is implicit in the 
label itself, that morality(n) is not the whole of morality, since 
6 There is certainly a question as to why it should be particularly 
human interests which morality protects or promotes; I shall come back 
to this in Chapter 12. 
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there is also what Mackie calls 'morality in the broad sense'. So, at 
least on Mackie's interpretation, any philosopher who offers what 
is in effect an account of morality(n), as an account of morality 
tout court, is mistaken. Clearly, to take an over-narrow view of 
something that needs to be understood in all its breadth and 
richness, is to take a distorted view of the phenomena; but to take 
a narrow view of what is in fact broad, is not the same as to take 
an accurate view of something which is in fact narrow. Once we 
make this distinction, between a narrow interpretation of 
morality, and an interpretation of morality -in -the-narro w -sense, 
we can see that a concern with morality(n) can quite properly 
survive much of Williams' and Taylor's critiques. 
Writers such as Mackie are saying that within the whole field of 
what he calls morality in the broad sense we can distinguish a 
particular institution, or practice, or way of thinking, which can be 
described as morality(n). Writers such as Williams and Taylor are 
not disputing that. Indeed Williams explicitly distinguishes what 
he calls 'morality' from the broader area of concern which is 
roughly what Mackie calls 'morality in the broad sense' and which 
Williams labels 'the ethical'; 7 and some years later Williams (1995, 
p. 246) himself uses the phrase 'morality in the narrow sense' for 
what he called in 1985 'the peculiar institution'. Williams and 
Taylor are not disputing the existence of morality(n). A large part 
of what they are doing is criticising the mistaken philosophical 
interpretation which sees morality(n) as being the whole of the 
relevant area of concern. But they are also criticising the way that 
morality(n) has itself been interpreted by philosophers (and in 
doing so they are, of course, acknowledging its existence). 
Thus Williams in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy criticises the 
interpretation of morality(n) which gives a particular kind of 
centrality to obligation. Roughly, morality(n) on the interpretation 
Williams is criticising is a Kantian morality. He acknowledges that 
utilitarianism can share some of the same features (p. 178). I take 
7 There is, however, at least one important difference between Mackie's 
Imorality in the broad sense and Williams' 'ethics' or 'the ethical'; that is, 
that Mackie considers morality, even in the broad sense, to be 'a body of 
principles'. 
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this to imply that a less Kantian, much more utilitarian, 
interpretation of morality(n) is a possibility. At times, while 
acknowledging the existence of morality(n), Williams seems to 
be saying that we would be better off without it. In his 1995 
collection, he seems to me to be taking a somewhat softer line. I 
find it significant, for instance, that in his essay in that volume on 
what would normally be called 'professional ethics, he uses the 
term 'professional morality. This may well be because he realised 
that, having defined ethics as the very broad area of thought 
about how one should live one's life, he could hardly use the same 
term of something intended to apply within strict professional 
limits. In any case, the sense of the term 'morality' in the phrase 
'professional morality' does seem to be that of 'morality(n)'. 
To turn to Taylor, in Sources of the Self (1989b, p. 3) he 
complains that 
'much contemporary moral philosophy.... has given such a narrow 
focus to morality that some of the critical connections I want to 
draw here are incomprehensible in its terms ..... This philosophy 
has accredited a cramped and truncated view of morality in a 
narrow sense, as well as of the whole range of issues involved in 
the attempt to live the best possible life ....... I. 
Here Taylor appears to be acknowledging that there is such a 
thing as morality(n), in contradistinction to the broader field 
(however that is to be labelled), while also saying that 
philosophical interpretations even of morality(n) are too narrow. 
Two more examples from recent moral philosophy. Griffin (1996 
p. 79) explicitly treats ethics as the broader field which includes 
both morality and prudence, and it seems fair to interpret 
morality here as morality(n). This makes the whole situation 
appear clear-cut (even though Griffin has spoken earlier in the 
book of the interpenetration of prudence and morality). Perhaps 
to Taylor and Williams Griffin's treatment might seem rather 
shallow in its clear-cutness; no doubt this is partly a matter of 
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style. 8 Slote (1992) is closer to Williams in treating ethics as a 
broad field of evaluation, wider than prudential, but not confined 
to morality in either its utilitarian, Kantian or common-sense 
forms. But there is no consistency of terminology across writers; 
nor, probably, is there likely to be. 9 
Taylor, in Sources of the Self, acknowledges that 'morality' can be 
and often is defined purely in terms of respect for and obligation 
towards others, and goes on 
'If we adopt this definition, then we have to allow that there are 
other questions beyond the moral which are of central concern to 
us, and which bring strong evaluation into play. (ibid. ) 
These 'other questions beyond the moral' are the questions which 
Williams labels ethical, but which Taylor himself in Sources Qf the 
Self continues to refer to as moral (in other words, he does not 
himself adopt the possible narrow definition, but continues to use 
I moral' in a broad sense). Later, Taylor (1995) appears to endorse 
Williams's terminology, but as Williams (1995 p. 241) himself says 
'The suggestion that we might use the words in this way has 
hardly, as yet, swept all before it, and it no doubt has its own 
powers to mislead'. The editors of TRAW, expressing a general 
suspicion of systematic theory in relation to moral education, say 
'For similar reasons, and in line with ordinary usage, we have 
avoided systematic differentiation between 'morality' and 'ethics' 
in this book' (p. x). ('Avoided' suggests that, but for this deliberate 
intent, they might have slipped into systematic differentiation; but 
avoiding that is easy; it is maintaining it that is difficult. ) 
Another complication which interacts with that of terminology is 
that the distinction between the phenomena and interpretations of 
the phenomena is not sharp. If there were no moral philosophers, 
8 In some respects Griffin is still an Oxford philosopher of the old 
school; a point recognised in the review of his Value Judgement by A. W. 
Price (Philosophical Books 39,1,1998), quoted on the back cover of the 
paperback. 
9 Bauman (1993, p. 21) for instance, uses the terms 'ethics' and 'morality' 
to mark a different distinction. 
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then indeed there would be no technically philosophical 
interpretations of morality, narrow or broad. But interpretations 
are written into the phenomena. This is much of the burden of 
Williams' discussion of the peculiar institution in Chapter 10 of 
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, and when Taylor says 
'morality can be, of course, and often is, defined purely in terms of 
respect for others. The category of the moral is thought to 
encompass just our obligations to other people. ' (Sources of the 
Self p. 14) he is (as I read him) referring to the thought of many 
ordinary people in modern cultures, not just the philosophers. 
This means that another kind of criticism is open to writers like 
Williams and Taylor. Besides criticising (a) the philosophers who 
treat morality(n) as if it were the whole of the relevant area of 
concern, and (b) the philosophers who misrepresent morality(n), 
they can also be criticising (c) morality(n) itself for inherently 
working with mistaken interpretations. This kind of criticism goes 
back at least to Marx. 1 0 As Lukes (1985) and many others have 
noted, Marx was highly critical of morality, if this was understood 
as the 'official' morality of his day (and earlier). This was what 
Lukes describes as 'the morality of Recht; and Lukes explicitly 
treats this as similar to Mackie's morality(n) (ibid. p. 31). 
Morality in this sense was to Marx inherently ideological, in other 
words, it incorporated - independently of philosophers coming 
onto the scene - understandings which were false but which, as a 
matter of false consciousness, could not be seen as false: had 
morality not been experienced as putting objective, universal 
constraints on people, it would not have been able to serve its 
actual social function, which was to protect the existing structure 
of social relations. 
Williams, while dissociating himself from a vulgar Marxist 
interpretation (1985 pp. 195-6), also believes that 'morality, the 
peculiar institution' rests on an illusion - which is, at 
least in P, &; t, 
that morality is somehow insulated from luck (see also 
Williams 
1995). It is not clear, however, that morality(n) necessarily has to 
be subject to the interpretations that Marx or 
Williams, or any 
101 used Marx in my exposition of criticisms of morality 
in TAV p. 66. 
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other particular theorist, read into it. In this sense, such writers 
are giving us a particular, still narrower, reading of morality(n). 
(Morality(n 1- ), so to speak). 
It seems to me that morality(n) does not have to rest on an 
illusion. It should be possible for people to be fully conscious of 
the nature of morality(n), and still take it seriously. But to try to 
bring this about is an educational task (to be addressed here 
chiefly in Part IV). 
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Chapter Five 
The language(s) of virtues 
The languages of morality(n) 
If there is to be a convergence in public understanding on a 
conception of morality in the narrow sense, there has to be a way 
of talking about that morality and expressing its content which 
can be both readily understood and widely adopted. 
if one puts weight on the analogy between morality(n) and law, 
one might expect morality(n) to be unpacked in a language of 
norms, that is, of prescriptions setting out what people are to do or 
not to do. This is, indeed, the kind of language adopted by the 
SCAA Forum in its list of statements beginning 'we should-1. . 
This fact is not, of course, an argument in itself. There are other 
possible kinds of language in which morality(n) could be 
articulated. In this and the following chapter, and Appendix 4,1 
want to look at other possibilities. 
There seem to be two main possibilities to be considered before 
returning (as I shall) to the rather undifferentiated idea of a 
language of norms. First, there is a possibility which tries in a 
sense to stay within a language of norms but to make this 
language more specific; it tries to talk purely in terms of rights. 
Then, there is a possibility which tries to move outside a language 
of norms altogether, by talking not about what people are to do or 
not to do, but about personal qualities: a language of virtues. 
Because the relationship between a language of norms and a 
language of virtues raises, to my mind, the most interesting issues 
(and also the ones most pertinent in relation to the recent 
literature) I shall concentrate on this in the main body of my 
argument. But it may also be constructive to consider the 
possibilities of a language consisting wholly of rights-talk; 
I shall 
do this in Appendix 4. 
First, it is worth considering what kind of question 
it is that we 
are asking in wondering what kind of 
language is appropriate for 
articulating morality(n). Is it a metaethical question about 
the 
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fundamental nature of morality: about whether morality is 
constituted by rights, or by virtues, or by something else? I think 
it is not that kind of question. I have already characterised 
morality(n) as itself subserving certain values, where these values 
are human interests (though I have also acknowledged that this 
raises a question about the moral status of non-human interests). 
The question, then, about the language in which to articulate 
morality(n) is a question about what kind of language will best 
enable morality(n) to fulfil its function; and in answering this 
question it is appropriate to consider such points as that the 
language in which we articulate morality(n) has to be one which is 
widely intelligible, which can be communicated and used in 
educational contexts, and so on. 
Seeing the question in this way also enables us to see that the 
candidates I have suggested are unlikely to be mutually exclusive. 
The actual language that we do use in moral discourse does 
contain both mention of rights (often using that word) and 
mention of virtues (usually not, outside philosophy, using that 
word), as well as mention of heterogeneous kinds of norms. It 
would need a special argument to show why, for purposes of 
achieving and promoting a shared public understanding of 
morality(n), some restriction should be imposed on the kind of 
language to be used. 
Nevertheless, in public contexts there is certainly room for 
differences in emphasis. And in educational discourse especially, 
there are deliberate decisions to be made about where to put the 
emphasis, what kind of language to use and to encourage others to 
use. It is still, then, sensible to look at what there is to be said for 
and against the different kinds of language I have mentioned. 
Can morality(n) use a language of virtues? 
Given that we are looking for some sort of public way of talking - 
which will also provide a vocabulary in which people 
do much of 
their own thinking - which will serve the 
functions of morality(n), 
it is worth considering w hether talk about virtues could serve 
this 
function. Law, of course, does not for the most part say 'be kind' 
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or 'be honest'; for the most part it lays down rather concrete 
prescriptions as to what is to be done or (more typically) not done. 
But if morality(n) shares its function with law, that does not by 
itself mean that it must share its form. In The Object of Morality, 
Warnock (1971), whose account of morality is rightly construed 
by Mackie as an account of morality(n)l, criticises the idea that 
rules are basic to morality and argues instead for virtues as basic. 7 
This is enough to show that the distinction between morality(n) 
and the wider sphere (however it is designated) is not the same as 
the distinction between a morality of rules and a morality of 
virtues. Though it would be true to say that most proponents in 
recent years (roughly, since MacIntyre's After Virtue) of what 
has come to be known as 'virtue ethics' are aiming at a 
characterisation of the wider sphere rather than of morality(n), a 
morality or ethics of virtues can itself come in narrow or wide 
versions. 
Mackie (1977 p. 106) defines morality(n) as follows: 'In the 
narrow sense, a morality is a system of a particular sort of 
constraints on conduct - ones whose central task is to protect the 
interests of persons other than the agent and which present 
themselves to an agent as checks on his natural inclinations or 
spontaneous tendencies to act. ' It is perfectly possible to 
interpret virtues as functioning as such checks; this is what 
Warnock does, and it was also a major element, for instance, of a 
rather seminal paper on virtues by Philippa Foot: 'they are 
corrective, each one standing at a point at which there is some 
temptation to be resisted or deficiency of motivation to be made 
good' (1978, p. 8). On such a basis, it is possible for an account of 
virtues to be offered as an account of morality(n); the qualities 
picked out as virtues will be ones which are seen as minimally 
necessary as a basis for life in society. 
1 This is shown by the rationale that Warnock gives for morality; and by 
the fact that he makes a sharp distinction between the topic of morality 
and that of 'the Good Life' (e. g. ibid. p. 92), 
2 In Chapter 71 shall agree with at least one of Warnock's points about 
rules. 
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Why might it be thought that a language of virtues is suitable, not 
only for the broader area of concern, but also for serving the 
function of morality(n)? Someone might think this on the basis of 
an argument that dispositions are basic to morality, which is the 
position taken by Warnock. A similar general point, though not 
specifically in relation to morality(n), is argued by Williams 
(1987), in a passage which Patricia White (1996) quotes at the 
beginning of her exploration of civic virtues. However, it does not 
follow from a recognition that dispositions are fundamental that a 
language of dispositions is the best language in which to talk about 
morality(n), especially where we have public understanding in 
mind. This would be a little like arguing that because chemical 
changes in cells are fundamental in human health and fitness, the 
language of biochemistry is the best language for public health 
policy. But this is certainly not an exact analogy. Instead of 
analogy, we need to think directly about the job that a public 
language of evaluation has to do, and what kind of language is 
suited to this job. 
A first point is that when we think about a language of virtues as 
a public language, our focus is rather different from the focus of 
the writers who have been arguing recently for conceiving of 
moral education as the development of virtue. An upbringing 
which develops virtues in individuals does not by in itself 
constitute an education for a shared public conception of morality. 
One of the features of virtue ethics, as a strand within the 
literature of moral philosophy, is that it puts rather more weight 
than do rule-and-principle based theories on tacit elements of 
morality. 3 For some purposes, for instance in thinking about the 
moral upbringing of one child by its parents, this emphasis on 
the tacit is important. Early moral upbringing may be to a 
considerable extent a matter of the child learning by example with 
little having to be verbalised at a general and abstract level - 
I abstract' in the sense of being abstracted from the particular 
circumstances. And so it is possible, at least to a degree, for a 
child to grow up with the virtues, say, of consideration and 
3 The work of Peters, of which I shall say more below, especially in 
Chapters 8 and 9, is something of an exception. 
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sensitivity to others, without actually having the terms 
'consideration' and ' sensitivity' in his or her vocabulary. 
But for a mass education system hoping to promote a shared 
morality, verbalisation is inevitable, as regards both means and 
ends. As regards means, even if the attempt to develop certain 
virtues in pupils were to be carried out in ways that did not 
involve actually talking to the pupils about the virtues, the 
teachers would need to have a way of articulating amongst 
themselves what they were doing, and any educationalists or 
public bodies concerned with education would need a language in 
which to talk to teachers about their task. 
Then as regards ends, a shared morality requires that citizens 
have a common language in which they can talk about matters of 
morality: about what kind of moral education they are going to 
give their children, about the kind of behaviour they expect from 
each other, and about public moral problems. Since possessing a 
virtue does not necessarily mean that one can oneself articulate it, 
then even if we could suppose that across a modern diverse 
society all citizens developed certain virtues in common, this 
would not by itself mean that they had a shared language of moral 
evaluation. To some degree this point is recognised, for instance, 
by Patricia White (1996 p. 6) when she argues that as well as 
fostering dispositions (which might by itself seem manipulative) 
education needs to promote understanding of the dispositions. But 
she does not in my view go far enough in asking whether this 
understanding, even when shared, provides a suitable language 
for public discussion of morality and moral issues. 
There are several reasons for a degree of caution about this. Most 
pragmatically, consideration of the language to be used in 
education has to start, not with a clean slate, but from where we 
are now. And where we are now is that while words for virtues 
and their negative counterparts - what some philosophers have 
called 'thick' terms of moral evaluation, such as 'generous', 
'decent', 'caring', 'self-centred', 'dishonest' and the like - are very 
common in everyday discourse, reflection on such qualities, and 
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their labelling by a general term such as 'virtues' - let alone a 
shared conception of what kind of quality a virtue is - are not 
everyday parts of ordinary discourse. 
This may sometimes be forgotten now by moral philosophers and 
philosophers of education, since in recent years the word 'virtue' 
has come into common use in these circles. This does not mean 
that it would be easy to get the general public to make explicit use 
of the notion of virtues. The notion of a virtue to the layperson 
can carry a connotation of an ideal, even of saintliness, that is, of a 
quality which could hardly serve as an everyday standard of 
evaluation or a public expectation. 4 
Some of the things which philosophers have said about virtues 
would be liable to strengthen this impression of a virtue as 
something exceptional (if the general public were to read works of 
academic philosophy). Thus Hursthouse says (referring to a 
woman because she is discussing abortion, but making it clear that 
she intends the gist of her remarks to apply to males also): 
The virtuous woman (which here of course does not mean simply 
'chaste woman' but 'woman with the virtues') has such character 
traits as strength, independence, resoluteness, decisiveness, self- 
confidence, responsibility, serious-mindedness, and self- 
determination 
........ (1997 p. 
235) 
If the language of virtues is to be understood as putting forward 
such an ideal (a 'paragon of virtue', in a phrase which significantly 
seems still to be in the everyday language), it may well be widely 
seen as barely relevant to ordinary mortals. No doubt, however, 
this is partly a matter of style; Patricia White(1996) uses the 
language of virtues without giving the impression that being 
virtuous would be beyond the ordinary citizen of a democracy. 
And if there are good arguments for trying to promote a language 
41 have only anecdotal evidence. But in the first draft of a glossary of 
terms which I was asked to prepare for the SCAA Forum I included the 
term 'virtue'. The teachers in the group with which I discussed the 
draft saw no point in including this term in something intended to be 
usable in schools; they did not see the idea of a virtue as 
being relevant 
to the standards expected of students in schools. 
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of virtues as a language of common currency and moral reflection 
and debate, then education will have to take o n this task, even if it 
does mean, over a generation or so, changing the way people talk. 
A thin language of virtues 
There are problems, though, about which language of virtues we 
are to choose - for there is more than one. While philosophers 
often refer to the words for virtues as 'thick' terms of evaluation, 
there are many possible, overlapping, languages of virtues, 
consisting of different sets of virtue terms; and there is also at 
least one possible language of virtues, with a certain plausibility, 
which does not consist of 'thick' terms at all, but of rather thin 
ones, and only a few of them. I shall consider this 'thin' language 
of virtues first, before looking at thicker ones. 
The 'thin' language of virtues which I have in mind is that used by 
Warnock (197 1). In his own account of morality he introduces 
what I have called elsewhere (TAV p. 42) 'an all-purpose set of 
virtues': - non-maleficence, beneficence, fairness and non- 
deception. He may well be right that these are the basic 
dispositions people need to have if human affairs are to go better 
than they would in the absence of morality. But he does not 
attempt, as many other writers on virtues have, to cash out these 
dispositions in terms of underlying qualities of character. To refer 
to these virtues seems to be little different, in its practical effect, 
from referring to the norms 'don't cause harm', 'do good", 'be fair' 
and 'don't deceive' - and so the language remains thin. These four 
virtues of Warnock's in themselves seem to go little way in 
enabling people to guide their conduct and organise their affairs in 
society. 
Recall that the function of morality(n) is partly one of enabling co- 
operation and co-ordination. 5 Warnock's basic virtues might be 
sufficient to overcome some self-interested motivations, and even 
to motivate co-operation, but will not by themselves give a 
sufficiently substantial form to co-ordination. To do that, norms 
5 On this point cf. Griffin (1996) p. 93, with particular reference to 
morality, and using the terminology of 'norms'; Campbell (1983) 
Ch. 3, 
with particular reference to law, and using the terminology of 
'rules'. 
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appear to be needed. Fairness is presumably close to Hume's 
artificial virtue of justice, but justice as a virtue needs standards 
of justice; that is, the just person, who is sensitive to injustice and 
strives to be just, still needs some standards by which to judge 
what is just. Non-deception is a disposition which Warnock 
stretches to account for the obligation to keep one's promises, but 
an account of that in terms of the norms of the practice and the 
underlying function of the practice seems more natural. As for 
non-maleficence and beneficence, I shall say a little more about 
them in the next chapter. 
In short, though Warnock speaks of virtues, he is not really 
propounding (what would now be counted as) a 'virtue ethics' at 
all. 6 Many writers have been willing to speak of virtues and to 
recognise their importance; but for some, the notion of a virtue 
has been secondary to, and parasitic on, certain norms. That is to 
say, virtues have sometimes been defined just as the dispositions 
to adhere to certain norms (Warnock himself comes close to this: 
ibid. p. 86). Honesty will be the disposition to adhere to norms of 
truth-telling, benevolence the disposition to adhere to norms of 
helping others, and so on. In this way of talking the reference to 
virtues becomes just a rhetorical variation on talking directly in 
terms of norms; it says nothing distinctive about character or 
motivation. 
Three kinds of thickness 
What of the thicker languages of virtues? These can actually 
differ from a thin language like Warnock's in more than one way; 
there are at least three relevant dimensions of 'thickness'. First, 
the meaning of each virtue-term in the language will be 'thick': to 
ascribe benevolence to someone, for instance, will not be just to 
say that the person has a tendency to help others. It will be to 
say something about the person's character. Different theorists 
will unpack just what it is saying in somewhat different ways, 
but 
something like the following would be fairly widely agreed. 
The 
benevolent person will differ from the non-benevolent first in 
6A conclusion supported by the fact that Warnock is rarely referred 
to 
in philosophical debate on virtues 
in the last fifteen years or so. 
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what he or she notices: she will notice when other people are in 
need of comfort or help, where another person might not notice at 
all. Then, the benevolent person will feel differently from the 
non-benevolent; she will be pained at the other's suffering and 
pleased at the other's well-being, where a non-benevolent person 
might be indifferent either way (while a sadistic person might be 
pleased at the other's suffering). Thirdly, the benevolent person 
will be moved to act where the non-benevolent person would not 
be; the benevolent person's feelings will not be inert. If she felt 
upset by the other's suffering and wished she could help - and if 
situations like this happened again and again - but she never 
actually did anything to help, then she would not be benevolent. 
This begins to show the way in which terms like 'benevolence', 
and other virtue terms, are 'thick'. There is much more to be said 
about what the virtues involve, but to some extent it has to be 
said for each virtue one by one. I shall say a little more about one 
or two particular qualities in the next chapter when I consider 
how the widespread public concern about violence might be 
addressed in virtue- lang uag e. 
A second dimension in which a language of virtues may differ 
from Warnock's is in simply containing a larger vocabulary of 
virtue terms. Suppose virtues are listed in a glossary; then 
Warnock's glossary of moral virtues would be the thinnest of 
leaflets, but the Aristotelian or the Christian glossaries would be 
thick pamphlets (with important differences between them); and a 
glossary of all the words in English which could be the names of 
virtues would be a substantial volume. 
The fact that there could be these different glossaries - in effect, 
different, though overlapping, languages of virtues - creates 
problems for the use of a language of virtues as a public language 
of discourse. Which glossary is to be used, in a plural society? 
The thinnest available, which could provide a lingua franca of 
virtues? But Warnock's is surely so thin that it 
brings us little 
benefit from using a language of virtues at all; it seems to enable 
us to say little or nothing that could not 
be said in a language of 
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norms. Notice, for instance, that Warnock's set of moral virtues 
does not even contain courage, one of the qualities most often in 
the past, across many traditions, considered to be a virtue. 
Actually, Warnock deliberately excludes courage from his list of 
moral virtues, while recognising that it is a virtue of a kind (ibid., 
p. 7 8). For MacIntyre (1981, p. 179), in contrast, courage is one of 
three virtues (the others being truthfulness and justice) which will 
be essential for the pursuit of any human practice. If we 
recognise that glossaries of virtues might be subdivided, into 
sections headed 'moral' and 'other', or 'central' and 'minor', or 
whatever, then there will be still more variation between one 
glossary and another; and even where two glossaries coincide in 
the terms they include, they may differ in their definitions 
because they draw on understandings derived from different 
traditions. 
If there is to be public agreement on some set of virtues within a 
plural society, that agreement must not be on a glossary which is 
that of a specific culture or tradition; at the same time the 
agreement must extend far enough to facilitate at least some 
workable level of agreement on the application of particular 
terms. One way of trying to find agreement on a common glossary 
would be to work from some single underlying rationale which 
would tell us which qualities are to be counted as virtues. But this 
is another matter on which we find no agreement among theorists. 
To some, there has to be something intuitively admirable about a 
virtue, in a way that is perhaps more a matter of aesthetic than of 
moral evaluation (e. g. Slote 1992). To others, a virtue can be any 
personal quality which contributes to general human well-being 
(essentially an utilitarian identification of virtues, e. g. Driver 
1996). To others again, a quality is not to be counted as a virtue 
unless it tends towards the good of its possessor (Philippa Foot 
held this view at one time). Many now would say that to be 
counted as a virtue a quality must contribute to human flourishing 
or the good life, but will interpret that notion in some non- 
utilitarian way. 7 
7 Maclntyre (1981) has his own way of picking out the qualities that are 
virtues -a way that requires reference to the interrelated concepts of 
practice, narrative and tradition. Though Maclntyre may still be, after 
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Here we come to yet a third way in which languages of virtues can 
be thicker than Warnock's minimal one. A minimal language of 
virtues will pick out qualities which can be expected to contribute 
to human good, where that good is interpreted in way which we 
could expect everyone across a plural society to agree on. This 
will be an agreement on the level of Rawls' (1972) 'thin theory of 
the good But actual languages of virtues have seen the qualities 
they pick out as contributing to human flourishing, where this is 
interpreted in some particular, 'thick', way. Thus the Christian 
and Aristotelian glossaries of virtues were different largely 
because their conceptions of human flourishing were different. A 
language of virtues rooted in a particular tradition with its thick 
notion of flourishing is a much richer language; but by the same 
token it is a language for talking about morality, or ethics, in the 
broader sense, not about morality(n). 
Virtues and public agreement 
One last point, for this chapter, concerns what would follow from 
public agreement on a list of virtues, even if that were achieved. 
There are two kinds of agreement that people can have on norms 
for conduct; they can agree that certain norms are the ones to be 
followed; and they can also personally agree to, that is, commit 
themselves to, follow the norms. Agreement of the first kind 
gives a common reference point by which actions and policies can 
be evaluated -a matter I shall return to in Chapter 9. Does 
agreement on a list of virtues do the same? 
It has been a common complaint against virtue ethics that it does 
not give guidance on conduct where there is doubt about what 
should be done. According to Louden (1997 p. 206): 
Aristotle, the most widely cited writer in contemporary virtue ethics, it 
is not clear that many writers actually follow his account in all its 
details. A good corrective to confidence that we know how to use the 
language of virtues would be a perusal of three recent philosophical 
collections on virtue ethics: Crisp & Slote (1997), Crisp (1996), and 
Statman (1997). These collections show that even philosophers who see 
themselves as contributing to virtue ethics are by no means agreed on 
what makes a quality a virtue. 
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'Owing to the very nature of the moral virtues, there is .... a very limited amount of advice on moral quandaries that one can 
reasonably expect from the virtue-oriented approach. We ought, 
of course, to do what the virtuous person would do, but it is not 
always easy to fathom what the hypothetical moral exemplar 
would do were he in our shoes. ' 
So far as individual behaviour is concerned, this may be too harsh. 
Hursthouse in several articles (1995,1996,1997) has shown that 
'doing what the virtuous person would do' does go further than 
one might think in giving one guidance. But she does not go far in 
considering whether it can guide citizens in public quandaries. 
Recall that Maclntyre(1981) begins After Virtue by calling 
attention to interminable disagreement over issues such as 
abortion and nuclear deterrence. His arguments in that book do 
nothing to show (and he would not claim that they do) that talking 
in terms of virtues, in itself, would enable the citizens of a 
modern, plural, liberal democracy to resolve such issues. It is the 
lack of a shared tradition, not the fact of using a language of 
norms rather than a language of virtues, that keeps the 
disagreements irresolvable. 8 
Then there is the second kind of agreement: agreeing to (be bound 
by) certain norms in the sense of agreeing to (try to) follow them. 
If I agree with you, and you with me, that we will both follow 
certain rules, we are doing more than agreeing that it would be a 
good thing if we both acted in such-and-such a way. We are 
committing ourselves to act in this way, and we are doing this 
mutually, so that each of us knows that the other expects us to act 
in this way. We have each made a commitment to the other, and 
will not want to be seen as going back on it. This gives each of us 
an additional motivation for so acting, over and above our 
thinking that it would be a good thing if we both did so. The 
equivalent understanding between citizens, who agree to 
follow 
certain norms, will be important when we consider 
in Chapter 11 
what kind of authority morality(n) can have. 
8A point which becomes all the clearer in 
MacIntyre's later writings- 
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Is there an equivalent in the language of virtues? What could 
correspond to each of us agreeing to act in a certain way? That 
each of us agrees to be virtuous? That would leave a great deal 
open to interpretation, and would raise the problem highlighted 
by the quotation from Hursthouse above: just how high a standard 
are people to be taken as setting for themselves? 
The considerations I have brought forward in this chapter do, 
perhaps, show that some writers9 have been rather too sanguine 
in supposing that somehow talking about virtues rather than 
talking about rules and principles is going to show us how to get 
moral education right. The likelihood seems to be that either a 
language of virtues is going to be a thin one which does not enable 
us to do anything we could not do with a language of norms, or 
that it is going to be a thick one, in which case its very thickness 
will disqualify it as a language for morality in the narrow sense. 
Nevertheless the points considered in this chapter do not 
constitute a knock-down argument against a language of virtues 
as a public language of moral evaluation. It is possible that 
someone will still develop a language of virtues that will serve the 
purposes of public moral discourse. 1 0 
Since the arguments of this chapter have been at a rather high 
level of generality, it might be helpful to have some more concrete 
illustration of the sorts of job that a language of virtues can, or 
cannot, do. To provide this illustration I shall take a chapter to 
look at a particular matter which is clearly of public moral concern 
- violencel I- and in the remainder of the thesis 
I shall 
occasionally again use violence as an example. 
9 See, for example, the reference to Cox in Chapter 7 below. 
10 The recent writings of Patricia White could be read as an exercise 
in 
this direction. 
11 In doing this I shall be borrowing from a more extended discussion 
in 




Violence and languages of morality(n) 
The comparison so far between different languages of evaluation 
may have given the impression that there are clear-cut 
distinctions between the languages. A first point that can be 
illustrated by considering the ways we talk about violence is that 
elements of the same vocabulary can be shared by different sorts 
of moral language. Consider the expression: 'John can be rather 
violent'. Out of context, it is ambiguous. It can mean that John, 
though normally peaceable, occasionally behaves violently. His 
acquaintances do not expect him to behave this way; indeed when 
he does, they recognise this behaviour as being out of character. 
Here 'violent' picks out a type of action; it does not refer to an 
underlying trait of character. But the same phrase could also 
mean that John is a violent person; 'violent' can be describing him, 
not just as occasional action of his. It can be ascribing a deficiency 
of character, a vice, to him. So the phrase could be uttered by 
someone whose language of moral evaluation is confined to the 
evaluation of acts, but it could also be part of a language of 
virtues. 
If the word 'violent' can itself figure in both a language of norms 
and a language of virtues, it is also true more generally that we 
can (and do) use both sorts of language in talking about violence - 
not least in public contexts. The virtue language that is commonly 
used about violence is not a thin one of Warnock's type; let me 
make this point first before turning to the richer kinds of language 
that we may actually use. 
In Warnock's vocabulary, the virtues which have a fairly direct 
bearing on violence are non-maleficence and beneficence. On the 
minimal assumption that violence does generally cause pain or 
harm, or at least has a tendency to do so, people with the virtue of 
non-maleficence would not be violent. For non-maleficence, 
in 
Warnock's terms, is just the disposition to refrain from (deliberate, 
unjustified) maleficence. But this shows up the thinness of 
the 
language, in several ways. For one, it puts all the weight on 
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whether someone sees the causing of certain harm as unjustified; 
it does not say that non-maleficence is the disposition to avoid 
causing any harm at all. The person who has the virtue of non- 
maleficence, then, must have some basis for seeing (or 'judging', 
where the latter term suggests a greater degree of explicit 
thought) whether the causing of certain harm would be 
unjustified. And that is the sort of judgement we generally make 
by reference to norms. 
This thin language of virtues, too, does nothing to help us 
distinguish violence from other forms of maleficence, or to see 
what, if anything, is specially bad about violence. Though 
Warnock himself rejects utilitarianism, non-maleficence and its 
positive counterpart beneficence are the virtues that one would 
expect to be central to utilitarianism. Non-maleficence and 
beneficence need, if they are to be put into operation, some 
understanding of what counts as harm and benefit, just as does 
utilitarianism; they need a degree of intersubjective 
understanding of harm and benefit such as might be supplied by 
shared norms. This reference to harm and benefit is a reference 
to consequences, and thus turns attention away from motivation 
and intention. Thus if the consequences overall of a certain way 
of organising a school appear as bad as the consequences of a 
physical attack by one person on another, the beneficent Person 
will see the need to avoid both sorts of consequence. Like the 
utilitarian, he or she may see reason for counting the school 
organisation as a case of 'systemic violence'. 1 If we want to find 
reasons for counting physical violence (or perhaps physical and in 
certain respects psychological violence) as in some way morally 
distinctive, we will not find it by using a thin language of virtues 
like Warnock's. 
Relativity of virtues 
Let's turn, then, to thicker languages of virtues in relation to 
violence. We immediately have to recall that there is more than 
Epp & Watkinson (1996). In this chapter I use the notion of violence as 
if it were unproblematic. In fact it is not; in VVVI have given some 
attention to controversy over what 
does or does not count as violence; 
see also Appendix 5 below. 
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one thick language of virtues; and if part of the function of 
morality(n) is to reduce conflict and violence, some languages of 
virtues, such as the language of martial valour in heroic societies 
(cf. MacIntyre 1981 Ch. 10), would hardly tend to fulfil this 
function. Though none of us now lives in an heroic society, we do, 
in a plural society, inherit different traditions of virtues. Different 
religions and different cultures do not necessarily agree on 
circumstances in which the resort to violence (in response, say, to 
violence from another) is admirable or deplorable. Turning the 
other cheek can be admirable moral courage to one and 
reprehensible timidity or servility to another; hitting back can be 
reprehensible irascibility or admirable manliness (some parts of 
virtue language are g en der- specific). Using a language of virtues 
to talk about violence and public responses to violence is by no 
means unproblematic. 
It is not only that as a culture we are heirs to a number of 
traditions; it is also that there can be subcultures within a culture, 
and subcultures will not necessarily have the same glossary of 
virtues as the main culture. Some sociologists (e. g. Wolfgang 1977 
pp. 37-38) have spoken of a 'subculture of violence' in which 
qualities such as machismo, quickness in responding to aggression 
with aggression, 'hardness' (cf. Schostak 1986), which in 
mainstream culture or different subcultures might be vices, are 
treated as virtues. 
If in relation to violence different qualities may be recognised as 
virtues in different cultures and subcultures, we can also 
recognise different virtues for different roles. Writers on 
professional ethics, influenced by the wider turn in moral 
philosophy towards virtue ethics, have begun to 
discuss, for 
example, the virtues of nurses. What of the virtues of soldiers? 
Annette Baier (1997, p. 269) writes that 'the easy willingness to 
go out and kill when ordered to do so by authorities' 
does not 
seem to her 'to be a character trait a decent morality will 
encourage by labelling it a virtue'. That may 
be so, but a society 
may nevertheless consider that it needs people with 
that 
willingness, and to that extent 
it may have to recognise that this 
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trait is a virtue in soldiers. (Whether a decent liberal society can 
recognise this is one of Baier's questions; we can add the question 
whether it is a trait that a decent liberal society could encourage 
through education; if not, we must expect the training of young 
persons as soldiers to be in some tension with the kind of general 
education those same persons will have experienced. ) 
In relation to violence, then, a society speaking a language of 
virtues may have to accept a certain relativity within that 
language. It is also possible that the appropriateness of different 
kinds of language of evaluation is relative to rather different 
concerns that we may have in our evaluation. Let me illustrate 
this by reference to a term which very commonly features in 
virtue-talk about violence (though not part of Warnock's thin 
language of virtues) - 'cowardice'. 
When politicians have condemned politically -motivated bombings 
in Northern Ireland, more often than not at least one description 
under which the act is condemned is that it is 'cowardly'. 
Although calling an act cowardly is describing the act, not directly 
the person doing it, the description refers to the motivation of the 
action and through that to the character of the agent (whereas the 
description of an act as violent will not necessarily refer to 
character). The act is being described as the kind of act a 
cowardly person would do, and implicitly as the kind of act only 
a cowardly person would do. 
Many of us (I say 'of us' because the readers of works like this are 
not in general going to be among the action heroes of this world), 
even if we were convinced that some political cause justified the 
planting of bombs, might be too timid to carry this out. Perhaps 
even that sort of action requires some degree of courage; the 
terrorists face some personal risk of injury or capture. They could 
have given up their cause and stayed at home, which would not 
have been a display of courage. 
This is not at all intended as a defence of terrorist bombing. 
Rather it suggests that a language of virtues is not sufficient for 
1 10 
the evaluation of acts of violence. As Williams (1993 p. 92) 
remarks in a quite different context, 'the action stands between 
the inner world of disposition, feeling and decision and an outer 
world of harm and wrong. What I have done points in one 
direction towards what has happened to others, in another 
direction to what I am'. The labelling of an act as cowardly points 
to what the agent is, but that need not exhaust the evaluation of 
the act. 2 What is wrong with planting a car bomb in a crowded 
shopping centre? To my mind what is wrong with this is that 
people are going to be - or are put in danger of being - killed or 
maimed, and other people as a result are going to be left bereaved 
and grieving. (Some would add to this description that the people 
are 'innocent' - but that hardly seems to me to be the central point 
either. ) Isn't that why the act should be condemned? Of how 
much moment is it that the action is cowardly? To apply that 
label to it seems to be, not so much to condemn the atrocity, as to 
utter a personal insult to the perpetrator. Even if the insult is 
richly deserved, it still seems to me rather beside the point. 
But here I am expressing my own reactions and, significantly, 
would not expect everyone to agree with me. I can believe that 
for some people the thought 'What kind of person could do thaff 
really does point to what is most horrible about the action. To me, 
what is most horrible about it is the pain and suffering the action 
causes. 3 Most of us, I imagine, are capable of making both kinds of 
evaluation, but we may differ in our tendency to make one or the 
other, or in which we give priority to. 
I have no wish to deny the richness of the languages of evaluation 
which our vocabulary and our inherited ways of thinking make 
available to us. Indeed I would argue that a person's education 
would be deficient if it left the person able to operate only with 
2 So I am basically agreeing with Mill's distinction between the morality 
of the act and the worth of the agent (Utilitarianism Ch. 2). 
31 recognise that the consequences of the bombing might in 
themselves be similar to the accidental explosion of a gas main or even 
to the consequences of an earthquake. And I recognise that the 
fact 
that the consequences of the bombing stem from the deliberate action of 
a human being does make the whole event more 




some narrow range of evaluative terms. It is worth noting too 
that the different theoretical accounts of morality and ethics 
which philosophers have developed do to a considerable extent 
reflect the different languages of evaluation which we have. To 
some of us it is the consequences of the bombing which constitute 
the real horror of it. If we are philosophers, it is likely to be 
consequentialist schemes that we develop. To others of us, it is 
the character - as some would say, the evil character - of the 
perpetrators that is the real horror. The philosophers within this 
school of thought will develop forms of virtue ethics. That is no 
doubt an o ver- simplification, but it does seem to me that the most 
important distinction to be drawn within contemporary debate 
between virtue ethics and its rivals is that - while no view need 
deny that we can and do evaluate both actions and agents - 
different approaches give the priority to the different kinds of 
evaluation. 
Perhaps indeed we should be pluralist about our forms of 
evaluation and even about our philosophical approaches to ethics, 
if these reflect different languages of evaluation. When we are 
asking what kind of evaluative language can best serve the public 
purposes of morality in the narrow sense (especially, for the 
moment, the limitation of violence), the considerations of the last 
few paragraphs show some of the problems in using a language of 
virtues to pick out publicly actions or patterns of behaviour that 
are going to be condemned. We need also to use a language which 
refers to the nature of actions and their consequences for others - 
which is what a language of norms mostly - though not exclusively 
- does. 
It is equally possible to argue the other way round: that a 
language referring to the nature of actions and their consequences 
is not sufficient, if we are interested in limiting conflict and 
violence. Think of a teacher who wants to prevent any violence in 
the classroom. She may well think it important that norms against 
violence should be recognised in the classrooM. 
4 But she may also 
4 Such norms will not necessarily take the form 'don't be violenC. 
There is, for instance, a not uncommon norm in primary classrooms 
1 12 
recognise that, if the culture of the classroom and the attitudes of 
individuals within it are such as to make violence a possibility, 
then norms against violence may not by themselves prevent it. 
She will have to consider why some people sometimes resort to 
violence (or find themselves being violent). 
One factor she will certainly have to consider is anger. Anger is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of violence, but it 
does have a special connection with it. As Midgley puts it, anger is 
'the appropriate motive for attack - not that it must always lead to 
attack, nor that all attacks are due to it, but that it is the feeling 
which makes attack intelligible, even without extra background 
conditions' (1986, pp. 76-77)5. Where there is anger, it is natural 
to expect some sort of attacking behaviour (though it may be only 
verbal), though this is by no means inevitable; and if we ask why 
one person attacked another (physically or verbally), a reference 
to anger will generally be intelligible as part of an explanation, 
though it will need to be supplemented by some explanation of 
the anger itself. Though there are certainly other motivational 
factors which can lead to violence (there can, for instance, be 
violence calmly and calculatedly undertaken as a means to an 
end), in this discussion, making no claim to completeness, I shall 
concentrate on anger. 
(cited by Skillen 1997 p. 376): 'We keep our hands, feet and objects to 
ourselves'. See Appendix 5. 
5 The reader may expect some reference to aggression. But 'aggression' is 
one of those terms which, because of its ambiguities, tends to obfuscate 
rather than clarify. While in a biological context 'aggression' may be used 
of a certain sort of motivation, in much everyday discourse about human 
conduct, the term picks out a kind of behaviour - attacking behaviour - 
rather than any specific motive. There is no single necessary motivation, 
for instance, behind the aggression of one state against another. In this 
way the notion of aggression is rather like that of violence itself; violence 
too may be picked out by reference to motivation or by reference to other 
characteristics of action. 
Where there is reference to motivation we might expect that the term 
Laggressive' - partly because aggression can be associated with violence - 
would be uniformly negative in its evaluative tone. Yet 'aggressive' can 
function as a positive description in a language of virtues: to call a business 
executive aggressive is to praise him or her. Given the ambiguities around 
the notion of aggression, I shall concentrate here on anger. 
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When someone is angry, reference to a rule such as 'don't be 
violent' is not necessarily going to stop them being violent; and 
when someone is beginning to get angry, reference to a rule like 
'don't lose your temper' is not necessarily going to stop their anger 
escalating. In such cases it would very often be better if the 
person concerned had not got angry at all; yet a rule that said 
simply 'don't get angry' would probably not be the right rule, 
since anger is not always bad, and may not always be within a 
person's control. And a rule which said 'always suppress your 
anger' would seem to many to be mistaken. The following, for 
instance, not only displays a not uncommon attitude towards 
anger, it also illustrates a suspicion of moral rules and of explicitly 
moral language of which I shall have more to say later. 
'Children are taught that it's "wrong" to be seriously angry with 
others and to express that anger physically or verbally. The 
conflict over what they feel and what they are "supposed" to feel 
creates a sense of isolation as they move further and further away 
from their instinctual selves' (Leseho & Howard-Rose, 1994, p. 8) 
Without necessarily agreeing with all aspects of this view, we can 
recognise that there is something in the nature of anger that does 
make a language of norms, in isolation, inappropriate for dealing 
with it. We commonly think that anger is an emotion that can get 
out of control, and that it is when it does get out of control that it 
is especially likely to lead to violence. It would be possible in a 
language of norms to give only minimal recognition to this point. 
If we firmly insist on the rule 'don't be violent', then we could say 
that it matters little whether people get angry or not; what is 
important is that they do not actually behave violently. We can 
even say that it doesn't matter if you feel like hitting someone, so 
long as you don't actually hit them (perhaps instead you say 'I'm 
so angry, I feel like hitting you'; cf. Houghton, 1998, p. 47). But a 
view which depends in this way on a sharp distinction between 
feeling and action can well seem over-sanguine. If part of the 
trouble with anger is that it can be difficult to control, and that it 
tends to lead to violence, it makes sense to look at ways of limiting 
anger in the first place. Since anger is an emotion which can 
motivate behaviour, and since some people seem to 
be more prone 
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to anger than others, this way of thinking is going to lead us into 
using a language of virtues. 
Part of the problem with limiting ourselves, in contexts of 
personal violence, to a language of norms referring to outward 
behaviour is brought out by Larry May, in a passage in which he 
is considering the wa y that some men (this does mean men, not 
'persons') try to excuse their violence by pleading that their anger 
or their sexual desire was too much for them. 
'Morality should not be diminished when the going gets tough. 
Indeed, it is just at that point that morality should clearly come to 
view. Those people who are already inclined to act in a morally 
responsible manner do not have as much need for the social 
institutions that constitute morality's public expression. In a 
sense, the public sanctions that attach to morality are there for 
those who would not normally act in a morally responsible 
manner. Of course, they also play a role for everyone else, since 
few people are always inclined to do what they should do. But the 
main function of such public sanctions would be defeated if people 
thought that morality applied less to those who had a hard time 
following it. ' (1998, p. 14)6 
I take this to illustrate both that a morality of public norms, 
telling people not to act in certain ways, is important, and that it 
might be of little effect if people (and, where violence is 
concerned, males especially) could too easily excuse themselves 
from it by saying 'my anger [or sexual desire, or both] got the 
better of me'. If in at least some of these cases anger really does 
get the better of the perpetrator, this is in some sense a deficiency 
in the person concerned; in some sense he would be a better 
person if this didn't happen to him. Here we are beginning to talk 
the language of virtues. There is some virtue relevant to anger, 
and the person who has this virtue is a person whose anger will 
not be excessive, whatever happens. 
6 Some strands of feminist thought and research point to the possibility 
that males may be more inclined than are females to think in terms of a 
morality of norms which constrain 'natural' appetites. May's 
discussion 
suggests that males may be more in need of such a morality; or rather, 
that females may need such a morality in males. 
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The nature of the virtue relating to anger 
How are we to characterise this virtue? One common answer is 
that given by John White in his contribution to TRAW (p. 22): 'The 
virtue of temperance, which regulates our bodily appetites, or the 
virtue of self-control., which does he same for anger.... control the 
temptations, or inclinations, we all have when we are young to 
follow easier paths. ' 
I do not want to read too much into remarks made in passing. But 
notice how odd it would be if someone were to suggest (though I 
do not think White meant to) that but for the development of 
temperance all boys would grow up as rapists, or that but for the 
development of self-control all children would grow up subject to 
uncontrollable fits of anger. This does, though, roughly represent 
a common picture of the virtue that relates to anger: it is the 
ability to control oneself, so that ones anger does not flow over 
into violence. 
Self-control seems a precarious basis for the avoidance of violence. 
Self-control sometimes may slip. Would it not be better if a person 
were not inclined to get angry in the first place, so that the ability 
to control one's anger was not necessary? This suggests that 
rather than the important virtue here being the ability to control 
the expression of one's anger, it would be the tendency not to get 
angry at all. Is this what educ ation shou ld be trying to cultivate? 
Consider the following scene, in which a small boy is observed 
wandering in the grounds of a sanatorium or clinic in which a 
number of elderly people are sitting. His elders 'did not appear to 
take much interest in him, but what interest they took was wholly 
benevolent' (so they possessed that virtue, apparently). To the 
boy, this abstracted benevolence appeared as indifference; he was 
clearly trying to get some reaction out of them. 
'He had gone up to an elderly lady apparently engaged upon a 
cross-word puzzle and insufferably snatched her paper from her. 
The lady had merely smiled and made a small, resigned gesture. 
And at this the boy had lost control of himself. Darting forward 
1 16 
again, he had dealt her a stinging blow across the face. And - once 
more - the lady simply smiled. 
....... The 
boy had drawn back. He was very frightened. He looked 
from face to face of the people scattered around him. Some of 
them had seen his act; others were preoccupied. But nobody made 
any move. He gave a choking cry and rushed at a tall man with a 
pipe in his mouth who was sitting in idle contemplation of the 
garden. The boy knocked the pipe to the ground and clawed, 
battered at the tall man's face. The man smiled, slightl y shook his 
head, got up and moved to another seat. Most of the people were 
now watching. They watched as if nothing abnormal was 
occurring. But this was itself the only abnormal thing about them. ' 
(Innes 1964 p. 221) 
These adults showed no anger at the boy's behaviour. This was 
not because they felt it but controlled themselves; they did not 
feel any anger (I shall come to the explanation of this in a 
moment). Does this lack of anger constitute a virtue on their part? 
It does not. This answer is not unconnected with the fact that 
their lack of reaction is indeed thoroughly abnormal. In 
Aristotle's understanding of a virtue, even though the possession 
of a virtue might be statistically abnormal, it would not be 
abnormal in the sense of running counter to human nature. The 
abnormal reaction observed here is a deficiency in the usual 
human tendency to respond with anger, or at least with something 
milder like annoyance or irritation, to injuries and insults. In 
failing to respond at all in any such way, these people are not only 
showing indifference, they are showing a lack of self-respect. 
A virtue, on the Aristotelian model, is a quality which contributes 
to, or is partly constitutive of, human flourishing. Does this lack of 
reaction to injury or irritation contribute to human flourishing? It 
does not, because it renders the people concerned far too passive; 
we could even say that in a sense they are being less than human. 
Does this deficiency count as a vice? In this particular case it does 
not, because it is in no way the fault of the people concerned; in 
fact it is drug-induced. 7 But if the people had knowingly allowed 
7 The scene is from a novel by Michael Innes concerning a highly 
improbable plot to take over the world by rendering people incapable of 
active resistance - making them, in fact, peaceable, or peaceful 
in at 
least one sense of the term. 
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their normal human responses to become atrophied, through 
habitually failing to stand up for themselves when they could 
have done so, then they would, on the Aristotelian model, be 
manifesting a vice, a culpable deficiency in an important human 
capacity. 
To the sort of provocation experienced here there can be, then, 
under-reaction as well as over-reaction. (It would be over- 
reaction, for instance, if the tall man, roused to fury, had viciously 
attacked and injured the boy. ) Somewhere between the extremes 
is the reaction of the person who has the relevant virtue in an 
Aristotelian scheme. On Aristotle's own account this virtue did not 
have a settled name in Greek (NE 1108a4), and it does not in 
modern English either, though translators sometimes use 'good 
temper'. Annette Baier (1985 p. 219) speaks of a virtue she 
names 'gentleness' which is similar, though probably not identical, 
to Aristotle's. 
It is important that there can be a deficiency in anger as well as 
an excess. While it is clearly possible to be too angry, and hence 
too violent, it is also possible to be too little angry, and hence, in a 
sense, too peaceable. (Deliberate policies of non-violence, as in 
Gandhi's case, are quite different from passivity; they are policies 
actively engaged in. ) As Aristotle is careful to point out, this does 
not mean that we can mathematically calculate where the mean 
will be; and we can now see, as perhaps Aristotle could not, that 
there is scope for cultural and even subcultural differences as to 
where the mean should be. As a matter of public discourse in 
modern plural societies we face the challenge of seeing how far we 
can agree on an understanding of this mean. 
Anger and judgement 
For Aristotle, the good-tempered person 'tends to be unperturbed 
and not to be led by passion, but to be angry in the manner, at the 
thing, and for the length of time, that the rule dictates' 
(Nicomachean Ethics IV. 5, Ross (1954) translation, pp. 96-7; 
1 125b). This phrase 'the rule dictates' (where 'rule' translates 
logos) can be puzzling, but is typical of Aristotle's treatment of the 
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virtues generally. There are right and wrong ways of responding 
to situations and other people, hence there are judgements to be 
made. The judgements cannot be made just by following a rule 
which could be set out in advance; that is why for Aristotle ethics 
could not be just a matter of rule-following, and why the notion of 
the person of practical wisdom (the phronimos, the person who 
has phronesis) is central to his ethics. The person who has 
practical wisdom will, from situation to situation, in effect be 
following a rule or principle (both of which terms are sometimes 
used to translate logos) but not one that could be set out by 
others, or perhaps that this person himself could articulate in 
words. The mean between excess and deficiency will be 
determined by the principle by which the phronimos would 
determine it; and that may be as much as can be said, in 
completely general terms. 
There is, however, more that can be said about the nature of the 
judgements involved in particular virtues. Anger is a response to 
a perceived injury or offence of some kind. (Some writers treat 
anger as always a response to some perceived injury to oneself, 
but that is too narrow; one can be angry at the way one person is 
treating another, or angry about injustice, even where one is only 
an observer. ) Part of the judgement to be made is about what sort 
and degree of active response is appropriate (e. g. in the example 
of the small boy the good-tempered person would perhaps have 
judged some verbal rebuke, but not physical violence, 
appropriate). But prior to that there is a judgement or perception 
that an offence has indeed been committed. This judgement is in 
a certain way internal to the emotion of anger itself. 
It is a familiar philosophical thesis that any emotion involves a 
cognitive element which is a judgement or perception. Thus fear 
is in part constituted by the sense that something in the 
environment is dangerous, and so on. Anger is in part constituted 
by the judgement or perception that the person one is angry with 
has offended in some way; without this perception it would not be 
anger that one feels (whatever the physiological concomitants may 
b e). 
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Since a judgement that some sort of offence has been committed is 
inherent in anger, anger carries with it the sense that it is 
justified. While we are actually angry with someone we think 
that they deserve our anger. (This seems to be true of anger 
against persons, which we should treat as the standard case. It 
does seem to be possible to be angry with things like the 
computer printer when you can't get it to work but when this 
happens it seems as if we are to some degree personifying the 
object, treating it as if it were a person and hence a deserving 
object of our anger - cf. Sabini & Silver 1982 Ch. 9). 
There is certainly such a thing as unjustified anger, but there is 
hardly such a thing as anger which the angry person, with a clear 
head, considers to be unjustified at the very same time as feeling 
it. This is not quite true, because feelings, once aroused, do tend 
to last for a while - probably because their physiological 
concomitants of increased heart rate, flushed skin, or whatever, 
cannot instantly subside. So it is possible to continue to feel angry 
with someone - for a while - even after one has consciously 
realised that there is no good reason for one's anger (perhaps one 
only imagined the slight; perhaps one had been misinformed, or 
misunderstood, or whatever). But once one consciously judges 
that one's sense of an insult or injury is misplaced, hence that 
one9s anger is unjustified, the anger is on the way to evaporating. 
But while the anger lasts, and whatever may have occasioned it, 
we typically feel - the word 'think' may suggest something too 
rational for such occasions - that the person we are angry with 
deserves our anger. Indeed our anger inclines us to interpret 
whatever the other is doing in a negative light. Harre*' (1986 p. 7) 
has a good description of this: 
6- the anger 'felt' by the apparently injured party (A) is the 
(almost) exclusive basis for A's interpretation of the actions of B as 
transgressions against A's rights, dignity or the like. If A feels 
annoyed, then this is the best ground for holding that B's actions 
must have been offensive. Furthermore, if B tries to escape from 
the 'no win' situation by denying an intention to offend, then A 
has further cause for complaint and ground for indignation. B's 
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defence implies that B (offensively) believes that A is the kind of 
person who would impose unjust interpretations on B's actions or 
facial expressions, just to nourish his or her anger. ' 
Indeed it is not just B's anger that A thinks B deserves - typically 
A wants to hurt or punish or humiliate B in some way, and this too 
A thinks B deserves. It is, then, all too easy for anger to slip into 
violence, accompanied by the sense that the violence is just what 
the person had coming to them. 
This kind of analysis gives us a way of unpacking what is involved 
in the differential tendencies, in line with Aristotle's account, to 
feel anger too little, or appropriately, or too much. The person 
who is too little inclined to anger is likely to be someone who has 
no self-respect or who does not think anything is worth feeling 
strongly about. The person who is too much inclined to anger is 
likely to be someone who is in a certain way over-sensitive, 
perceiving slights or offences where there are none, or reacting 
disproportionately to those which are there - even at times to the 
point of violence. The person whose tendency to anger is neither 
defective or excessive gets his or her judgements right. 
The person who has the genuinely Aristotelian virtue - who will 
also be a person of practical wisdom, since for Aristotle this is 
essential to any genuine virtue - will get these judgements right 
without particularly having to think about it. Having consciously 
to review one's judgement and perception is in that way a second 
best; nevertheless, it may be very desirable. Suppose a person is 
in the habit of asking herself 'am I right to take this as an insult, 
or an I overreacting? ' This person will be slower to anger than 
one who does not reflect on her own reactions in this way; and 
even where her anger survives her self-reflection, she will be less 
likely to feel that violence is a deserved expression of her anger. 
This shows a way in which education should be able to get a grip 
even on something often as apparently non-rational as anger (cf. 
Dent 1984; anger is one of his main examples). There is a sort of 
reasoning inherent in anger, and it is an educational task to try to 
see that people are aware of the reasoning which they would 
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otherwise not articulate to themselves, and that they are 
concerned about the validity of their own reasoning. This also 
shows that the language of virtues can lead us back to the 
language of norms, in which we ask ourselves whether our 
responses and our feelings are justified. 'Has this person actually 
offended against some moral norm? (Maybe he has upset me, but 
that's not the same thing). Should I blame him? Or was h e only 
doing what one would expect of anyone in that situation? ' And so 
o n. 
None of this is saying that we should belittle our own feelings or 
ignore those of others. There is point in the idea, often found in 
suggestions for conflict resolution, and in the book about Anger in 
the Classroom (Leseho & Howard-Rose, 1994) from which I 
quoted above, that acknowledging our feelings, to ourselves and to 
others, can be a step in preventing negative feelings from 
escalating into anger and beyond that into violence. But part of the 
point of this is that acknowledging our feelings brings them into 
the open and hence up against public norms. Our feelings are not 
self-vali dating; the fact that I feel angry cannot by itself show my 
anger to be justified. Yet that is just the way it feels at the time; 
so I need the reference to something external to my feelings - 
which can include public norms - to bring me to question my own 
feelings. Recognition of a clear prohibition on violence, for 
instance, could be the factor which makes the difference between 
anger turning and not turning to violence. 
This discussion of anger has reinforced the conclusion of the 
earlier discussion, that while a language of norms by itself will not 
enable us to say all we want or need to say about violence, the 
public concern about violence also cannot without remainder be 
unpacked into talk about the virtues that are to be developed or 
the vices to be avoided. (In particular, 'non-violence' is not itself 
the name of a virtue. ) 
We need to recognise, with MacIntyre (1981 p. 141), that a 
community needs a table of offences - of kinds of act which are 
intolerable - as well as a table of virtues. 
In other words, we 
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cannot avoid thinking in terms of norms which prohibit certain 
types of action. 8 At the same time we can recognise that the two 
ways of talking need not be opposed to each other. As we shall 
see again below, the contrast can easily be overdrawn. 
81 say more in Appendix 5 about the form such norms might take in 
relation to violence; this also involves some discussion of what 
is to 
count as violence, which is by no means as unproblematic as 
I have 
assumed in this chapter. 
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Part III 
morality of norms 
At this stage it still seems to me that a language of norms has a 
certain priority in the articulation of morality(n). But since norms 
- or rules and principles - have come in for heavy criticism in the 
recent pro-virtue literature, a positive defence of their role is 
needed. This is the task of Part III. I reply to a number of 
objections to rules, consider the role that rules and principles can 
play in moral thought and discourse, and attempt an overview of 
the public functions of moral norms. 
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Chapter Seven 
What's wrong with rules? 
Rules in recent philosophy of moral education 
The salience of rules has often been downplayed in recent 
academic thinking about morality and moral education, including 
philosophical writing on the latter. 1 I shall give here some 
examples from TRA W. The first is from Michael Rustin, not 
himself a philosopher, but a sociologist also well versed in 
psychoanalysis: 
'In the sphere of education, there is the demand that moral 
standards should be taught in schools ...... The implicit idea seems to be that morality consists of a self-evident set of rules and 
precepts'. (p. 76) 
Rustin himself takes a negative view of this demand: 
'The demand for prescriptive teaching of moral principles has 
recently functioned mainly as a mechanism of denial of the 
damage that is being done by the weakening of many social 
institutions, including the family.... . Whilst there have been many 
demands that more attention be given to moral issues, this 
prescriptive climate has been largely inimical to rather than 
supportive of moral thinking. ' (p. 90) 
Several things are worth noting here: 
i) Rustin makes no distinction (in these passages, or as far as I can 
see elsewhere in his chapter) between 'rules' and 'principles' (and 
indeed 'precepts'). In terms of the distinction I shall make later, 
he is talking about rules. 
ii) The idea of teaching rules or principles, and recognition of 
social and institutional factors, are treated as mutually opposed. 
Rustin may well be right that one can function as a distraction 
from the other. But there is no necessary inconsistency between 
the two lines of thought. There is a possibililty to be considered 
lRichard Peters, as recognised by White (1990, p. 41), did give an 
important role to rules and a good deal of space to them; there has been 
much less in most writers about moral education within philosophy of 
education since then. 
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that the teaching of rules or principles could actually strengthen 
social institutions, including the family. 
iii) The teaching of rules or principles is seen as inimical to moral 
thinking. The possibility that the two could be mutually 
supportive needs more attention. 
Carole Cox in the same volume writes in similar vein, but going 
further, apparently rejecting the idea of moral rules altogether: 
t.... when we express our concerns about the moral education of 
the young, we can find ourselves wanting children to know what 
the rules are and how to apply those rules. Unfortunately, there is 
no set of tablets of stone on which these rules are inscribed. 
Instead, moral situations are specific and particular, concrete and 
local. They require us to respond to these particulars, rather than 
obey a rule or maxim. ' (p. 68) 
Cox does not expand on the philosophy underlying her rejection of 
rules. She appears in this passage to be adopting the position 
which Dancy has labelled particularism, though Cox herself is 
perhaps more likely to be following feminist arguments than those 
of Dancy. 2 What Cox turns to straight after this passage is a virtue 
ethic (thereby exemplifying how it is possible in current writing 
about moral education within philosophy of education almost to 
take for granted a rejection of anything that smacks of Kantianism 
or universalism, without even running through the arguments). 
in the same volume, Richard Smith takes a view that is in several 
ways similar to Cox's, emphasising the inescapable role of 
judgement and the value of literature in developing judgement; 
but whereas Cox's first mention of rules is apparently to deny that 
there are any, Smith's first mention of them, after his opening 
example from Huckleberry Finn, is to say that this example 
reminds us that 'as well as moral principles or rules ' [my italics] 
there are many other elements of the moral life (p. 106). 
2Dancy defends particularism in Dancy (1993). In Dancy (1992) he 
explicitly aligns particularism with feminist arguments 
for an ethic of 
care. Particularism will come up again below. 
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One might think that the difference between Cox and Smith is only 
that Smith's language is more circumspect. But the differences 
between contributors to TRAW go a little deeper than this, even 
though one might get an overall impression that they share a 
common point of view (an impression reinforced by the editors, 
p. X). 3 
As in moral philosophy generally, so in philosophy of education, 
we can distinguish in principle two quite different critical 
positions regarding rules, which in pure forms would be 
incompatible with each other, though both mean that little 
space is given to rules. 
One position is essentially negative about the role of rules. It may 
actually give some space to discussing them, but only in order to 
reject or minimize their role. Some writing on an ethic of care is 
like this, as is some virtue ethics, and as is much of the writing 
critical of morality(n) (these categories overlap, of course). A good 
deal of recent philosophical writing about moral education adopts 
this kind of position, while sometimes, as in Cox's case, assuming 
rather than explicitly using the arguments that have been made 
elsewhere in philosophy (something which philosophy of 
education will surely sometimes have to do if it is to say 
anything substantial about education). 
A second position is much more positive about rules; it allows that 
there is a significant, perhaps important, even perhaps a basic role 
3 John White, for instance, explicitly asserts the importance of certain 
rules. In this respect White seems to have been consistent throughout his 
writings on moral education-In White (1982) - written before After Virtue 
initiated widespread attention to virtues - he treats moral minimalism as a 
matter of following basic moral rules, and while he considers various 
possibilities for moving beyond minimalism, he does not suggest that such 
rules ever cease to have a role. In Education and the Good Life the idea of a 
basic moral framework is still there, and in his chapter in TRAW he 
recognises both certain 'framework prohibitions' and rules which require 
some habituation - and thus are part-way towards 
being virtues - such as 
'rules against lying, promise-breaking, not helping people in distress, 
being unfair'. Thus, while White wants to go well beyond a morality of 
rules, and also considers that 'where possible, the 
distinction between 
virtues and rules could well be eroded' (TRAW p-23), 
he never suggests, as 
does Cox, that there are no rules to be taught and to be followed. 
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for rules in morality; but it holds (sometimes only implicitly) that 
because this is fairly obvious and a well-worn point, we don't 
actually need to say much about it. 4 
In response to this I think that philosophy, and philosophy of 
education in particular, does need to say rather more about moral 
rules, for at least three reasons. 
1) A lot of popular thinking about morality does see it as 
something like a set of rules; media reaction to events like the 
death of Philip Law rence seems often to have taken the form that 
parents or teachers have failed to inculcate into children 
adherence to certain basic norms or standards. The talk of 
absolutes on such occasions fits with a law- or rule-model of 
morality. 
If popular conceptions of morality often do fit this pattern, 
philosophers should not ignore the matter. If philosophy of 
education is to be a species of applied philosophy - and if that is to 
mean, not just that it says things which could be applied, but that 
4A particularly explicit example of this position occurs in a writer who has 
been heavily influenced by postmodernist thought but who has retained 
the analytical penchant for clear distinctions: the philosopher of religion 
Don Cupitt. In a work on ethics, in which he uses the terms 'morality' and 
'ethics' in much the way that Bernard Williams does, Cupitt writes: 
'Morality, for the most part, can be left to look after itself. Where in any 
particular sphere of life rules of practice are needed, people can be relied 
upon to evolve them. So long as the rules are working well people can be 
relied upon to maintain them, and when they have become redundant or 
archaic, nothing can revive them and people will let them drop. ' 
...... the renegotiation of the rules of morality looks like a straightforwardly 
political task. Through public debate one tries to obtain and establish an 
agreed code of practice, backed where necessary by sanctions. And 
philosophy nowadays does not need to say very much more about moral 
codes than that. ' (Cupitt 1995, pp. 11-12, paragraphs transposed. ) 
What Cupitt has in mind here does seem to be morality(n): a code of rules 
serving a social function and liable to be changed as necessary in order to 
continue to serve that function in changing circumstances. But it is 
surprising that a writer like Cupitt who must be well aware of critiques of 
morality as ideology, and of the possibilities of distortion and 
bias in public 
communication, can be so sanguine about the processes of maintenance 
and change. 
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it actually gets some application - then it cannot afford to ignore 
or be high-handed towards popular conceptions. Philosophy of 
education surely should be able to offer some guidance to teachers 
who are faced with popular demands for their engagement in 
moral education, even if those demands are based on 
misconceptions. In doing this it needs to recognise that if there 
are differences between popular understandings and philosophers' 
understandings, the untutored understandings of teachers for the 
most part (especially if there is no philosophical content in teacher 
education) are going to be closer to the popular ones than to the 
philosophers' ones. So philosophy of education needs to engage 
with the popular conceptions - to understand their motivation, 
and to see whether, perhaps in some aspects if not in all, there is 
point in retaining those conceptions. 
2) In engaging with popular conceptions, philosophy of education 
has to take seriously the critiques of the role of rules in morality 
which have been coming out of moral philosophy in recent years. 
In doing this philosophy of education has, of course, to remember 
that it is concerned with education, not only with the moral 
thought of mature moral agents. 
3) Philosophy - educational, moral and political - has to consider 
whether the role of rules in morality is so straightforward and 
self-sustaining that it can be left to look after itself. If rules were 
unproblematically transmitted from one generation to the next 
there might indeed be little for philosophers of education to say. 
But rules have to be interpreted, perhaps reinterpreted, and 
sometimes renegotiated (there will be more in later chapters on 
what these processes can amount to). There are surely 
educational issues arising here. 
In what follows, then, I shall make a contribution towards 
redressing the current balance in the literature by looking more 
closely at the moral role of rules in moral contexts, beginning with 
objections which have been made to this role. 
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Objections to rules 
Criticisms in the literature of the role of rules do not necessarily 
take account of the distinction between morality(n) and the 
broader field. An argument, then, which says in general terms 
'there is more to morality than rules' may turn out in effect to be 
an argument that there is more to ethics than morality(n); and 
this, of course, is something that the case for morality(n) is 
already committed to. Nevertheless, objections to the role of rules 
in morality may turn out to have a bearing on how we interpret 
morality(n). Here, then, I shall not try to select out in advance 
points which bear only on morality(n), but will consider what 
seem to me to be the main lines of attack in the literature on the 
role of rules in morality (there may, of course, be some that I have 
missed). These attacks are not necessarily all found in the same 
writers and they do not necessarily form a consistent set. 
a) Some objections to a morality of rules are objections to the idea 
of absolute rules. 
b) Some are objections to the idea of unchanging rules (cf. the 
passage from Cox above denying that there are tablets of stone on 
which the rules are written). 
c) Some are objections to the idea of universal rules. 
d) Some objections turn on the fundamental matter of what it is 
that makes something right or wrong: the objection is to the idea 
that something is right or wrong because it is against the rules. 
e) Some objections turn on the role that rules have - or may 
be 
thought to have - in moral reasoning, 
judgement and perception. 
In particular, such objections often involve the rejection of a 
model by which moral reasoning consists in seeing that a 
particular instance falls under a general rule. 
f) Some objections turn on the question of motivation; 
it is argued 
that doing something because the rule demands 
it is not an 
appropriate or desirable form of motivation. 
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9) Some objections concern the kind of authority that rules can 
have: why should moral rules be taken to be in any way 
authoritative? (Cf. Anscombe's argument against the idea of moral 
law, mentioned in Chapter 4). 
Of these types of objection, the last two seem quite closely 
interrelated; if someone does something because a rule demands 
it, then what moves them to obey the rule may be that they 
recognise the rule as having authority. At the same time, the 
questions about motivation and authority are not ones that arise 
only about morality construed as a set of rules; they arise more 
generally about morality(n), so that even if we were persuaded 
that we should think of morality(n) in some way other than as a 
set of rules, we would still have the questions 'Is it a desirable 
form of motivation that a person does something because it is 
what morality(n) requiresT and 'What kind of authority does 
morality(n) haveT. These are questions I shall take up in 
Chapters 10 and 11. 
In the remainder of this chapter I shall treat objections (a) to (c) 
as matters of clarification to be cleared out of the way fairly 
briskly. Objection (d) will turn out to raise more fundamental 
issues, and will lead into consideration of (e), which will be the 
topic of the next chapter. 
Absolute, unchanging and universal? 
a) A full response to this objection would require consideration of 
whether there can be absolute moral rules; and this in turn would 
require a distinction between two rather different (though not 
unrelated) construals of 'absolute'. 5 'Absolute' can mean 'not 
relative to anything': this is, I think, the sense in which Kant 
conceives the categorical imperative as absolute (though the term, 
so far as I am aware, is not his). The categorical imperative is not 
even relative to human nature, since it would apply to any 
rational beings. More often perhaps, in ordinary speech, 'absolute' 
5 Cf. TA V pp. 3 8-9. 
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is used to mean 'allowing no exceptions. 6 Some people who want 
to defend a morality of rules may want to defend exceptionless 
rules along with this; but I see no need to. Our ordinary concept 
of rules does not imply that they are absolute; this is shown by 
the fact that we have in common usage the idea of an exception to 
a rule (as opposed to a violation). Without further argument as to 
why morality must be special in this respect, it is possible that 
morality(n) is a set of rules to which there can in special 
circumstances be exceptions. And this too is an idea that is 
common in ordinary conceptions of morality (one of the 
commonest reactions of students to a presentation of Kantian 
ethics is to point out circumstances in which it seems that there 
might be a justified exception to, for instance, the rule that one 
must not tell a lie. ) 
b) That rules can change is a familiar fact in many contexts. So the 
idea of morality(n) as a set of rules is not (without further 
argument) committed to these rules being unchanging. Indeed 
prima facie there is reason to think (with Cupitt in footnote 4) that 
they are likely to change. The root idea of morality(n) was of 
checks on tendencies which in some sense 'come naturally' (the 
scare quotes are essential). But human beings, as part of nature, 
live in an environment, both natural and humanly manipulated, 
which is changing. If the environment changes so much that 
I natural' tendencies which once would have been dangerous are no 
longer dangerous then (I am tempted to say 'naturally') one would 
expect the elements of morality(n) to change. (This is roughly the 
kind of account which many people would give of the way in 
which contraception has changed the rules of 'sexual morality f .7 
The possibility of norms changing in response to changing 
circumstances and to criticism will be important in Chapters 11 
and 12. 
6 On the matter of absolutes in this sense, it is interesting that Anscombe 
(who is no Kantian) in her critique of law-like conceptions of ethics 
and defence of attention to virtues, also criticises consequentialist 
thinking precisely because it does not recognise absolutes. 
71 put this in scare quotes because I think that in a sense there is no 
such thing as (specifically) sexual morality - cf. TAV pp. 64-5. 
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C) The idea that moral rules are universal often comes in the 
same package (labelled 'Kantian') with the ideas 'absolute' and 
I unchangingf. 8 To return to a distinction made in Chapter 4, the 
Kantian (and in many respects the Christian) conception is indeed 
that the moral law is universal. But this is not a necessary part 
of the notion of morality as a set of rules. We have taken 
morality(n) to have a similar function to that of law. The idea of 
law (the positive law of states) is clearly not undermined by the 
fact that it is not universal. 
Interestingly, it is also possible to see morality, on the dimension 
of local to universal, as closer to the local than positive law is. 
This is because in a modern plural state, the law at least applies to 
everyone under the jurisdiction of that state, 9 whereas (on certain 
relativist views) morality may vary from culture to culture within 
one state, or (on certain sorts of subjectivist view) it may even 
vary from one individual to another. 
The most viable conception of moral norms in the foreseeable 
future may well see them as not very different in scope from 
actual law. That is, any set of moral norms will be the norms of a 
society, though its elements will often in fact, but not necessarily, 
be universally held. (See also Chapter 12. ) It is a communitarian 
truism, now increasingly recognised by liberals, that human 
beings are not brought up (merely) as members of the human 
race, but as members of a particular society. It is the norms of a 
society, whether moral or legal, which they are, first and foremost, 
initiated into. Some moral norms may indeed be widely, and 
progressively more widely, shared across many societies, for 
intelligible reasons Oust as legal systems also, with increasing 
globalization, may tend towards increasing similarities); but it will 
still be true that what the child first learns is 'this is what we do 
8 Cf. A. Baier (1985, p. 235), for whom universality is a 'mere Kantian 
prejudice'. 
9 There is, however, beginning to be increased consideration, both in 
political practice and political philosophy, of the possibility of 
culturally differentiated legal systems: cf. Kymlicka (1995) and 
Young 
(1990). In an unpublished paper on children's rights I have considered 




(here)' or 'this is not done (here)' rather than 'this is how anybody, 
anywhere should behave towards anybody, anywhere'. 10 
Rules and reasons 
From the point of view of recent mainstream moral philosophy (at 
least in the Anglo-American tradition), objection (d) probably 
raises the most fundamental issues. Does reference to a rule tell 
us why something is wrong (or right)? If not, what are the rules 
for? 
The basic point behind the objection can be put like this. If 
something is wrong, there are reasons why it is wrong. These 
reasons may or may not apply also to any other instances which 
are similar in certain ways (many philosophers, including myself, 
think that reasons have an inherent generality; but Dancy argues 
against this, and some feminist positions perhaps reject it without 
a great deal of argument). If there is a rule against something 
then (if the rule is not simply ungrounded, like the taboos to 
which MacIntyre (1981 pp. 105-6) refers) there will be this rule 
because the kind of conduct to which it refers is wrong; the 
conduct will not be wrong because of the rule. Any reasons we 
can give for the wrongness of killing will be reasons against killing 
in any individual case, and will also be reasons for a rule against 
killing; but 'because there is a rule against it' will not itself be a 
reason why killing is wrong. 
Mary Warnock (1977, p. 138) goes so far as to say 'a rule against 
bullying or theft would be an absurdity'. In the context, she 
means that it would be absurd for a school to put in its list of rules 
'There is to be no bullying' or 'There is to be no theft'. To me, this 
is not obviously absurd, but that is a point I shall eventually 
return to in Chapter 12. Warnock's underlying point is the one we 
10 Griffin(1996) also argues that morality is rather like law - meaning 
positive law - instancing the norms relating to matters such as euthanasia. 
Though he does not explicitly address the point about scope (using in this 
context, as is so often done in philosophy, the philosopher's rather 
unspecified 'we') it is a plausible concomitant of his view that there would 
be a certain culture -relativity about norms on life and 
death. 
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are concerned with now, and this relates to morality(n), whether 
or not it applies to school rules: 'A rule against bullying or theft ..... 
would suggest that ..... apart from the existence of the rule, there 
might be nothing against bullying or theft... ' (ibid). 
Geoffrey Warnock makes much the same point, explicitly referring 
to a putative analogy between morality and law. On a certain 
interpretation of this analogy 'just as something illegal would not 
be illegal if the legal rule in question did not exist, so something 
morally wron g would not be morally wrong if the moral rule in 
question did not exist' (1971, p. 57). 1 1 This, as he says, does not 
seem right; but while Warnock has shown here a point at which 
the analogy between law and morality breaks down, this seems to 
me not to u ndermine a possible deeper analogy: that both 
morality and law might involve rules which can be seen to have a 
certain kind of underlying rationale. 
The disanalogy perhaps occurs because there is a distinct process 
by which laws are made but no such process by which moral rules 
can be made (this point will be relevant again when I discuss the 
kind of authority that rules can have, and how they can change). 
So although the same reasons which could underpin a moral rule 
might also in many cases be able to underpin a law, it is not 
possible to say that the law exists until it has been made, and if a 
law has been made for quite other reasons, it still equally exists. 
In the case of morality, if we are to speak of moral rules at all, we 
will want both to look at actual practice - what is recognised, 
taught and so on within a given society - to establish whether 
certain rules exist, and also to look at the reasons behind the rules, 
to know whether they are to be counted as mora I rules. 1 2 
If the analogy between law and morality(n) still holds in terms 
11 Warnock does acknowledge the existence of moral rules in a certain 
sense, but thinks their existence is of no fundamental status. We shall 
see this in Chapter 9. On the issues in the present section 
Straughan(1989) Chapter 1 is also useful. 
12 In societies in which a firm distinction between law and morality had 
not emerged, this distinction could not apply; and it might indeed be 
more likely in such societies that there would be talk of something 
being unlawful even though po law against it had explicitly been made. 
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of the underlying functions they serve, then the essential point 
which I take both Warnocks to be making still holds. There will 
be no reason for counting certain rules as part of morality(n) if 
they cannot be seen as serving the underlying values and 
interests which morality(n) protects and promotes; when 
something is wrong, in the context of morality(n), it will not be 
wrong because it breaks a rule but because of its relation to the 
values and interests which underlie morality(n). 
There are complications to be considered. One concerns the 
difference between regulative and constitutive rules; another 
concerns the extent to which the reason for a rule has to be 
understood. 
Regulative and constitutive 
Discussions of morality(n) commonly treat moral rules as 
regulative, that is, as regulating, directing and putting constraints 
on conduct which could go on independently of the rules. To put it 
crudely, it is possible, prior to or independently of the existence of 
the moral rules, for people to ignore others, aid others, injure 
others, and so on. The rules come in to tell people whether or not 
they should do these things. 
Standish in TRA W (p. 52), referring to the distinction between 
regulative and constitutive rules'l 3 says 'to imagine that morality 
is centrally a matter of regulative rules gets the whole landscape 
wrong. The regulative comes to usurp the place of meaning in our 
moral geography, covering it over with abstract grid lines of 
control'. 
The point that Standish expresses in 
moral geography' is an important one. 
is a matter of giving shape to lives. 
human beings by itself leaves open a 
behaviour. Even if evolutionary psyc 
some of the ways in which patterns 
terms of 'meaning in our 
A lot of morality, or ethics, 
The biological make-up of 
vast range of ways of 
hology succeeds in explaining 
of behaviour emerge, it cannot 
13 The distinction itself is by now a commonplace of philosophical 
terminology. It was possibly first used by Searle (1967), while a related 
distinction was used by Rawls (1967). 
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by itself explain just which particular forms of life will emerge 
within the range of possibilities. And we know that the range of 
possibilities is considerable, because all the human forms of life 
which ever have existed must be compatible with human 
biological make-up, and it would be implausible to suppose that 
what has existed so far has already exhausted the possibilities. 
Within this vast range, then, what would otherwise be an almost 
formless landscape is shaped into meaningful contours by the 
moral geography of particular ways of doing things and particular 
norms on what is to be avoided. 1 4 (A similar point was made in 
the discussion of diversity in Chapter 1. ) Standish, then, wants to 
treat morality essentially as constitutive of forms of life rather 
than as regulative of basic human behaviour. 
It is tempting to think that the distinction between regulative 
and constitutive rules lines up with the distinction between 
morality(n) and other areas of morality or ethics. Regulative 
rules for human conduct would constitute morality(n); many 
constitutive rules, giving particular shapes to human activities, 
would exist in the wider ethical space. It is not, however, possible 
to collapse the two distinctions into one; nor does there seem any 
particular reason, other than a desire for neatness, for trying to do 
SO. 
There may be some clear cases of constitutive rules (though the 
obvious ones, like the rules constituting the games of chess or 
football, seem to fall outside morality even in the broadest sense); 
and there may be some clear cases of regulative rules ('do not let 
your weapon get blunt' in the case of the hunter-gatherer band? ) 
But in many cases between the clear ones it appears that norms 
regulate human behaviour precisely by constituting one practice 
rather than another possible practice. Thus (as Hampshire 1983 
and Nussbaum 1993, for instance, have argued) there will always 
be some norms regulating sexual relationships. In many societies 
there have been norms constituting the relationship, and 
institution, of marriage. It is plausible to see the rule against 
14 Cf. TA V p. 45 and Hampshire (1983) Ch. 6 
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adultery, for instance, as constitutive of the institution; but the 
whole institution has itself performed a regulative function. 
Similarly, the rule 'don't break promises' is not plausibly seen as a 
rule regulating the activities of people who happen to have made 
promises; it is rather a constitutive element of the practice of 
promising. At the same time, the whole practice of promising 
serves a regulative function in human affairs, bringing a degree of 
structure and predictability where these would otherwise be 
lacking. Thus it can be seen as contributing to the function of 
morality(n) just as surely as a norm against killing. 1 5 
A significant difference between the two cases just considered 
seems to be, not the distinction between the regulative and the 
constitutive, but the difference of degree in how much scope for 
variation there is, compatibly with the function of morality(n). It 
seems unlikely that any set of norms which had developed to 
serve the functions of morality(n) would not incorporate in some 
form the practice of promising. There seems, in contrast, scope for 
considerable variation in what sort of practices relating to sexual 
relations might be incorporated into a set of norms. 
To be more systematic, I would suggest that among the prevailing 
norms of a given society we might find at least the following four 
kinds of relationship which a norm might hold to underlying 
reasons for the norm: 
(1) There are cases like the norms against killing and assault, 
where there are generally clear enough considerations against the 
action itself which would hold even if no general rule had 
been 
formulated. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, hence numbered 
(4), there 
are norms which, viewed in relation to the underlying point of 
morality(n), will seem no more than taboos. 
(I am old enough to 
15 Cf. my comment in Chapter 5 on Warnock's attempt 
to construe the 
practice of promising 
in terms of the virtue of non-deception. 
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remember a time when many people viewed the length of a man's 
hair with something tantamount to moral fervour. ) 
The awkward cases are between the ends of the spectrum. Closer 
to (4) are cases where wide variation in the norms between one 
culture and another seems possible, since morality(n) does not 
dictate any particular set, but some set of norms rather than none 
at all may be necessary. Many people have viewed norms about 
sexual relationships in this way (whereas on hair length there 
probably doesn't have to be any norm at all). This will be 
category (3). 
Similar in some ways to category (3) will be cases in 
category (2) where there actually seem to be good reasons, of a 
consequentialist kind, for one particular set of norms (or some set 
within a narrow range); but where the connection between 
individual acts and the underlying purposes of morality(n) is 
looser than in (1). Some people (including Hare 1992) have 
argued that, rather than monogamous marriage being just one 
among many possible sets of norms for sexual relationships, it is 
the best available on cons equentiali st grounds, because of the 
effects regarding stability in the upbringing of children and so on. 
My own argument does not require me to take a view on this, but 
suppose for the moment that it is right. Then a society has reason 
to try to uphold norms of monogamy. But that fact itself seems to 
give only a weak reason to any individual for going along with the 
norms. I shall come back to this point in Chapter 12 when 
considering what sort of authority norms can have. 
Rules and understanding 
That a rule serves the general function of morality(n) does not by 
itself imply that the rule must be understood as serving that 
function by all those (or even any of those) who follow it. Rather 
in the way that religious rules prohibiting certain dietary practices 
might in fact serve functions of nutrition or hygiene, rules which 
are understood as commands of God or even rules which are 
simply seen as taboos (cf. MacIntyre 1981, pp. 105-6) could be 
part of morality(n) if they in fact serve its functions. In that case, 
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the fact that an act is against the rule (or is taboo) might be all 
the reason against the act which those following the rule could 
actually offer. 
In such a case, though the existence of the rule, and the fact that 
the rule is followed (whatever the reasons for people's following 
it) may together serve a social function, the extent of 
understanding of the rule (within the community concerned) is 
clearly limited. Since here we are talking about the public 
understanding of morality, we can hardly include rules whose 
rationale is not understood among the contents of that 
understanding. (If we did, we would be going for something like 
Plato's noble lie; I shall in effect argue later that in such a case the 
rule could not be granted the kind of authority that a moral rule 
needs. ) We are talking too about education. Rules whose rationale 
is not understood may be inculcated but can hardly be part of the 
content of education - at least, though they may be laid down 
early on, an education which in general encourages critical 
reflection cannot insulate particular rules from reflection. 
Arguably, it is not just education, but the whole cultural climate of 
late modernity which encourages critical reflection; in that case, 
Williams' (1985, Ch. 9) point about there being no route back from 
reflection applies: we cannot go back to rules unquestioningly 
accepted, even if we did (on reflection) consider that the purposes 
of morality(n) would be better served by rules unquestioningly 
accepted. 
So far, I have argued that none of the objections from (a) to (d) 
gives us much reason for rejecting the role of rules in morality. I 
shall turn in the next chapter to a consideration of moral 
reasoning. It is worth remarking here that in recent philosophical 
thinking about moral education there is an unstable relationship 
between the idea of rules and the idea of reasoning. Sometimes, 
both reference to rules and the idea of moral reasoning are 
lumped together in one package (which might be labelled 
'rationalistic' or 'cognitive') which is opposed to the package 
labelled 'ethics of care' or 'virtue ethics' - where the latter package 
both puts more emphasis on the affective as against the cognitive 
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or rational, and more emphasis on the particular as against the 
general. In other contexts, reasoning and rules may be seen as 
opposed to each other; here rules are linked to the general and 
reasoning is linked to the particular, the idea being that general 
rules will n ot by themselves give answers (or will n ot give 
appropriate answers) in all particular cases, so that reasoning 
about the p articular has to be done. 
In the next chapter, I shall agree that reasoning about particulars 
does not have to refer to general rules; having at that point 
apparently suggested that rules are not needed at all, I shall still 




Rules and moral reasoning 
More objections to rules 
Of all the objections to construing morality(n) in terms of rules, 
those which turn on the nature of moral reasoning, judgement and 
perception are perhaps the most directly pertinent to education, 
since they raise the question of whether people can be taught 
rules for thinking morally. The terms 'reasoning, judgement and 
perception' cover a wide field (deliberately); below I shall 
sometimes use the term 'moral thought' as a general term which 
does not prejudge questions such as how explicit the thinking has 
to be, or whether there has to be some thinking which precedes 
action. 
One quite common objection in recent moral philosophy to the 
model of morality as a set of rules is an objection to a certain 
model of moral thought. 1 This model is one of deduction of a 
conclusion about a particular instance from a general rule. Thus: 
Breaking promises is wrong (a universal premise which is known 
in advance) 
To do this would be to break a promise (a particular premise, 
arrived at by seeing that this particular act can be subsumed 
within the general category of promise-breaking) 
Therefore I should not do this. 
Such a form of argument can be expressed formally as a syllogism; 
indeed it can fit the pattern of practical reasoning used by 
Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics VI. 7. I shall call this the 
deductive model of moral reasoning. That some moral philosophy 
and philosophical writing on moral education has used such a 
model is certainly true; see for instance, K. Baier (1973). Explicitly 
using an analogy with legal reasoning, which he construes on the 
deductive model, Baier argues that legal reasoning should be 
taught as an element of moral education. 
1 For this objection cf., for example, Pincoffs (1983); Schneewind (1983). 
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There are several possible objections to the idea that moral 
thought works on the deductive model. One would be that it is in 
all circumstances false, since moral thought never works that way. 
But that is implausible; it is surely not unknown for someone to 
avoid taking an action because she realises that it would involve 
breaking a promise, and she believes that promises ought to be 
kept. Far more plausible is the objection to construing all moral 
thought on this model, since some moral thought does not take 
that form. That seems to me certainly true, as I shall illustrate 
below. A third objection, which I shall call here the Standish 
objection, holds that in so far as we do try to follow, and to teach, 
a deductive model we shall be going wrong by obscuring people's 
responsibility to exercise their own judgement in the complexities 
of real life: 
'clear rules cover over the difficulty that responsibility to our 
circumstances must face. The regulative can seduce us with its 
formal appeal, seeming to dissolve the messy complexities of our 
ordinary experience. ' (Standish in TRAW, p. 52)2 
A fourth objection, the Smith objection, is that overemphasis on 
rules and principles 
&acts as a standing invitation not only to conceive of moral 
thinking as a search for the rigid and unvarying guidance of rules, 
but to see that search, and the use of rules, as something for 
special occasions only [my italics]: for when we are confronted 
with a dilemma, or when we are discussing euthanasia or genetic 
2 By 'responsibility to our circumstances' Standish presumably means 
something like 'responsiveness to circumstances. It is a point worth 
making (in line with Sartre) that no one has responsibility to 
(as 
opposed to Tor') the rules as such; but to speak of responsibility to the 
circumstances is no better. One has a responsibility to other persons, 
and that responsibility includes both responding to circumstances and 
also not neglecting to consider, though not slavishly obeying, 
the rules 
that the other persons recognise and therefore expect one to 
follow. 
Within a religious framework, one might also 
have responsibility to God. 
By extension from responsibility to other persons, one may 
have 
responsibility to animals, and even conceivably 
to the environment. 
But if we speak of our responsibility to (as opposed to 
f or ) the 
environment, it is as if we are supposing that 
the environment can call 
us to account, because responsibility 
in the present sense is very close 
to accountability (see Haydon 1978). 
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engineering. It obscures the way that the moral dimension 
colours the whole of our lives. ' (Smith in TRAW p. 116) 
Here, fully conceding the second objection, I shall argue that while 
in theory moral reasoning could dispense with rules, we can 
recognise an important role for rules and principles in actual 
moral thought, while meeting the Standish and Smith objections. 
Consider Blum's everyday example of the woman giving up her 
seat to an older woman laden with shopping: 
I .... when Joan pi 
offer to help need 
she may be acting 
sentiment in which 
reason for helping. ' 
erceives the standing woman's discomfort, her 
not be mediated by a rule, principle or precept; 
out of direct compassion, an emotion-based 
the woman's discomfort is directly taken as a 
Blum (1994) pp. 32-3 
In such a case we do not need to say that no kind of thought 
whatever is involved; there is after all a perception of the woman 
as being in discomfort, and the woman's discomfort is taken as a 
reason; we are not talking about a pure stimulus-response, 
automatic piece of behaviour. But certainly there need be no 
spelt-out step-by-step reasoning procedure going on. 
There are in fact two important points illustrated by Blum's 
example: 3 that there need be no reference to a general rule, and 
that there need be no conscious reasoning process going on. 
Sometimes it may be assumed that these two points are 
effectively one, on the basis that when there is a consciously 
articulated process of r easoning going on, it must be a matter of 
deducing the particular conclusion from the rule. But this is not 
so: even a consciously articulated piece of reasoning need not refer 
to a general rule. 
3 Later in the same chapter Blum analyses in detail the elements which 
make up the moral thought that may be 
involved even in quite simple 
exercises of moral appraisal and 
behaviour. 
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Guidelines for moral reasoning 
Consider the following set of guidelines for moral reasoning 
(deliberately expressed in non-technical language, such as could 
plausibly be used in schools rather than academic journals). 
1. Be aware of the ways in which what you are doing is going to 
affect other people. Think about this if it's not obvious. 
2. Try to think yourself into the position of other people affected 
by what you are doing; try to see what it is like to be in their 
shoes. 
3. Think whether they would be likely to agree to what you are 
doing. Sometimes, the appropriate way of doing this will be to ask 
them. If that's not possible, you can still ask yourself 'if I were in 
their position, would I agree to be on the receiving end of the kind 
of thing which I, now, am thinking of doing? ' (E. g. if you have in 
mind to do something which involves deceiving another person, 
ask yourself whether you could agree to be deceived in a situation 
like this. ) 
4. Having seen what it would be like to be in the position of each 
of the people affected - seeing it, if you can, as if it were 
happening to you - ask yourself whether you think it is all right 
for people, in the sort of situation you're in now, to do the kind of 
thing you are thinking of doing. 4 
I formulated this set of guidelines on an earlier occasion to show 
that it could be done; that it is not difficult to construct guidelines 
for moral reasoning (it being a further question whether there is 
good reason for anyone to adopt them). This set of guidelines is 
not, of course, in any important sense original; indeed to anyone 
familiar with the literature the influence both of Kantian ethics 
and of utilitarianism will be clear. It is closest perhaps to the 
philosophy of R. M. Hare, who was himself influenced by both Kant 
and utilitarianism (and hence it might remind some readers of 
4 This set of guidelines is taken without alteration (except that I have added 
numbers) from a conference paper, Haydon (forthcoming). 
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Kohlberg, who was in turn influenced by Hare in his discussion of 
Stage 6 reasoning). But there is also in it a reference to Habermas 
(in the move from the 'monologic' to the 'dialogic' in step 3), and to 
the strand in feminist ethics which stresses conversation as the 
way for moral problems to be resolved (e. g. Noddings 1984 pp. 
132 ff. ). Outside of academic writing there is in it something of 
the everyday question 'what if everyone did thaff, which echoes 
the Golden Rule of the Bible 'do unto others what you would have 
them do unto you', and similar precepts in many other traditions. 
This is not surprising, since a form of reasoning which requires 
people to think about the effects of their actions on others will 
tend to serve the functions of morality(n). 
I am not concerned here with whether this set of guidelines is in 
some sense 'the correct' model of moral reasoning. If moral 
reasoning were to be taught as such, then it might be that 
individual schools, on their own initiative, would develop their 
own model, or could follow the model above, or some other which 
is available. 5 Alternatively, if there were to be a national scheme, 
and appropriate teacher training to back it up, there would have 
to be convergence on a single model, whether by consensus or by 
imposition. But my guess is that any model which would be likely 
to attract sufficient agreement would have to say something about 
considering the effects of one's actions on others, and would have 
to have an affinity with the 'what if everyone did thaff question; 
and so it would not look totally different from the version above. 
I am interested here in the fact that this model of moral reasoning 
makes no reference to moral rules. 6 in that way it escapes many 
of the objections that are likely commonly to be raised against any 
suggestion that moral reasoning might be taught. Moral reasoning 
5 John Wilson's work (see e. g. 1990, and references there), which has 
been influenced by similar sources, would be a likely resource. 
6 While it does not itself refer to any first-order moral rules, these 
guidelines, or something like them, could themselves be seen as 
constituting a set of moral norms. That is, it could well be considered 
that thinking morally in something like this way (and taking the 
trouble to do so) is not optional, but is itself a moral requirement - 
especially in situations where no clear application of 
first-order rules 
is to be had. 
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in the form suggested does not, so far as I can see, dilute in any 
way the concreteness of thinking about what to do in a particular 
situation. Much moral reasoning is a matter of attending to the 
actual situation, seeing how people will be affected in this 
situation, seeing whether these people in this situation could agree 
to what you are proposing to do - actually asking them and talking 
it through when possible - and in all of this paying attention to 
how people will feel, whether they may be hurt, and so on. This 
seems to me to be just the sort of contextualised thinking that 
writers such as Noddings or Gilligan, and many other advocates of 
an ethic of care, have in mind. 
A major plank of the objection to general (let alone universal)7 
rules which we find in such writers is that rules cannot be 
sensitive to the particularities of the indiv idual case (especially, 
perhaps, in con texts of personal relationshi ps - cf. Blum 1994). It 
should be clear that this objection to rules is not an objection to 
moral reasoning as such. If anything, the emphasis on how much 
one situation can differ from another, and the emphasis on 
response to the 'concrete' rather than the 'generalised' other (to 
use Benhabib's (1992) terminology), show how important moral 
reasoning (or 'thinking' if that term carries less baggage) is; we 
would need it much less if we could mech anically apply rules as 
algorithms. 
Does all this mean that moral thought could dispense with rules 
altogether? There are various accounts by which this is possible: 
not only that given by some of the writers on a ethic of care, and 
not only Dancy's particularism, but also Hare's critical moral 
thinking. Hare (1981) shows that it is possible to carry through a 
whole piece of moral reasoning in terms of how far people's 
preferences are satisfied - the preferences, that is, of all who are 
or who might be affected by one's action. So with sufficient 
sensitivity to the particular circumstances, one would never need 
to refer to a moral rule (as conventionally understood) at all. 
And 
7 it is perhaps unfortunate that the distinction between 'general' and 
funiversal' which Hare (cf. 1981 p. 41) drew has not been more widely 
recognised. The distinction will 
be illustrated in the next chapter (note 
3). 
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this is a conclusion which might well be congenial to writers such 
as Cox (quoted in the previous chapter) who are inclined to 
dismiss the role of rules altogether. On the other hand, it might 
well be worrying to others, who might want to say, in effect, that 
people doing their own moral thinking is all very well so long as 
they only do it within the framework of the rules (the kind of 
view which Cox was rejecting). 
People who think it vital to keep the framework of rules may 
want this because they are afraid that if people do their own 
thinking they will go off the rails. In some quarters, existing 
oddly alongside an insistence on educational standards, there is a 
suspicion of people thinking (very much, or for themselves) when 
it comes to morality (see chapter 11 below). But the most fervent 
critics of 'relativism' or 'subjectivism' would hardly need to worry 
about people doing their own moral thinking, if they were doing it 
in something like the way suggested here. Suppose the question 
were 'Is it all right to assault an old man in the street for funT Is 
there any room for doubt that someone following the kind of 
reasoning suggested above would come to the answer 'No'? if 
people had been taught a rule (say, 'don't as sault people for fun') 
could that make it any more certain that the answer would be No? 
At this point in my own argument I have tried to answer a 
number of objections to moral rules; but far from showing that 
moral rules are necessary, I have granted that there is at least a 
theoretical possibility of our managing without them altogether. 
I need, then, to consider in what way, after all, there is still a role 
for them. 
How rules and principles can work 
Consider a person who, about to take some action which 
in itself 
seems perfectly innocuous, or even morally desirable, realises 
that 
taking this action is going to make it impossible to fulfil some - 
initially quite unconnected - promise she has made. 
(In the 
complexities of real life, it may have been 
far from obvious that 
there would turn out to be this incompatibility). 
If the deductive 
model were all there could be to moral thought, 
the reasoning 
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would have to go through: This would be breaking my promise; 
therefore I must not do it - end of question. 
If this really were all there were to it in the particular case, the 
person could probably have got to the same conclusion - that she 
ought not to do the action - by a form of reasoning more like that 
mentioned above, in which a general rule does not figure at all. 
Does this mean there is no point in a rule? It does not. Rules have 
a degree of convenience that a more discursive process of 
reasoning does not have. The advantage this brings is not the 
saving of labour to the agent as such; if that were all, we could say 
'people ought to be prepared to do a bit more thinking'; and no 
doubt often that is right. But people will not always have time to 
do the extra thinking; if they do, they will not in fact always be 
prepared to do it; and if they do it, they will sometimes not do it 
very well or will indulge in special pleading (cf. Hare 1981 p. 38). 
From the point of view of the function of morality(n), it may well 
be better that there are recognised rules than that people always 
have to do their own thinking from scratch (I shall say more on 
the importance of the rules being socially recognised in the next 
chapter). 
Now suppose that our example of the promise-breaking is more 
complicated, with more factors to be considered. The person will 
now have realised one factor - that the action would involve 
breaking a promise - which she takes as relevant to her 
considerations; that may be the beginning of further thinking 
rather than the end of it. She may take the breaking of the 
promise to be prima facie wrong; 8 she may also think of other 
moral rules which seem to count in a different direction, and she 
may be aware of special circumstances which don't fall under any 
established rule. She will treat the possible breaking of the 
promise as one factor among others, and will try to think what is 
the best thing to do overall in the circumstances (this could sound 
like utilitarian reasoning, but what I have in mind is more the 
kind of contextual thinking of which the proponents of an ethic of 
8 The use of the term 'prima facie' in this context is owed to Ross (1930, 
1939). 
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care write; it is interesting that accounts of this can indeed come 
out sounding like utilitarian reasoning). 
This is the point at which it will be helpful to bring in explicitly 
the terminology of principles as well as that of rules. A distinction 
between these is not consistently marked in ordinary language 
but has been used by some writers in the philosophical literature. 
The distinction seems to me to be one worth marking, though the 
difference will be one of degree (I shall return to the 
terminological points in the next chapter). 
I shall say that rules are relatively specific prescriptions for 
conduct, such as 'don't tell lies' or 'don't hit people'. The more 
concrete and specific they are, the more it may be possible for 
them to be used in a way approaching the algorithmic; but such 
possibilities will always be very limited. If the need for moral 
thought is granted at all, there are going to be the possibilities 
both of recognising sometimes that what a rule requires is 
indeterminate, and of recognising sometimes that it is better to 
make an exception to the rule. Only further thought will be able 
to deal with these possibilities; and the furt her thought is likely to 
bring in principles. 
I shall say that a principle is a more general consideration which 
is to be treated as relevant in any moral thinking. 9 Examples of 
principles in this sense are 'respect for persons', 'fairness' and 
I consideration of interests'. Clearly these are not rules in the sense 
of specific prescriptions for action. How, then, could they 
function? Recall that the model of moral reasoning I proposed 
above began: 
Be aware of the ways in which what you are doing is going to 
affect other people. Think about this if it's not obvious. 
In thinking about how one's conduct will affect others one needs 
some basis by which to count the effects on others as relevant or 
9 Among writers who have made the distinction in something 
like this 
way are: Beauchamp & 
Childress (1989); Grimshaw (1986), Peters (1981). 
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irrelevant, good or bad. After all, some effects on people may 
Simply not matter. If I keep in mind such considerations as 
fairness and respect, then I have an idea of what I am looking for. 
This does not necessarily mean that one is rehearsing principles to 
oneself, let alone trying to deduce determinate conclusions from 
them. But even where the thinking in question is at its most 
situated and contextual, as in many of the situations which writers 
on an ethic of care focus on, the person in the situation has to see 
some factors as more salient than others. In this way he or she 
will be at least implicitly using certain principles (cf. Grimshaw 
1986 p. 209). Using principles of fairness, respect and 
consideration of interests, though it may sound a rather abstract 
procedure if expressed in this way, may only mean that in any 
situation one is trying not to be unfair to people, to respect them 
and not to hurt anyone if possible - and that seems to me 
compatible with the most situated contextualised moral thinking. 
(The fact that many writers on an ethic of care do not use the 
terminology of principles may be due to their associating that 
terminology with a rather simplistic deductive model). 1 0 
Since this present - discussion is framed within a consideration of 
morality(n) as being in important ways similar to law, it is worth 
noting that making the distinction between rules and principles 
does not undermine but rather reinforces the similarity (and in 
some respects continuity) between morality and law; indeed a 
very similar distinction between rules and principles is a major 
plank in Dworkin's (1977, pp. 22ff) account of legal reasoning. 
Dworkin's argument in outline is that judges in deciding cases 
cannot entirely be applying rules given in legislation; they 
sometimes have to appeal to principles which they perceive as 
10 In developing his particularism, Dancy (1993) gives a role to principles, 
treating them as reminders of the sort of importance that a property can 
have in suitable circumstances. Dancy puts this forward as his own 
suggestion, but it has surely been anticipated by Peters, and indeed by 
many others: the difference being (only? ) that whereas Peters would say 
that the considerations picked out by principles such as fairness or 
consideration of interests are always relevant, Dancy wants to say that they 
are likely to be relevant, but that we cannot know in advance that they will 
always be relevant. This enables Dancy to stick to his particularism, but 
rather at the expense of plausiblity. 
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being part of the morality underlying the legal system. These will 
be for the most part principles of justice, widely recognised even 
if not, at a given time, written into statutes, such as the principle 
that people should not profit from their own wrongdoing 
(Dworkin 1977 p. 23; 1986 pp. 15 ff. ). 1 I 
There is yet a further way in which the analogy between moral 
and legal reasoning can be developed, beyond the deductive 
model. The idea that law is a system of rules binding on judges 
has led some commentators to suggest that when judges exercise 
their discretion in hard cases, not clearly covered by statute law, 
they are simply making up the law as they go along. This is 
analogous to the idea that a moral agent, in a dilemma in which 
the normal rules don't give a clear answer, can only decide 
subjectively, i. e. arbitrarily. Dworkin's (1986) response in effect 
is that in legal reasoning the notion of what the law is still 
functions as a regulative idea. When judges have to decide a case 
to which written rules and recorded precedent give no clear 
answer, they will appeal (even if they do not themselves describe 
it this way) to a broader sense of the purpose of the law and of 
the values inherent in it. In doing this they are engaging in an 
interpretive, hermeneutical, process, which, far from supposing 
that any answer is equally valid, presupposes that there is some 
interpretation which is more defensible than others. It is 
significant, again, that Dworkin in his writing on legal reasoning 
makes the kind of use of hermeneutical ideas which many recent 
writers on ethics have been making. 
Neo-Aristotelians appealing to phronesis, proponents of 
Gadamerian hermeneutics, and proponents of an ethic of care can 
all agree that ethical thinking has to be situated and 
contextualised. That it is contextualised does not show that there 
is no point in seeking what is the right or the best thing to do; this 
can function as a regulative idea, a notional goal. Someone in a 
11 Much of the prevalent modern rhetoric of rights, I would suggest, 
functions in a similar way. While for some purposes it is important to 
distinguish, as analytic philosophers have been wont to do, between 
moral and legal rights, the notion of human rights 
functions at a level 




complicated interpersonal situation, having to weigh up all kinds 
of factors, aware that it is going to be hard for someone not to get 
hurt, may well say to herself 'I wish I knew what is the right 
thing to do' or 'I wish I knew if I was acting for the best'. This 
does not imply that she thinks there is some deductive process 
that will turn out an answer at the bottom; it does imply that she 
does not think she is in a situation where any move is as good as 
any other and she might as well toss a coin. In recognising that 
this is so, she is implicitly, even if not explicitly, recognising the 
salience of factors which will inevitably have salience in other 
cases than this particular one - factors indeed which would be 
widely recognised to be salient. The language of principles 
functions to pick out - for certain purposes, when there is actually 
point in picking them out and looking at them - just this kind of 
factor. 
Perhaps these arguments will reassure those who think that any 
reference to rules or principles must immediately shift moral 
thought onto an abstract plane, away from the concrete and 
particular level where (in the view of these critics) it should be 
located. The Standish objection has by now been answered; there 
need be no derogation from the responsibility of individual 
judgement which takes full account of circumstances. The Smith 
objection still needs some attention. 
The pervasiveness of morality 
The idea that 'the moral dimension colours the whole of our lives', 
and is not something which only obtrudes itself from time to time 
when we come up against a problem, is a common one within 
TRAW, and indeed in many arguments critical of rules and 
favourable towards caring or virtue ethics. Another of the 
contributors to TRAW, Mary Midgley, has in a different place 
expressed this idea by saying that getting outside morality is like 
getting outside the atmosphere - (Midgley 1991a p. 8; on the same 
theme see also Pincoffs 1983). It is a thought which I fully 
endorse. But I question the idea that recognising the salience of 
rules is in any way incompatible with recognising the all- 
pervasiveness of morality, and hence of moral thought. It is as if 
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rules were thought only to apply from time to time. But moral 
rules, on any view I am aware of (including, on the theoretical 
front, both Kantianism and utilitarianism) apply all the time; so 
far, then, they are perfectly compatible with the all-pervasiveness 
of morality. If critics think that reference to rules encourages the 
idea that the moral dimension only becomes salient from time to 
time, it must be something else about rules which they have in 
mind. 
Perhaps the idea is that it is, for any one agent, only occasionally 
that any question of following or not following the rule comes 
Up. 1 2 Here a lot may turn on what is meant by 'the question 
comes up'. Perhaps the critics have in mind a rule like 'keep your 
promises'; if one has made a promise to do something at a 
particular time, then it is at that time that one has to fulfil one's 
promise; so it might seem that outside of that time the rule has no 
salience. Even for a rule of promise-keeping, this is a very limited 
view: the need to keep a promise may have other implications for 
how the agent lives his or her life; the acknowledgement of the 
rule may affect how far someone is or is not willing to enter into 
promises; and some promises do not have the limited temporary 
character of, say, promising to return a book on a particular day. 
Consider, though the example is somewhat culture -r elativ e, the 
promises involved in marriage. Or consider truth-telling as a 
moral rule. Since most of us rarely go for more than a few hours 
at a time without communicating something to someone, the 
possibility of not telling the truth is constantly there. If we need a 
rule to tell us not to lie, that rule is one that is constantly salient. 
But do we need such a rule? Not in the sense that we have to be 
constantly articulating it to ourselves. But a rule - or again, a 
principle - can become internalised, so that we 
do not constantly 
have to be reciting it to ourselves, but would nevertheless notice if 
something we might do was liable to go against it. Following a 
rule, or not breaking a rule, can bec ome in a certain sense a 
12 Even if this were so, it would not diminish the social importance of 
rules, which will be my concern 
in the next chapter. 
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matter of habit. 1 3 Something that Peters realised and stressed 
more clearly than most writers on moral education was that the 
rules can recede into the background, only occasionally having to 
be brought to mind. But as a part of the background, they can still 
be a vital feature of our moral lives. They mean that we do not 
have to be constantly thinking about every situation anew, trying 
all the time to be sensitive to all the features of every situation we 
are in and responding to it ab initio. As Peters (1981, p. 98) put it 
'Surely the importance of established habits in the moral life is 
manifest. Life would be very exhausting if, in moral situations, we 
always had to reflect, deliberate, and make decisions. ' 
Adding only that every situation is a moral situation (and 'every 
day is judgement day', as Smith puts it - TRAW p. 116), we can 
say that it is only the existence of a background of habit capable 
of taking us through most of these situations, that frees us to 
respond seriously and even afresh to situations which really do 
turn out to demand something more than habit. 
This means that while an individual agent may only occasionally 
refer to rules explicitly, reference to rules within a philosophical 
account of the moral life, far from suggesting that morality is only 
relevant to 'special occasions' (as in Smith's claim above), actually 
supports the idea that the moral dimension is all-pervasive. 
Rules and virtues 
it might be thought that in saying that rules often recede into the 
background in an individual's moral life I am almost removing 
them from the moral landscape after all. But this would be to 
neglect the large role that rules can still have in public, 
including 
public educational, contexts - the topic of the next chapter. 
Here it 
is worth saying a little about the relationship between two 
kinds 
of account of the moral life which can be expressed using a 
language of virtues and a language of rules. There can seem to 
be 
two quite different accounts, if they are expressed this way: on a 
rule-based account, a person goes (or should go) 
through life 
13 Cf. Peters 1981 pp. 95-104 
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constantly referring to certain rules and consciously following 
them. On a virtue-based account, a person goes (or should go) 
through life with a set of dispositions which have already been 
formed, and in the light of which she recognises the salient 
features of whatever particular situations she is in and responds 
accordingly. 
It is possible now to see that this contrast is overdrawn. If rules 
often operate as a background factor then they can be operating 
within the dispositions of the virtuous agent, as we saw in the case 
of the virtue relating to anger. If we start, in our account of moral 
life, from rules, then we have to say that rules cannot be applied 
mechanically; indeed the agent who has internalised certain rules 
has to have the sensitivity and judgement to see what is 
compatible with the rules in the particular circumstances. Thus 
our account begins to move towards a virtue account. If we start, 
in our account of moral life, from virtues, then we have to say that 
the person who possesses certain virtues will be aware of features 
of situations which are of general relevance, and will be aware of 
public expectations in relation to these features; the person of 
virtue is, after all, far from being a subjectivist. Starting from 
either end, the two accounts may well converge (see also my 
remarks on Hursthouse in the next chapter). 
Thoughts of this nature presumably underlie White's view that 
'the distinction between virtues and rules could well be eroded' 
(TRA W p. 23). This ought to be no surprise to anyone thinking 
about moral education without a preconception that rules and 
virtues can never meet. Certainly there is a strong precedent in 
Peters, for though, as I have pointed out (in note 1 to the previous 
chapter), he gave a good deal of attention to rules, he also had a 
lot to say about virtues (in articles written well before After 
Virtue). And Peters saw his account as being in the tradition of 
Aristotle, whom he read as arguing that virtues have to be 
developed through first initiating people into rule-following. 
This does not mean that there is no distinction to be drawn 
between an ethic of rules and an ethic of virtues; it does mean 
156 
that there is not a great gulf between them. As Griffin (1996, 
P. 113) puts it: 
'Most moral views - indeed all plausible ones - make the virtues important. So that is not enough to qualify those views as a form 
of what we nowadays call 'virtue ethics. What is definitive of 
virtue ethics, as I take it, is that it makes virtues not just 
important to, but in some sense basic in, the mor al structure; they 
are so deep in the structure that they can be said to generate or to 
animate the rest of it. 11 4 
A similar point has been made within philosophy of education by 
Steutel (1997), who argues that virtually any approach to moral 
education - including Kohlberg's - could be construed as a virtue 
approach, but that only some are based in virtue ethics. But the 
distinction between virtue ethics and other forms, as a distinction 
about what it is that 'generate[s] or animate[s] the whole of an 
ethical position' is a distinction within moral philosophy. In 
considering morality(n) - which by definition would not be the 
whole of anyone's ethical life - we need a language which is 
susceptible of broad public understanding and agreement. In the 
light of the last few chapters we can see, I think, that while a 
language of virtues must have a place, the primary language for 
public moral discourse is likely to remain one of norms (including 
both rules and principles), thoug h some of these norms may 
themselves refer to feeling and motivationl 5. It is time now to 
attempt something like an overvi ew of the public role of moral 
norms, beginning with their place in moral education. 
14 He adds that virtue ethics need not make virtues fundamental 
in the 
whole structure of values. The point is similar to one I made 
in Chapter 
4 about morality(n). Both our thinking about norms and our thinking 
about virtues have their point or meaning by their relation to what 
matters in life. 
15 An example is one of the norms Griffin most often cites - 
'don't be 
cruel' - since cruelty cannot 
be specified without reference to the 
motivation of the agent. I shall return to this example 




The public role of moral norms 
Rules in moral education 
The role of rules in moral education has often been recognised by 
moral philosophers, but sometimes with the implication that this 
role is rather unimportant from the moral philosopher's point of 
view. Thus Geoffrey Warnock (1971 p. 51): 
'it is often said, reasonably enough, that the moral education of 
children at any rate may include, at a certain stage, the 
promulgation to them by parents and teachers of rules for their 
conduct on certain moral matters ....... However, if it is to be 
admitted that there are moral rules in this sense, it must surely be 
added at once that they are of no great theoretical importance. ' 
They are of no great theoretical importance because, as Warnock 
goes on to argue, the need for such rules rests only on the 
contingent fact that children at a certain stage are incapable of 
appreciating the underlying moral reasons for behaving in one 
way rather than another. 1 This is perhaps enough to show the 
relativity of 'theoretical importance'; what is unimportant to the 
Oxford moral philosopher of a certain era may be rather central 
to the theorist of moral education. Schneewind's (1997, p. 179) 
summary of the attitude of some proponents of virtue ethics 
seems to encapsulate Warnock's view also: 
'We may educate children into virtue by teaching them some 
simple rules, but mature moral agents do not need them' 
This invites the obvious riposte 'what about the immature onesT 
Even if it were true that a degree of moral maturity removed the 
need for rules, this can hardly be a matter of only peripheral 
interest for philosophy of education. Philosophy of education 
needs to enquire into what might be meant by 'immature' and 
'mature' in this context. The term suggests a development over 
time, and certainly many theorists of moral education have 
subscribed to the view not only that individuals over time come to 
I See also my remarks on Warnock's position in Chapter 7 above. 
15 8 
be more able to make rational moral judgements, but also that 
some individuals get further in this development than others. 
This sort of view may be especially associated with Kohlberg, but 
Peters also subscribed to it: 'a great number of people do not 
develop to a rational level of morality' (1981 p. 157). How far one 
subscribes to this view - how great one thinks the number of 
people is who do not develop to a rational level - partly depends, 
of course, on how much is written into the notion of 'rational'. 
If we are interested in promoting a shared public understanding 
of morality, we will want the understanding in question to be 
widely distributed; hence we will also want it to be of such a 
nature that it can be widely distributed. Some trade-off between 
depth and breadth of understanding may be unavoidable. Thus if 
we were to interpret 'the public understanding of morality' in 
such a way that no one counts as understanding morality who is 
not able to follow and understand the arguments of Kant's 
Groundwork we might find that this understanding is very 
narrowly spread - which would defeat the object of promoting 
public understanding. At the other extreme, if we were to aim at 
no more than the ability to recite certain received rules in a 
standard formulation, while we might find this aim could be 
achieved across a broad band of the population, there would be 
little ground for claiming that we were promoting understanding. 
There would be no good grounds for trying to limit public 
understanding to either a language of norms or a language of 
virtues, Particularly given the interactions and overlaps that we 
have seen between the different forms of evaluation. But it is my 
contention that a language of norms will have a certain priority if 
we are to have a way of talking about morality which can be 
publicly accessible and transparent without being too simplistic. 
(But the norms will be of a variety of kinds, including some which 
refer to feeling and motivation. ) 
Given a concern with shared public understanding we can see 
additional reason for putting some weight on rules, as articulated 
norms of conduct, in moral education. Whatever the outcome of 
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the debate about how far rules are needed in the moral 
development and education of each individual, 2 they provide a 
means by which a degree of convergence between the moral 
education of different individuals can be expected. They may not 
be the only conceivable means; it is possible that a society making 
a considerable use of a language of virtues could have a publicly- 
acknowledged consensus on the virtues which it expects parents 
and other carers to try to engender in children. But as I have 
already suggested in Chapter 5, there are reasons to think, at any 
rate in a large and diverse society, that a language of virtues may 
be less effective in this respect. In any case, if Hursthouse (1996, 
p. 27) is right, even people thinking primarily in terms of virtues 
would be likely to use rules of conduct in the moral upbringing of 
young children: 
t .... why should a proponent of virtue ethics deny the significance of 
such mother's-knee rules as 'Don't lie', 'Keep promises', 'Don't take 
more than your fair share', 'Help others"? ...... Virtue ethicists want 
to emphasise the fact that, if children are to be taught to be 
honest, they must be taught to prize the truth, and that merely 
teaching them not to lie will not achieve this end. 3 But they need 
not deny that to achieve this end teaching them not to lie is useful, 
even indispensable. ' 
The point, then, about teaching rules to young children is not just 
that it takes them through a certain necessary stage of 
development individually; it is that, if the same publicly 
acknowledged rules are taught to all children, this makes it more 
likely that there will, as those children grow up, be a publicly 
shared morality. And to the extent that there is a publicly shared 
morality at any one time, it will be more likely that parents will 
bring up their children in that morality; and so on from generation 
to generation (I have yet to consider the ways in which the rules 
can change). The society in general, however, has no way of 
ensuring that all parents will bring up their children 
in the same 
2 Cf. Baler (1985) pp. 222 ff. for a contrary view to Peters; and 
Straughan (1989) Chapter I for an argument with which I largely 
agree. 
3 Notice that nothing that 1, or, for instance, Peters, have said 
in putting 
weight on rules has denied this. 
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set of rules (though parenting classes might make a difference); 
this is one argument against those who claim that moral education 
is properly the business of families and should be no concern of 
schools. 
It is perhaps not necessary to argue at length as to why it is 
desirable that there should be a publicly shared morality. If it is 
desirable that there should be morality(n), it is desirable that it 
should be widely acknowledged, or it will not be able to do its job. 
Part of its job is, of course, to counteract various selfish or 
thoughtless motivations by which individuals might act in ways 
detrimental to others or to co-operation with others. But this task 
is not carried out only by individuals responding directly to the 
requirements of morality(n); it also happens partly through 
individuals being aware of the expectations of other people - 
provided those expectations have themselves been formed in 
accordance with morality(n). The norms of morality(n) may be 
initially transmitted through education, but they can also be 
reinforced through being referred to when appropriate in the 
discourse of adult members of the society. Part of the way in 
which this happens is through criticism. 
Criticism 
Criticism itself, of course, is viewed by many people as suspect; to 
make any moral criticism of another is viewed as being 
'judgmental' or 'moralistict. The situation is well brought out by 
Midgley (1991a, p. 1): 
"'But surely it's always wrong to make moral judgements? " 
This ..... was spoken ardently and confidently, with no expectation 
that it might be questioned ..... a moral platitude, something so 
obvious that it need only be mentioned to be accepted. ' 
Suppose A says that B is being moralistic or judgemental in 
criticising C. A is undeniably making a criticism herself. Can she 
offer any interpretation of her own conduct by which it escapes 
from the self-referential application of her own norm that one 
should not criticise? She might try this: what is wrong with B's 
criticism of C is that B is appealing to norms which he, B, holds but 
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which other people, including C, may not share. A, however, in 
criticising B for making this sort of criticism, takes herself to be 
appealing to a norm which she believes to be publicly shared - 
namely that one should not make criticisms of others which are 
based on norms which are not publicly shared 
If this kind of analysis is on the right lines, then even someone 
who is wary of being moralistic or judgemental can acknowledge 
that there is a role for criticism which refers to norms which are 
publicly shared. And it is hard to see how morality(n) could 
function without the possibility of such criticism. Morality(n) 
loses its point if it makes no difference to people's conduct. And 
one of the ways in which it makes a difference to people's conduct 
is via reference to its norms in interpersonal communication. 
Suppose I say to you 'You shouldn't do that; it would be breaking 
your promise. ' This is criticism, albeit criticism of a proposed 
action which you have not yet taken. It is intended to make a 
difference to what you do, by appealing to a norm which I assume 
you already recognise (there is also an assumption here that you 
might be moved by the thought that the action is against the norm 
- this raises questions about motivation and recognising the 
authority of norms which I shall take up in the next two chapters). 
The reason why I can assume that you already recognise this 
norm - even if I do not have any special knowledge of you 
personally - is that I take the norm to be publicly recognised. 
Suppose instead that I criticise some action you have already 
taken. Is this pointless, because it can no longer affect your future 
conduct? Not necessarily, because the fact that one action of yours 
has been criticised might affect the likelihood of your doing 
something similar in future. Notice that in making such a 
criticism, whether of past or possible future action, there are 
various things I need not be doing. I need not be taking a stance 
of moral superiority. I am appealing to a norm which 
I take to be 
shared; I acknowledge tacitly, and might acknowledge explicitly, 
that it applies to me as well. I am not claiming that 
I have never 
gone against this norm myself. Thus, I am not necessarily 
being 
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hypocritical (the fear of being judged hypocritical may be one 
common reason for reluctance to criticise). I am also not 
condemning you as a person. And I am not claiming to have the 
last word on the matter. I can be willing to listen to your 
response 'Yes, I know it's breaking a promise [here you 
acknowledge that you do recognise the norm], but in the 
circumstances ........ You may well be right. 
This is not to say that it is desirable for people to go around 
constantly criticising each other. And it is not to deny that when 
criticism is made there are better and worse ways of doing it. To 
judge when it is appropriate to criticise, and when it is not, to see 
how to do it and in what words (if in words at all); and if in words, 
to do it in the right tone of voice, and so on, requires all the 
phronesis and sensitivity which any neo-Aristotelian, particularist 
or proponent of an ethic of care could wish for. No wonder, then, 
that some people might prefer to treat 'never criticise anyone' as 
an exceptionless rule. But the norms of morality(n) not only need 
to be learned, which will inevitably involve parents and others 
sometimes saying to children 'You shouldn't do that' or 'You 
shouldn't have done that' and explaining why; they also, as I 
suggested above, need to be reinforced, even for adults. And 
these last two points come together, since if children were never 
aware of norms being used by adults in criticism of adults, 
morality could come to seem to children to be an imposition by 
adults, which they could shake off when they themselves become 
adults. 
There can be no sharp cut-off point here between education and 
the rest of life. And this in practice means that a willingness both 
to offer and receive criticism which is intended in a constructive 
spirit is desirable throughout life. What goes with this is a 
disposition to consider whether one's own conduct is justifiable in 
relation to publicly acknowledged norms; and to be prepared to 
discuss with others whether it is or not. One of the problems 
about anger, as mentioned in Chapter 6, is that the angry person, 
focusing his or her attention on a perceived slight to himself or 
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herself, can too easily lose sight of the public norms by which the 
angry reaction might be shown to be or not to be justified. 
The public aspect of norms, then, is vital as a basis for criticism 
which is not to be purely 'personal' in the sense of ad hominem 
(which may well be resented as such). The need for a publicly 
acknowledged reference point does not rule out an appeal to 
virtues as a basis for criticism, and we often do criticise in this 
language. ('That was mean of you'; 'You could have been more 
generous', and so on. ) But there are difficulties in criticising on 
the basis of virtue-assessments. It may be unclear, and not 
necessarily publicly agreed, how high a standard is being 
expected, or where the mean in some quality is (cf. Chapters 5 and 
6). And we cannot assume that any one virtue is equally easy for 
one person to acquire as for another; to that extent, criticising a 
person for not possessing a given virtue can appear unfair. 
Publicly acknowledged rules of conduct, on the other hand, set up 
a standard that we assume everyone is capable of meeting 
(though we may also acknowledge mitigating circumstances, on 
which I shall say more in the next chapter). 
These points on the role of criticism show part of the sense in 
which morality(n) is, as it is sometimes put, a matter of public 
morality. But the term 'public morality' can be misleading, since it 
can suggest that the morality in question applies only in public 
life. It is important that morality(n) should not be so restricted 
(recall that in the last chapter I endorsed the all-pervasiveness of 
morality). So publicly acknowledged norms can provide a basis 
for criticism even within close personal relationships. This is 
certainly an area where care is needed. It can become too easy to 
criticise (why otherwise would it have become 'a moral platitude' 
that one ought not to? ) People can ruin relationships by getting 
into the habit of doing it all the time. But it is just because of the 
dangers of indiscriminate criticism within personal relationships 
that the distinction between norms which are publicly shared and 
standards which might be particular to an individual, or to a 
background the individual shares only with certain others, can be 
vital. it is, for instance, the distinction between 'You should not 
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have said that because it was a lie' and 'You should not have said 
that because it's not the sort of thing my parents would have said'. 
In a plural society, many relationships, whether entered into 
through choice or not (the latter for instance will include many 
relationships between work colleagues) will be between people 
who do not necessarily share the same background of assumptions 
about values and goals. It cannot be assumed that they will agree 
on all issues of values; if we are thinking of morality or ethics in 
the broadest sense, the sheer range of possibilities is so great that 
total agreement is likely to be the exception. Part of the role of 
morality(n) is to provide a set, in effect, of working assumptions 
which all parties can be as sumed to share. In many past societies 
arguably the existence of such shared working assumptions could 
be left to look after itself; it would seem rash now to assume that 
it can be. 
Norms, rules and principles 
I have been arguing that a language of norms is suitable for the 
maintenance of a publicly shared morality(n). I also said above 
that goals for public understanding should be neither too 
simplistic nor too ambitious. I want to argue that something more 
than just shared acknowledgement of a list of norms, all on the 
same level, should be possible - not only because some norms may 
rightly be seen as more important than others, but also because 
different sorts of norm stand in a different relationship to people's 
conduct. 
At this point I need to return to some issues of terminology, 
because education for public understanding of morality will 
have 
to address some important distinctions and hence will 
have to 
consider the terms in which they may be expressed and 
by which 
they may potentially be obscured. It may well 
be, for example, 
that if there were greater consistency in the marking of a 
difference between rules and principles there would be less 
confusion about whether there can or cannot 
be absolute rules (or 
principles). 
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I have been using the word 'norms' as the broadest of the terms 
4norms9, 'rules' and 'principles', broad enough to include 
conventions which may not be verbalised. We can imagine, for 
instance, that in the early human society mentioned in Chapter 4 
certain conventions or expectations might have become 
established before the language had even developed in which it 
would have been possible to articulate them. Though usage of the 
terms is probably neither fixed not consistent, we are more likely 
to speak of rules when we have in mind norms that can be and 
sometimes, perhaps often, are articulated in words, particularly if 
they are expressed grammatically as imperatives. 
I also introduced in the last chapter the distinction between rules 
and principles, where a principle is a broader, more general 
consideration, a rule more specific in its action-guiding force. This 
distinction is connected, I think, with the fact that we are more 
likely to speak of a rule when we are dealing with imperative 
formulations. It is not that the grammatical imperative form 
cannot be used to express broad principles - for instance, rather 
than speaking of the principle of non-maleficence (principles are 
often referred to in this way by a single word or phrase) we can 
say 'do no harm; but 'do no harm' is so broad as to give little 
indication as to what a person is actually to do or not do. In 
contrast, the imperative 'don't hit anyone' is more specific. There 
seems more point in the imperative form here, and we are more 
likely to speak of this prescription as a rule. 4 
I also said that the rule/principle distinction is one of degree. 
Clearly there are degrees of specificity and generality, and even if 
we try to use the terms consistently there may well be cases 
where we are uncertain whether to speak of a rule or a principle 
(it is also unlikely in such cases that much will hang on which 
term we use. ) It also seems possible for the same consideration to 
be treated more as a rule or more as a principle. This can be 
illustrated by the example used before, of promise-keeping. In 
simple enough cases, the norm of promise-keeping can function as 
4 The example can also be used to illustrate Hare's distinction between 
the general and the universal. 'Do no harm' is more general, 'don't hit 
anyone' more specific; but both are equally universal. 
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a rule - it can be straightforwardly followed. In my further 
development of the example, where the person realised that what 
she was thinking of doing would amount to breaking a promise, 
she took this into account as one factor among others. The idea 
that the breaking of a promise is a negative factor in a situation, 
something to be avoided if possible, functioned then more in the 
way I have spoken of principles as operating - it picked out one 
feature of the situation which was relevant but not conclusive. In 
other words, it is possible for someone to treat a consideration as a 
rule or as a principle, depending on how much discretion they see 
it as allowing. 
The linguistic situation, however, is still more complicated, 
because we have such locutions as 'on principle' (which is 
different from 'in principle') and 'as a matter of principle if 
someone says that as a matter of principle they will never do 
such-and-such, then because of some rather general consideration 
they are in fact 'making it a rule' (an exceptionless rule) not to do 
such-and-such. Safety considerations provide an interesting 
comparison here. Safety in the workplace is a very important 
principle of great generality. There are times when the chances of 
safety on a particular occasion will not in fact be compromised if 
someone does not wear a hard hat on entering a building site 
(work has finished for the day; there is no piece of equipment 
installed which is higher than foundation level; the person 
concerned is only going just inside the perimeter of the site). 
Nevertheless the rule 'no one is to enter without wearing a hard 
hat' may be considered one that is to be applied without exception 
- roughly because if any exceptions are allowed, the risks of 
someone sometime allowing themselves an exception which turns 
out to be disastrous are too great. 5 The person going just inside 
the perimeter may say that as a matter of principle he is going to 
wear a hard hat (whereas if he said that 'as a rule' he wears a 
hard hat, he would be suggesting that he would be likely to make 
an exception from time to time). 
5 There are, of course, parallels here with discussions in the literature 
of act- and rule- utilitarianism. The example used is not morally 
neutral; indeed if there is a professional ethics of the construction 
industry this is surely part of it. 
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A further point is that, as the last chapter should have made clear, 
we can use the words 'rules', 'principles, or 'norms' - and indeed 
others, including 'standards' - for what can be internalised. But 
we are probably more likely to speak of principles or norms, 
rather that rules, when referring to something which often 
operates without being consciously verbalised at all. 
The point of this excursus into the vagaries of the English language 
is partly to warn the reader not to be too concerned about 
thinking up counterexamples to my own use of the terms: there 
are always going to be counterexamples. A more important point 
is that education for shared public understanding needs to take 
account of ordinary usage. It would be too much to expect formal 
education to promote a completely consistent usage of the words 
we have been considering. It is not, I think, too much to expect 
formal education to direct people's attention to the distinction, 
which still seems to me the fundamental one, between broad 
considerations which are always relevant but which do not in 
most circumstances mandate specific forms of conduct, and 
prescriptions which are fairly specific in what they prescribe or 
prohibit. With this distinction in place one can also make a 
distinction within the latter category: between rules to which, 
when general principles require it, one may make an exception, 
and rules which, precisely because of the general principles, are 
to be treated as exceptionless. 
Are there absolutes after all? 
An interesting consequence of all this is that, if there are any 
norms which are (to be treated as) absolutes in the sense that no 
exceptions are ever to be made (cf. the discussion above in 
Chapter 7), they are either very broad principles or quite specific 
rules. At the broad end of the spectrum there are principles like 
'consider people's interests'; this does not tell us that there cannot 
be occasions when, for other reasons, it is right to do something 
which goes against people's interests - so it does not, for 
instance, 
tell us that violent action is always wrong - but it does tell us that 
there are never any circumstances (what kinds of circumstance 
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could they be? ) in which one should give no consideration to 
people's interests at all. (This in turn does not mean that one 
must be actively at every moment thinking about other people's 
interests; it does mean that one should always be receptive to the 
possibility of other people's interests being affected - cf. Scheffier 
1992 p. 32. ) 
At a similar broad level of generality there are norms which refer 
to the motivational aspects of actions, not just their externally 
observable features. Thus one of Griffin's examples of a 
'maximally reliable' moral norm is 'don't be cruel'. 6 This does not 
just mean 'don't cause pain', which would have no plausible claim 
to be an absolute norm (doctors and dentists could hardly be 
expected to adhere to this one). It means something like 'don't 
cause pain for your own satisfaction' (Griffin 1996 pp. 79-80; 
McGinn 1997 pp. 61 ff. ). Apart from far-fetched philosophers' 
constructions, it is more difficult to think of exceptions to this. 
('Sometimes you have to be cruel to be kind' does not mean 
(sometimes in order to be kind you have to cause pain for your 
own pleasure'. ) 
At the other end of the spectrum there are likely to be some quite 
specific rules which have claims to be exceptionless. Consider the 
following: 'Never shake a baby'. This does not usually occur in any 
7 putative list of moral rules. It might seem more like one of 
Kant's imperatives of skill (1948 p. 79), one variety of 
hypothetical imperative: 'if you want to look after a baby, never 
shake it, where the imperative is grounded in knowledge of the 
dangers in shaking a baby. So one might think that any well- 
intentioned person in charge of a baby will have the sense not to 
shake it; assuming either a minimal attitude of care for the baby, 
or respect for a principle of non-maleficence, or both, the person 
concerned will avoid the dangerous action. 
6 Here the languages of norms of conduct and the language of virtues 
seem to overlap, but there is still a differe nce. Griffin's norm means 
'don't act in a cruel way'; not 'don't be a cruel person'. 
7 it would not have occurred to me but for the 1997 trial of the nanny 
Louise Woodward for the murder of a baby in her care. In the remarks I 
make below no opinion is implied (nor 
do I think I am in any position to 
have one) about Wo odward's guilt or innocence. 
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But, as Kant is well aware, an imperative of skill can equally be 
turned to different ends: even the grisly: 'if you want to kill a 
baby, without making it too obvious, try shaking it'. Why not 
treat the rule itself, 'never shake a baby' as a moral imperative? 
Even though it is far from being at the kind of broad level of 
generality and abstraction from context of Kant's own categorical 
imperative, this could reasonably be taken to be a rule to which 
no exception is ever to be made. Of course, any philosopher (with 
a certain sort of training) will easily be able to think up a 
counterexample: if I don't shake this baby you are going to press 
the button which will set off the explosion which will trigger the 
earthquake under the maternity hospital ..... and so on. But as Hare 
long ago argued (1981, ch. 8), the possibility of imagining 
counterexamples, and even the slight possibility that such a 
counterexample might one day become reality, is not a good basis 
for refraining from promulgating a rule as one to which no 
exception is to be made. 
It may be asked what is the point of a rule such as 'never shake a 
baby', if broader norms such as respect for life and non- 
maleficence are in place. The point is that the more specific rule 
may be what is needed in a specific kind of situation. Someone 
who does have respect for life and who has no wish to do harm 
may nevertheless not realise that shaking a baby may be so bad; 
or if he or she has learned of the possible causal connection 
between shaking and possible injury or death for a baby, may 
nevertheless not call that connection to mind, under stress, at the 
appropriate moment. Whereas if that specific rule, 'never shake a 
baby' has been learned, it may prevent an action which the more 
general principle would not have prevented. 
Principles in public discourse 
If that was one end of the spectrum of specificity of rules, at the 
other end, to come back to that, are the very broad principles such 
as non-maleficence and consideration of interests. These can have 
a different kind of function, in that they are publicly 
acknowledged as reference points. The idea, for instance, of 
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respect for human life often functions in this sort of way. It does 
not resolve debates about abortion or capital punishment, military 
responses to terrorism, or how far the police should be armed, but 
it stands as a factor which serious debate cannot ignore. 
A set of four very general principles - beneficence, non- 
maleficence, respect for autonomy, and justice - have been 
influential in health care ethics, especially through their advocacy 
and dissemination by Beauchamp and Childress. 8 In recent years 
there has been a tendency in that field to give more attention to 
an ethic of care, and to the virtues which it is desirable that 
practitioners in health care should develop. The reasons for the 
(partial) shift away from a principle-based ethic towards a 
virtues- or care- based one are the reasons familiar in moral 
philosophy more generally: that practitioners need to make 
decisions in all the complexities of concrete situations, responding 
to the needs of individuals, so that the answers given by broad 
principles may be too abstract, or conflicting, or insufficiently 
determinate. 
What is less often noted is that broad principles of the Beauchamp 
and Childress kind may have an important role in public policy 
debate about health care. The general public - which in a sense, in 
relation to health care, includes politicians - are not in the front 
line of care for patients; they cannot, in the relevant sense, 
exercise care for patients - or display some of the virtues relevant 
to doing so - however important they think it that care should be 
exercised. For the general public, to say that nurses and doctors 
should be caring people is itself to talk at the level of general 
principles - which is the only level at which the general public can 
talk when considering health care policy. 9 Perhaps some would 
8 Beauchamp & Childress's text Principles of Biomedical Ethics has gone 
through numerous editions since its first publication in 1979. The four 
principles mentioned above have remained central in the text, but it has 
also - responsive to developments in moral philosophy - given 
progressively more space to virtues and caring. 
9 Arguably the need for a caring attitude and responsiveness to 
individual circumstances should be added to the four principles of 
Beauchamp & Childress - or alternatively it may already be covered by 
those four principles, sensitively interpreted. 
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argue, precisely for this reason, coupled with a distrust of 
argument at the level of general principles, that all health care 
decisions should be left to the practitioners in the front line. But 
not only would that probably be quite impossible in practice, it 
would also go against the idea that a liberal democracy requires 
some sort of public oversight over the work of professionals. 
Whether that idea must be accepted can in turn be debated; and 
that debate too will invoke general principles. Discourse at the 
level of general principles is surely inescapable in public policy 
matters. 
It is no part of my argument to suggest that if there is public 
agreement on broad principles there will necessarily be 
agreement on the details of practice. Broad principles keep open 
great scope for disagreement - partly because it is rarely possible 
in any case to deduce specific and incontrovertible conclusions 
from the principles, and partly because principles on which there 
is agreement at a verbal level may still be open to very different 
interpretation. 1 0 
That principles such as 'respect for human life' are open to 
different interpretations is not, as I see it, an objection to 
appealing to such principles, especially if the possibilities of 
dialogue are taken seriously (cf. Haydon 1999d). In moral 
discourse, people may discover that they share an understanding 
of what it is to respect human life; if so, they may go on from 
there in attempting to reach agreement on more particular 
matters. Or they may discover that they interpret 'respect for 
human life' in significantly different ways; but even that will have 
clarified what is at issue, and so will have constituted a 
progression in mutual understanding 
Even, then, where differences remain at a deep level (which may 
be true of some of the differences between certain more-or-less 
fundamentalist religious outlooks and certain more-or-less godless 
liberal outlooks), there is the possibility of an increase in mutual 
10 This point is made in a discussion of the SCAA work by Smith & 
Standish in TRA W pp. 143-144.1 am not sure how far Smith and Standish 
see this as an objection to thinking in terms of general principles at all. 
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understanding. Far from public moral discourse being 
insubstantial or trivial, it is only public moral discourse that 
makes such an increase in understanding possible. 
I suggest it is in this light that we should read the Statement of 
Values produced by the SCAA Forum (see Appendix 3). This 
Statement contains many prescriptions which are clearly open to 
interpretation, such as 'we should respect others, including 
children' and 'we should understand and carry out our 
responsibilities as citizens'. Some critics have seen such 
statements as merely platitudinous. But we should see them, I 
suggest, as having a function in interpersonal discourse in the 
sorts of way mentioned above. They need for the most part to be 
read as principles rather than rules, and as such they are 
reference points which, at least at a verbal level, would be widely 
agreed on. Within a school, as more widely, people may find that 
they agree on an interpretation of them and can go on from there; 
or they may, in the attempt to clarify the interpretation and 
application of such prescriptions, come to a better self- 
understanding and mutual understanding. Thus consideration of 
prescriptions such as these (taken seriously because there is 
widespread agreement on them at some level) will itself be a 
contribution to and enrichment of public moral discourse. 
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Part IV 
Making morality(n) work 
I take the arguments of Parts III to be sufficient to allow me, in 
the remainder of the thesis, to assume a language of norms, even 
though some of the questions remaining would arise for 
morality(n) even if it were articulated in some other way. 
This thesis is about the public understanding of morality, and 
more specifically, of morality(n). I do not have in mind a 
detached understanding, as of a phenomenon of purely intellectual 
interest. Rather, I hope that morality(n) can be understood as 
something to be taken seriously. In Part IV I consider a group of 
questions which need to be answered if it is to be understood in 
this way. Why should anyone take notice of it, as it bears on their 
own conduct? Does it incorporate any understanding of moral 
motivation? Can it be seen as having any authority? And how far 
can we suppose that there could be agreement on its content? In 
answering these questions I begin to show the role that schools 
can have in promoting and maintaining morality(n). I argue for 
seeing citizenship education as having an important role, and I say 
something about the implications of expecting teachers to assume 





Motivation in law and morality(n) 
If people don't violate moral norms, does it matter why they don't 
violate them? Morality(n), like the law, expects people to act in 
certain ways and refrain from acting in certain others, but does 
not demand that they do so out of one kind of motivation rather 
than another. This is another of the ways in which, for public 
purposes, the language of norms may seem preferable to that of 
virtues. As Schneewind (1997, p. 180) has put it: 'The rules or 
principles can be known and applied by someone who has no 
desire or concern for acting on them'. 
The points I made at the end of the last chapter may reinforce 
this view. Where rules or principles are functioning in a public 
discourse on policy issues, it is indeed possible for someone to 
know and apply the principles without any desire to act on them, 
since the people who apply the principles in the sense of 
thinking what kind of action they require and the people from 
whom the principles require some kind of action, may be different 
persons. However, I did not claim that this kind of role in public 
discourse is the only role for publicly acknowledged principles; to 
the contrary, the norms of morality(n) have their primary 
importance to the extent that people do act in accordance with 
them. 
There are still many possible motivations which can lie behind 
people's acting in accordance with the norms - if ýhis means, 
acting in ways which do not violate the norms. OA different 
occasions I may be acting from unthinking habit, or from 
calculated self-interest, or from affection for another, or 'on the 
spur of the moment' for no articulated reasons, and on agy.. of 
these occasions I might be acting in ways which do not in fact 
against any of the norms. To that extent, one might say that it 
should not matter, from the point of view of morality(h), what my 
motivation is, provided my action is in fact in accordance with the 
norms. 
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However, morality(n) could not function if it were only a matter of 
chance whether people's actions are or are not in accordance with 
the norms. People can act in accordance with the norms without 
consciously acting on the norms1. It is not a matter of logical 
necessity that the more people consciously act on the norms, the 
more they will act in ways that are in fact in accordance with the 
norms (people might be so ineffective in doing what they are 
trying to do, that they would have acted in accordance with the 
norms more often if they had not been trying to). Nevertheless, it 
is a reasonable assumption in practice that there will be many 
occasions when people's actions would not be in accordance with 
the norms were it not that they were consciously acting on the 
norms. 
This means that for morality(n) to function it must be possible for 
the recognition that something is required by the norms to be a 
motivation (at least partial) for action. It must after all be 
possible for people to have some sort of 'desire or concern' to act 
on moral normS. 2 
From this there are two implications for education. First, that the 
public understanding of morality(n) will have to include 
understanding of the kind of motivation which morality(n) 
sometimes needs. Second, that educators should be trying not 
just to promote a detached understanding of this kind of 
motivation, but to make it probable (so far as this can be done 
compatibly with their role as educators) that people will in fact 
be susceptible to this kind of motivation (though not only to this 
kind). 3 
IA parallel distinction is important both in Aristotle's ethics 
(cf. 
Nicomachean Ethics 11.4) and Kant's (cf. Groundwork, e. g. Ch. 1,397 
(Paton p. 63). 
2 Nothing in my argument requires that all motivation 
has to be construable 
in terms of desires; cf. Scheffler 1992 Ch. 5. 
3 Both points are needed, because it may be possible 
both for someone to 
be motivated in a certain way without understanding 
their own 
motivation, and for someone to understand a certain 
form of motivation 
- what it involves, 
how it is possible - without actually 
being motivated 
in that way themselves. 
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So far we have not seen that a desire or concern to act on moral 
norms should be of any particular kind. (Part of the contrast 
between norm- and virtue-based accounts is that on norm-based 
accounts there is no one particular kind of motivation which 
morality(n) is exclusively concerned with, whereas a virtue-based 
account is focusing on some particular kind of motivation in the 
case of each virtue it distinguishes. ) So far, the position of 
morality(n) is still parallel to that of the law. It matters to the 
functioning of the law that the existence of legal norms should 
sometimes enter into people's motivation - that people can have 
some sort of desire or concern to act according to the law - but 
there is more than one form this desire or concern can take. To 
mention the most obvious (which are not mutually exclusive), 
people may obey the law because they do not want the 
inconvenience and sanctions which may ensue on their breaking 
it, or because they respect the law and think that they ought not 
to break it. 
One way in which morality(n) differs from the law is that the 
norms of morality(n) - in cases where they are not also legal 
norms - are not backed up by coercive sanctions. Some theorists 
would still say that morality(n) works through sanctions of a kind, 
though these might be sanctions only of more-or-less public 
disapproval. It is an important difference, though, that legal 
sanctions are designed to be hard to take for anyone with certain 
common human motivations (people don't like being locked up or 
forced to hand over large amounts of money), whereas it is 
possible for people to be indifferent or defiant towards the 
disapproval of others which is not itself coercive. The desire or 
concern to avoid coercive sanctions, which are usually 
accompanied also by social disapproval, is not a sufficiently 
effective motivation to deter all action in violation of the law; it is 
not to be expected, then, that avoidance of social disapproval alone 
would be a sufficient motivation to deter all action in violation of 
norms which are not backed up by coercive sanctions. 
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The other motivation for obeying the law which I distinguished 
above also has its an alogue for morality: the motivation which is 
operating when someone refrains from doing what they want to 
do because they think they ought not to (or think it would be 
wrong), or does what they are reluctant to do because they 
believe it is the right thing to do (or they ought to do it). As the 
writer of a boo k on moral education for the popular market puts 
it: 
'The great battleground of morality is between obligation and 
desire. When somebody says 'I ought to do so and so' we 
understand that she doesn't really want to do it, or would prefer 
to so something else, but feels she should nonetheless. ' 
(Houghton 1998 p. 59) 
In her first sentence, this writer is perhaps expressing a view of 
the matter which has been influenced by a certain kind of theory 
- though not only Kantian-style philosophy; we might cite much of 
mainstream religious traditions too. Arguably, this use of 
'obligation' as a noun form of 'ought' is itself a philosopher's input. 
But certainly it is not a philosophical invention that people use the 
word 'ought' to express something which they themselves see as 
pulling against their own wishes or inclinations (though this does 
not preclude their acknowledging that they may in some sense 
want to do what they think they ought to do). And it is, I think, a 
fact of experience that people do sometimes act other than the 
way their wishes and inclination would lead, because they think 
they ought to. In other words, such thoughts, involving words like 
'ought' and 'right' and 'wrong', can function as an element in 
people's motivation. And some approaches to moral education see 
the development of this form of motivation as central. The same 
writer, for instance, goes on to speak of the need for (self-) 
discipline: 'doing what you do not want to do, and not doing what 
you would like to do' (ibid. ). 
When people use 'ought' with the sense that the 'ought' pulls 
against their inclination, it is not necessarily the case that they are 
consciously referring to a rule or principle. (I outlined in Chapter 
8a form of reasoning which could issue in an 'ought' without 
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referring to norms. ) But often there will be an awareness of some 
rule or general principle which should be followed and which 
applies in the particular case - and for some people acting on 
principles may be central to their experience of morality(n). And 
there will sometimes be the sense - since the 'ought' pulls against 
inclination - that it takes an effort of will to act in accordance with 
the principle. Thus we have the notion that was seen as central to 
morality in the discussion document on Spiritual and Moral 
Development from the National Curriculum Council for England 
and Wales (NCC 1993, republished as SCAA 1995), which put at 
the head of its list of the qualities to be developed in moral 
education: 'The will to behave morally as a point of principle. ' 
Varieties of ethical motivation 
This is a way, then, in which motivation can function in 
morality(n). Is it, however, desirable that it function in such a 
way? There is a strong strand in recent moral philosophy and 
philosophical writing about moral education which plays down the 
value of such motivation and might like to exclude it altogether. 
Anscombe (1997) examined and found wanting the 'ought' which 
she saw as central to modem moral philosophy; Williams (1985) 
put a deconstruction of the notion of obligation at the centre of his 
critique of 'the morality system' in Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy, and taking up this theme of moral obligation John 
White (1990, p. 53) writes: 
'Children are brought up to believe that ineluctable duties are laid 
on them to do or refrain from this or that ..... They also learn, as 
part of this same scheme of thought, to feel guilt and remorse 
when they fail to live up to their obligations. They come to blame 
themselves and their shortcomings. And not only themselves. 
They are trained to see other people, too, through the same 
reductive spectacles, as abiders by, or deviants from, their moral 
duties. ' 
White goes on to comment that 'our ethical life does not have to be 
as unlovely as this'. If w e accept that an ethical life centred on 
and dominated by a sense of moral obligation is unlovely, we need 
to look for alternatives. And much recent moral philosophy has, 
of course, been exploring alternatives. There are the neo- 
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Aristotelians, the Humeans, the proponents of an ethic of care. 
There is a variety of positions here, but they tend to converge on 
one or other, or both, of two points. First, they move away from 
such general (one could almost say 'all-purpose') motivations as a 
sense of obligation to more particular motivations, such as are 
incorporated into the various virtues (where each of honesty, 
courage, fidelity and so on has a motivation specific to it; cf. 
Jackson 1978; McDowell 1997). Second, they see moral behaviour 
as motivated by desire or affects in one way or another, so that 
rather than there having to be a 'battleground' of obligation and 
desire, the important question is the nature of the person's desires 
and affects. Thus an ethic of care finds the underlying motivation 
of the ethically responsible person in caring, which is an 
essentially affective matter. Again, when White suggests that for 
moral education we should substitute an education in altruism, he 
is speaking of something which has to be manifested in people's 
feelings. At a minimum, the altruistic person will sometimes be 
motivated by compassion, whereas we can imagine a rigid 
moralist, adhering to general principles, and capable of the will to 
follow them, never actually feeling compassion. 4 
4 To some degree, a broadly Humean tendency is manifested in the recent turn 
in moral philosophy towards 'virtue ethics', though the writers within this 
tendency more often take their cue from Aristotle than from Hume (Annette 
Baier is one exception). Advocates of virtue ethics often see themselves as 
presenting an Aristotelian account in contrast to a Kantian one. The point 
needs to be mentioned here, because while I shall in what follows be suggesting 
that an aspect of the Kantian approach needs to be retained, I would not want to 
be read as defending Kant against Aristotle; it does not appear that there is 
necessarily a large contrast between Kant and Aristotle on this matter of 
motivation. 
An Aristotelian ethic does not suppose, as some modern accounts seem to, that 
people ideally would act mainly out of fellow-feeling (in fact a distinctly 
altruistic motivation does not figure largely in Aristotle) and it does have to do 
with the basic structure of an agent's desires rather than with adventitious 
feeling. The NCC document's /will to act morally as a point of principle' may 
not be alien to Aristotle's ethics, even though the modern phrase could not be 
translated exactly into Aristotle's vocabulary. Certainly Aristotle believed that 
the possession of the virtues involved acting according to the right rule or 
principle (cf. Ch. 6 above), and he has the conception of doing what is noble for 
its own sake. One can imagine that if Aristotle and Kant could converse now, 
they might agree on a good deal, including some notion of 'how the upright 
gentleman behaves' (where the gender reference is deliberate). 
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In the face of so much counterargument, is there any point in 
trying to hang on to the notion of a sense of moral obligation as a 
motivation? In the next section I shall reinforce the point already 
made, that it is not sufficient to rely on other forms of motivation 
even if they do seem more attractive. 
The case for a specifically moral motivation 
To a moral philosopher, the kind of motivation we are now talking 
about comes, so to speak, with the label 'Kantian' attached. This 
can be misleading, both because we do not have to accept all of 
Kant's ethics in order to recognise a role for a sense of moral 
obligation, and because it is possible to defend its role on other 
than Kantian grounds. 
On the former point, it is in the first chapter of the Groundwork, 
where he is still analysing what he calls 'common rational 
knowledge of morality', that Kant gives his initial account of the 
motive of moral duty, well before he introduces the notion of the 
categorical imperative, let alone the notoriously difficult 
conception of the noumenal and phenomenal standpoints. To Kant 
himself, then, the experience of this kind of motivation is 
recognisable prior to the rest of his own theory; in this sense, 
there need be nothing specifically Kantian about it. It is striking 
that when Mill writes in Chapter 3 of Utilitarianism about the 
sanction of morality - for which he uses the word 'conscience', and 
which he describes as an inner feeling - he seems, if one can put 
on his words the phenomenological interpretation which they 
seem to demand, to be talking about something which, in 
experience, would be very like the sense of reverence for the 
moral law which Kant talks about. The sense that one ought to act 
in a certain way, even though it is against one's immediate 
inclinations, is certainly present in Mill (and in many utilitiarians, 
as Williams (1985 p. 184) recognises). 
On the latter point, it is possible, with Mill, to defend the salience 
of a sense of moral obligation on cons equentiali st grounds, that 
is, 
by showing that things are likely to go better on the whole 
if 
people are capable of acting out of a sense of obligation. 
Kant 
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himself points out that someone who is so absorbed in his own 
troubles that he feels no inclination to help others, may 
nevertheless do so out of a sense of duty. The picture of someone 
who takes account of the interests of others only out of a sense of 
duty is not an attractive one. But our question here is, is it 
desirable that this sort of motivation is available as one among the 
possible kinds of motivation that can move people to take account 
of the interests of others? 
In earlier writing (TA V, p. 78; Haydon 1999b) I have used the 
example of the Milgram (1974) experiments on obedience: many 
of the subjects in these experiments, believing that they were 
inflicting severe electric shocks on other people, went on doing so 
on the instructions of the experimenter. I suggested - not that 
people who defied the experimenter's instruction couldn't have 
had a variety of motivations for doing so - but that it is important 
that there is the possibility of people saying 'No. This is immoral, 
I will not do it. ' (Some people, but not many, did respond in that 
sort of way. ) It is possible that there are cases in which someone 
defies the experimenter, not out of benevolence or altruism, but 
simply because he or she thinks that what she is being asked to do 
is morally wrong. The mere possibility that this kind of 
motivation might operate in the service of morality(n) in cases 
where no other motivations would is, I suggest, enough to show 
that this kind of motivation is worth maintaining. In other words, 
it is important that there be the possibility that a thought such as 
'I ought not to do this, 'It would be wrong to do this', or even, 
'This is against the (moral) rules', can function for an individual as 
a reason, and sometimes a sufficient motivating reason, for doing 
the action. 
Language and psychology 
If there is to be t hat possibility, it has to be a possibility within 
the public discourse of morality. It is not only that people must 
sometimes say to themselves, privately, things like 'I am not going 
to do this because it would be wrong. For if such things were only 
ever said privately by people to themselves, new speakers could 
never learn to say such things. That is the importance of the 
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language in which such thoughts are expressed being part of 
public discourse. 
In earlier writings (TA V Ch. 8, and 1999b) I have put some weight 
on the idea that the very meaning of words like 'ought' in such 
contexts might be mysterious. I was perhaps unconsciously 
working - though I should have known better - with a picture 
theory of meaning by which there has to be something in the 
world for a word to correspond to if it is to have meaning. Then 
one would be puzzled by the meaning of 'ought', and related 
words, because there seems to be nothing in the world to which an 
'ought' corresponds. On a more Wittgensteinian view of meaning 
it need be no surprise that the practice, in discourse, of using 
terms such as 'ought' and 'right' and 'wrong' can exist, and have 
effect, even though the participants in the practice may be quite 
unable to give an abstract account of the meaning of the words. 
We do not, then, have to follow Anscombe's advice from 1958 that 
'the concepts of obligation, and duty - moral obligation and moral 
duty, that is to say - and of what is morally right and wrong, and 
of the moral sense of 'ought', ought to be jettisoned if this is 
psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or derivatives 
from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no 
longer generally survives ....... (Anscombe 1997, p. 26). 
Even if they are survivals from a publicly defunct conception of 
ethics - which is a conception of morality as law where the law- 
giver is God - this does not mean that these terms cannot be put to 
service in the cause of a different conception, such as that of 
morality(n) understood in secular terms. Forms of discourse 
which ar e incorporated into social practices are quite capable of 
surviving changes in the interpretation of terminology (this has 
happened for many people with religious language). 
Arguably all we need to say about the meaning of terms such as 
'ought' is what Griffin (1996 p. 83) says: 'To say "You ought not to 
do it" is ...... to say that there 
is some norm or standard to which 
your not doing it would conform. ' Within philosophy of education 
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Straughan (1982 Ch. 3; cf. 1989 Ch. 1) has a more thoroughly 
worked out account based on what is essentially the same idea. 
An account of how the word 'ought' functions in relation to norms 
does not by itself constitute an account of motivation; for that it 
would need at least to be supplemented by an account of how it is 
that certain norms can be recognised as having authority over 
people's conduct (which will be the topic of the next chapter). But 
seeing 'ought' in Griffin's way may at least remove the sense 
(which non-philosophers may not share in any case) that there is 
something mysterious about the very meaning of 'ought. 
If the public discourse which uses terms such as 'ought' and 
'wrong' can function without any articulated theory of the 
meaning of the terms, it can also function without any specific 
psychological understanding of what is going on when people's 
motivation involves the use of such terms (when people do 
something because they think they ought to, because the rules 
demand it, and so on). But four points are worth making in 
connection with psychological accounts: 
1) Any plausible account is likely to include the idea that norms 
which have an existence in public discourse can be internalised. 
Such an account will not necessarily use the word 'internalised' 
but it will have to give an account of how norms which exist in 
public space before a particular individual exists at all, can come 
to operate in some sense inside that individual. Mill, for one, 
offers such an account in Chapter 3 of Utilitarianism, before Freud 
came on the scene. I am not competent to say whether the most 
plausible account will turn out to be a psychoanalytic one, but 
there are certainly a number of writers on morality and moral 
education, not themselves psychoanalysts, who have taken such 
accounts seriously, including Peters and, more recently, Scheffler 
(1992 Ch. 5), and Rustin in TR A W. 
2) It is not, so far as I can see, necessary for such an account to 
put great weight on guilt - which, as I have noted, is one of the 
things that worries White and many others. If it were true that 
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morality(n) could not function without people constantly being 
racked with guilt, this would suggest that morality(n) was 
defeating its own object of ameliorating the human condition. But 
first, while guilt may come into certain psychological accounts of 
moral motivation, the thought which moves the individual need 
not be 'I shall not do this because I shall feel guilty if I do (and 
feeling guilty will be an unpleasant experience which I would 
rather avoid)'. The conscious thought may contain no reference to 
guilt but may merely be 'I shall not do this because it would be 
wrong'. At the level of public discourse, it is a necessary condition 
of such motivation that the conceptual possibilities for it are 
available; whether the possibility of feeling guilt is or is not a 
necessary condition is a separate question. 
Secondly, the negative features of guilt should not be exaggerated. 
Consider this example from Hare (written at a time when 
Czechoslovakia still existed, and doing philosophy there was a 
subversive activity): 
'I recently visited Prague to talk to some philosophers there. if, 
when I was crossing into Czechoslovakia, the officials had asked 
me the purpose of my visit, I should certainly have told them a 
lie, because if they had known they would most probably have 
expelled me ..... And, 
just as certainly, I should have felt, not 
merely fear of being found out and getting into trouble, but a 
feeling of guilt at telling the lie (although I should have been in no 
doubt that I ought to tell it). ' (1981 p. 31) 
If Hare had told the lie he would not have been racked with guilt; 
and his disposition to feel guilt in such circumstances (which he 
sees as a morally positive disposition) has not destroyed his 
quality of life (if it had I think we would have heard of this in his 
later writings). I do not think this is only because he is a 
philosopher. We should not think that any conception of morality 
which has a place for guilt is one that must be rejected by civilised 
benevolent people. 
3) The same applies for conceptions which have a place for shame 
as a motivation, where shame differs from guilt (cf. Taylor, G. 
1985) in having more direct reference to the perception or opinion 
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of others. In the last chapter I argued that a publicly shared 
understanding of morality will include a place for criticism, and 
for consideration, both individual and shared, of whether a 
criticised or potentially criticisable action can be justified. Shame 
seems to be the affective side of the disposition to consider 
whether one's actions can be or could be justified to others. It is 
not surprising that with increasing attention among moral 
philosophers to the social aspects of morality there have been 
recent acknowledgements of the role of shame. 5 
4) The public discourse which uses this idea of motivation 
presupposes that people can act in a particular way because they 
think that they ought to. That is not necessarily to say that it 
presupposes freedom of the will, with all the connotations that 
that term has had for some philosophers, but it is to say that the 
public discourse of morality will not too easily accept excuses of 
the form 'I couldn't help it, because ..... . Of course, this public 
discourse can acknowledge that there are cases where people 
really could not have acted in a certain way, even if they did think 
they ought to: it may really be that some provocations, 
temptations, or whatever, are too great. But if it were really 
thought that no one was ever able to choose to act in a certain way 
because they thought they ought to, there would be no role for 
such locutions in the discourse. 
Since the thinking of individuals is never isolated from public 
discourse, the extent to which people think they can or cannot 
help what they are doing is itself in part a function of the nature 
of the public discourse. It is not unusual to hear on television talk 
shoWS6 remarks such as 'I've been unfaithful to my partner ten 
times; I can't help it; it's my nature' (from someone who 
acknowledges in some sense that his or her unfaithfulness 
is a 
violation of shared norms). And given the apparently self- 
5 See, e. g., Williams (1993), Tombs (1995), and research currently 
being 
pursued at the Institute of Education by Brenda 
Finney on the practice 
within the juvenile justice system of 'reintegrative shaming'. 
61 don't often listen to them, and I have heard this sort of thing several 
times. For some remarks on the way American talk shows 
focus on the 
victim, thus diverting attention 
from the blameworthiness of the 
perpetrator, see Lamb (1996) pp. 
123-7. 
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justifying nature of anger and the attacks it can lead to, as pointed 
out in Chapter 6, claims that violence was an inevitable response 
to provocation are part of a similar discourse. My point here is not 
that such an account of an individual's behaviour cannot be 
correct; it may be in certain cases. It is that if such thoughts 
become increasingly frequent within public discourse it will 
become increasingly likely that people do think they are unable to 
help what they are doing or should not be criticised for it, and so 
on. It is not just that people will avail themselves of whatever 
resources in public discourse serve their purposes. It is that the 
contents of our consciousness are formed at least in part by what 
is available in public discourse. If thoughts such as 'you could 
resist however great the temptation' are not available in public 
discourse, they may not be available to an individual; and it could 
be that very fact which makes the difference between the 
individual's being able, and being unable, to resist. 
Recall the point cited in Chapter 6 from Larry May: that 'morality 
should not be diminished when the going gets tough. ' We could 
bring out May's point by reading 'morality should not be seen to 
be diminished when the going gets tough'. The point is about how 
morality must be publicly perceived, if it is to fulfil its function. It 
must not be seen as too easy to escape from in the face of 
pressures; though it is at the same time true that it will lose 
credibility if it is seen never to make allowanceS. 7 
Schooling and moral language 
As educators, fortunately, we do not have to be passive in the face 
of changes in public discourse; to some degree we can influence it. 
(I am trying, in a small way, to influence it through some of my 
publications. ) The overarching educational conclusion from the 
argument of this chapter is that children have to be exposed to the 
terminology of moral evaluation, and that it matters what kind of 
terminology of moral evaluation they are exposed to. It is not part 
of my argument that they should only be exposed to a thin 
vocabulary of 'right' and 'wrong', 'ought' and 'ought not'. There is 
the whole rich vocabulary of 'thick' ethical concepts to which 
Cf. Scheffler's (1992) discussion of the stringency of morality. 
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virtue theorists have drawn attention. But I do maintain that a 
certain sort of motivation would not be available to persons who 
had not learned to use terms such as 'right' and 'wrong' and 
t ought' and 'ought not' 
Should one take it for granted that schooling will get people into 
the way of using such terms? I think one should not. This is not 
to deny that schools are, by and large, very moral places, as Nick 
Tate said in his January 1996 speech (at the conference mentioned 
in Appendix 2). But it is to express a degree of scepticism about 
how far one can assume in schools any systematic and consistent 
use of moral language. It is not unusual to come across teachers 
who would be reluctant to use the terms 'right' and 'wrong' out of 
fear that they would be thought, or conviction that they must not 
be, 'judgemental' or 'moralistic' (cf. the quotation from Midgley in 
the previous chapter). 
If one cannot assume a consistent use of moral terminology among 
teachers then it also cannot be assumed among the general public 
who include the parents of children coming into the schools. 
Possibly in a more homogeneous (and perhaps literally God- 
fearing) society it might once have been possible to assume that 
whatever initiation into moral discourse was needed could be left 
to home upbringing. But in our present situation few assumptions 
can be made about the current understandings of morality and 
moral language other than that there is a fair degree of 
subjectivism, scepticism, and sheer confusion around. 
Schools, then, have a responsibility for the maintenance of a 
certain sort of public discourse. This means that the willingness or 
otherwise of teachers to use a certain sort of vocabulary is 
important. Perhaps some anecdotal evidence will be admissible 
here. At a meeting of the Values Education Council in May 1998, 
where most of the participants were or had been teachers and 
most were professionally involved in moral education, I raised the 
question whether (in view of the scepticism and confusion which I 
have just mentioned) the terms 'right' and 'wrong' (in a moral 
sense) would be better abandoned. I find it significant that 
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participants took the question seriously enough to make it a focus 
for further discussion. 
In that discussion there was some consideration of alternative 
terminology which people might use if they wished to convey that 
some conduct goes against accepted norms. One term which 
appears to be growing in popularity is 'unacceptable': often used, 
it seems, to mark the difference between what is (to be) tolerated 
and what is not (to be) tolerated. In some ways the term 
'unacceptable' may seem to carry its meaning on its face more 
clearly than does 'wrong'; the reference to recognised norms, while 
still implicit, may be easily understood. An educationalist and 
teacher of long experience said that she would tell the pupil who 
was disrupting a lesson by banging on the desk that his behaviour 
was unacceptable, but not that it was wrong. 8 No doubt part of 
the point was a concern not to condemn, or appear to be 
condemning, the child as opposed to criticising the behaviour (a 
distinction which it is vital if the kind of criticism I referred to in 
the last chapter is not to be counterproductive). But I think there 
was also the idea that to call such behaviour wrong would be to 
make too grand a claim, as if it purported to refer to a universal or 
absolute norm; banging on a desk, after all, is not wrong per se. 
The term 'unacceptable', understood as something like 'ruled out 
by the norms which the teacher has decided to apply in this 
classroom' makes a more modest claim. 
Later in the same discussion participants were wondering what 
they would say about rape. I think there was a shared sense of 
the incongruity of using the term 'unacceptable' both for desk- 
banging and for rape. If 'unacceptable' becomes an everyday 
term of criticism, something stronger will be needed for other 
occasions. Perhaps (of the terms available within a relatively thin 
vocabulary) 'wrong' is the sort of word to do the job. 9 
8 Acknowledgements to Janet Edwards. 
9 President Clinton, in his television statement on 17 August 1998 
following his evidence to a Grand Jury on the Monica Lewinsky affair, 
admitted that his relationship with Lewinsky had been 'inappropriate - 
in fact, wrong'. This shows the usage of 'inappropriate' as another 
word which, like 'unacceptable', indicates that something is ruled out 
by certain norms - in this case the norms pertaining to public office. 
It 
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My own argument, at any rate, is that morality(n) needs the 
availability of terms such as 'wrong' (though 'ought' and 'ought 
not' may be even more centr al); and not just their availability, but 
their being taken seriously. This certainly m eans that they should 
not be overused. They need to be used with reference to norms 
which are seen as important, not purely local or temporary, and 
subject to wide c onsensus. 
It has not been the argument of this chapter that people are 
necessarily motivated to do what they think they ought to do. It 
is possible to see what one ought to do by reference to certain 
norms or standards, while not taking those norms seriously at all. 
And there may be nothing wrong with this - if the norms, say, are 
those of a particular game which one has no interest in playing. 
What we need to do now is consider what is involved in people 
taking certain norms, those of morali ty(n), to have authority. 
also shows Clinton's awareness that 'wrong' 
is a stronger term of 
condemnation of the behaviour. Later 
he moved to a term which is 
presumably even stronger in American public 
discourse, though it 
would not be part of a secular morality(n): 




A crisis of moral authority? 
Many observers are worried by what they see as the questioning 
of moral authority in the modern world. A not untypical example 
occurred in Melanie Phillips' (1996) polemic on educational 
standards, All Must Have Prizes. It is particularly pertinent here 
because she was commenting on something I had written in 
1993.1 Her somewhat selective quotation from my article is as 
follows: 
'It still must be said forcefully that accepting uncritically what 
someone tells you because they are seen to be in authority is not a 
good thing ..... 
Doing what is right cannot be a matter of doing what one is told. 
Schools must produce people who are able to think for themselves 
what is right.... 
It will not take an exceptionally clever pupil, or an exceptionally 
bolshie one, to ask 'How do we know this is right or that is wrong? ' 
Any pupil who is being taught to think ought to be asking such 
questions. And the same pupil ought to see that 'Because I say so' 
is not an acceptable answer. Nor is 'Because these are the values 
of your society. ' When exposed to a little more teaching of history, 
perhaps, this pupil will see that by such an argument the values of 
slave states and Nazi states would have to be endorsed. ' 
Phillips' comment is: 
'But this reasoning was specious and dangerous. Of course pupils 
should be taught to think for themselves and should understand 
the reasoning behind the moral rules they are taught. But the 
answer to the pupil's question was surely: 'Because these are the 
values of our common humanity and are the basis of human 
flourishing. ' Not to answer it in that way leaves it up to the pupil 
to decide that sometimes the end may justify the means, for 
example; or that stealing may be permissible if you are poor; or 
that lying to Parliament is justified to protect the sale of arms. Far 
from preventing us against succumbing to totalitarian regimes, it 
provides the means to endorse them. Quite contrary to Haydon's 
own example, it might legitimise Nazism because it would say in 
effect that the Nazi view of the world was merely what the Nazi 
In TES 19 March. (Phillips' reference Is incorrect. ) 
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thought was right and was therefore as valid as the pupil's own 
view. If there is no absolute right, it follows that there can be no 
absolute wrong, just as if there is no absolute truth there can be 
no lies. If rightness is simply what is right-for-me, then who is to 
say that Nazism was an absolute wrong? But of course it was just 
that, because it offended the common moral code of humanity. 
Haydon's attitude, however, opened the way for his pupils to say 
that racial prejudice was no less right than tolerance; or that it 
was permissible to kill people because they were genetically 
imperfect. Moral relativism leads directly to despotism and 
tyranny. It was no accident that Nietzsche, in whose long shadow 
our relativist society was formed, represented a significant 
milestone on the road to the Final Solution. ' (pp. 221-2) 
In his contribution to TRA W, Paul Standish comments on Phillips' 
attribution to me of moral relativism on the basis of the passage 
quoted: 
'Now this is a bit odd given that Haydon's point of view derives 
very much from the tradition of liberal education (with the 
questioning Socrates in the background) which in other respects 
Phillips seems eager to embrace. Is this the relativism that must 
be so roundly condemned? ....... Haydon's purpose is hardly to 
endorse the idea that we cannot know what is right and wrong. It 
is to favour reason-giving over blind acceptance of authority. ' 
(TRA W p. 49) 
Standish is exactly right about my purpose in the 1993 article. 
One could leave the matter there, except that Phillips' reaction is 
an example of the current state of the public understanding of 
morality, and anyone concerned with the improvement of that 
understanding needs to give some regard to writings which may 
typify current confusions, and which may themselves have some 
influence on the views of a wider public. 
These are some of the things Phillips is doing in her comments: - 
1) She is accepting that reasons can be given for something being 
right or wrong. I have no problem with this. 
2) She is offering her own account of the fundamental kind of 
reason for something being right or wrong. The reasons she sees 
192 
as fundamental are of a broadly naturalist or neo -Aristotelian 
kind, and are broadly in line with what I have said here about 
the function of morality(n). 
3) She is suggesting that pupils should be given the correct reason 
for the norms they are expected to follow. Perhaps what matters 
here is the interpretation of 'give'. 2 If a teacher simply tells 
pupils a reason this may have little or no effect on their thinking. 
A reason which they come to through their own thinking may be 
one they take more seriously. In fact I do not think the relevant 
teaching need be or should be either purely didactic or purely a 
matter of 'discovery learning' on the pupil's part. In the passage 
immediately following that quoted by Phillips (but ignored by 
her) I referred to the rich resources within moral philosophy for 
answering the pupils' questions about how we know what is right 
and wrong. Such resources can be used both to structure 
discussion and to give content to it; answers which emerge from 
philosophical discussion are neither impositions by the teacher nor 
the pupils' unguided thoughts. 3 
4) Phillips displays as, I think, do many popular commentators 
on moral education a scepticism about the abilities of ordinary 
people to 'see reason' in moral matters. Her concession - as it 
seems - that 'pupils should be taught to think for themselves' is 
immediately followed by the assertion that they should 
understand 'the reasoning' (not apparently their own reasoning) 
behind the moral rules they are taught, and then that they should 
be given the correct reason. As Standish also sees, one encounters 
- not only in Phillips -a curious brand of anti-intellectualism or 
anti-rationalism when the topic is one of right and wrong. People 
who are concerned about educational standards will usually 
believe that there are appropriate ways of thinking in particular 
areas of the curriculum, so that when pupils are thinking about a 
2 One might think that the word 'give', in a educational context, 
is 
hardly one that needs any special philosophical attention. 
But see the 
chapter 'Giving Someone a Lesson' in Blake, Smeyers, 
Smith and 
Standish (1998). 
31 have argued for the importance of philosophy in moral education in 
Haydon (1993a) and briefly in TAV pp. 151-2. 
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problem in, say, maths or physics, it does not follow, just from the 
fact that they are doing their own thinking, that there is no limit 
to what they can reasonably come up with. Yet where questions 
of right and wrong are concerned, these same people seem to 
believe that if pupils think for themselves they might come up 
with anything at all - at which point we begin to get invocations of 
Nietzsche, relativism, and various other bogies, including Nazism. 
This actually suggests that these critics themselves subscribe to a 
kind of irrationalism about morality, believing that morality does 
not rest on any rational basis, and therefore that there is no such 
thing as a right way of thinking about moral matters. If they 
believed there were a rational basis for morality, why would they 
be so worried that other people, doing their own thinking, would 
come to the kind of answers which they (the critics) think are 
wrong? If they believe there are right answers in morality, why 
should they be so sceptical about ordinary people's capacity to see 
what these answers are? 
5) Phillips does not separate the question of how we know what 
is right and wrong from the question of whether other people 
have the authority to tell us what to do. But it has to be said that 
I also did not make that distinction in the article from which she 
quotes. Certainly I was expressing a scepticism as to whether the 
authority of society should be accepted. Since in my present 
argument I am giving a large role to the social recognition of 
norms, it may look as if I am contradicting myself. Here then may 
be the crux, both of what is at issue between Phillips and myself, 
and of whether my present argument hangs together. 
Kinds of authority 
In the last chapter I argued that morality(n) cannot dispense with 
the kind of motivation involved when people act in a certain way 
because they think they ought to. In this way, morality(n) has to 
be what some have called an imperative or prescriptive 
conception of morality. The relevant contrast here is with 
conceptions, perhaps Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian, in which the 
motivating force of morality is attractive rather than imperative. 
4 
4 For this distinction see e. g. Larmore (1996). 
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If the attractions of a moral life, intimately connected with the 
good life, were sufficient, or could be made sufficient, we would 
not need to raise questions about the authority of morality. For 
my part I do indeed find such an 'attractive' conception of 
morality attractive; but it is not a conception of morality(n). 
Assuming that morality(n) is primarily a morality of norms, it 
cannot be considered an optional matter whether individual 
agents follow the norms of morality(n) or not. There have to be 
social expectations that the norms are to be followed, and that the 
attitude of individuals towards the norms will not be that which 
individuals might quite properly take towards the rules of games 
which they choose not to play. This is to say again that the norms 
of morality(n), like the norms of law, have to be recognised as 
having some kind of authority. 
From a pragmatic and educational point of view, it is worth noting 
that popular conceptions of morality at present probably do see it 
largely in imperative terms. While it is not inconceivable that 
public education about morality might involve an attempt to 
subvert such understandings, it is an advantage to be able to work 
from where people are in their present conceptions, or at least to 
be able to take them seriously rather than dismissing them. The 
thought, widespread in public conceptions, that young people 
should be taught certain norms which they will take to have 
authority over their actions, will not just dissolve in the face of 
positive accounts of virtues or of caring. 
One might wonder at this point whether it is essential that all 
those who see themselves as subject to the authority of the norms 
of morality(n) must have the same conception of that authority. 
The SCAA Forum acknowledged in the Preamble to its Statement 
of Values that agreement on the values is compatible with 
disagreement on their sources. One might read this as applying 
something like Rawls' (1993) notion of overlapping consensus to 
the authority of moral norms: people can have different ideas 
about the nature of that authority, so long as they all think the 
norms have some kind of authority. 
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Possibly no specific understanding of the nature of moral 
authority has to be written into the conception of morality(n) as 
such. It seems likely, though, that a shared morality in which 
there were no shared sense of the authority of that morality 
would risk coming apart. Different sources of authority would be 
unlikely to coincide completely in the norms they underpin; 
acknowledgement of different sources of authority by different 
people might tend to pull attention away from the consensus on 
norms that are shared, towards those that are not. It is a fact, 
certainly, that different sources of moral authority will be 
acknowledged in a plural society; the point is to see whether, 
compatibly with this, there can be acknowledgement of one 
shared source of authority attaching to morality(n). (There does 
not, after all, seem to be any inconsistency in one person 
acknowledging more than one source of authority - say, the law 
of the land and God - for the norms against murder. )5 
Is there a candidate as a source of authority which can be 
acknowledged by all in a plural society? I take it that the 
authority cannot in a plural society be divine; also that a Kantian 
universalist understanding in which the authority of moral norms 
is the authority of Reason is too problematic - even among 
philosophers - for it to provide a source of authority which can be 
publicly acknowledged. What of the idea that the authority of 
morality over the individual is the authority of Society? 
In the literature of philosophy of education a distinction between 
two kinds or senses of authority has often been made (e. g. Peters 
19599 1966; K. Baier 1973). There is the authority of the expert 
who has knowledge which others (lay persons in relation to that 
authority) do not have; and the authority, often conferred on 
5 The Preamble to the SCAA Forum Statement of Values also says that 'the 
only authority claimed for these values .... 
is the authority of 
consensus9. If the consen sus itself is seen as a source of authority 
people will have a reason (a publicly sanctioned one) for going along 
with the consensus even when they also acknowledge a 
different source 
of authority which pulls in a different direction. This can admittedly put 
individuals, and possibly whole communities, in a difficult position; but 
this is a difficulty which already exists; it may be clarified, 
but is not 
created, by conceiving of morality(n) and its authority 
is the way 
suggested here. 
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particular persons under publicly recognised norms, to tell certain 
others what to do. Thus the teacher may claim (relative to her 
pupils) an authority on a certain area of curriculum content; and 
she may claim the authority to tell her students what to learn and 
in various ways how to behave. The first claim may be used as a 
premise in an argument to support a claim to the second kind of 
authority, but they are two different claims. 
In terms of this distinction, what kind of authority, on moral 
matters, could society have in relation to the individual? It will 
not be the authority of knowledge of what is right and wrong. if 
we were to say that society 'knows' what is right and wrong, we 
would presumably have to unpack this in terms of a social 
consensus being the criterion of right and wrong. There is one 
kind of case, conceivable rather than actual, where consensus can 
be taken as the criterion of what is right. This is the kind of case 
envisaged hypothetically in Habermas's (e. g. 1990) communicative 
ethics, where all those affected by a given norm are able to 
discuss and raise objections to that norm, under conditions of 
unconstrained communication (as defined by Habermas's ideal 
speech situation). If all those who would be affected by a given 
norm would - because of conditions of full information and so on - 
see any objection which there might be to that norm from their 
point of view, and none of them in fact do see any objection, then 
ex hypothese we can say that there is no objection to that norm; 
then the consensus is the criterion of the norm's being justified. 6 
This possibility affords an answer to some of the worries which 
people often have about the idea of a morality based in consensus. 
It will often be objected that consensus does not make something 
6 It is doubtful whether this argument can apply to any norms which 
are not concerned with, and seen by those affected to be concerned 
with, the protection or promotion of interests (cf. TAV p. 144). Some 
norms - including some which are seen by their adherents as deriving 
from divine authority - are not seen by their adherents as being about 
human interests at all. One response to this would be that it should not 
be a problem where morality(n) is in question; but see Ch. 12 below. 
Another response would be to argue, with Khin Zaw (1996 pp. 152-153), 
that wherever there is a conflict of moral beliefs, the beliefs can be 
treated as moral interests. If she is right, it may be possible to bring 
even beliefs which are not about human interests in the normal sense 
into a Habermas-like schema. 
197 
right, and examples like that of Nazi Germany will be cited: if 
consensus makes something right, then Nazi policy was right 
because there was a consensus on it in Germany in the 1930s. 
The reply is that this was not a consensus in the relevant sense: 
namely a consensus of all those who would be affected by the 
norms in question. There were whole sectors of the society, very 
much affected by the norms in question, which were not part of 
the consensus. 
The conditions written into Habermas's test for the justification of 
norms are empirically unlikely to be realised as regards norms 
applying to a whole society (let alone even more widely). It is not 
possible for all those who will be affected by a given social norm 
to participate directly in discussion on it (even if we confine our 
attention to humans who will be affected by it7); and for those 
who are involved in discussion, it is unlikely that the discussion 
will be free of all bi as and pressure such that, in Habermas's 
terms, the only force is the force of the better argument. 
In ordinary conditions, the fact that there is a broad consensus 
across a society on certain norms does not establish - or should 
not be taken to establish - that these norms are right or beyond 
criticism8. My alternative formulations here are intended to take 
account of the possibilities of a range of realist or non-realist 
interpretations, so that it will not be necessary here to go into 
metaethics. If a realist account is wanted by which certain norms 
are correct, I am saying both that being norms on which there is a 
social consensus is not what it is for norms to be correct, and that 
a social consensus on norms is not infallibly correlated with their 
being correct. If we take a non-realist route, then of course social 
consensus is not a criterion of actually-held norms being the 'real' 
ones, because there is nothing which is a criterion of actually-held 
norms being the 'real' ones; but this need not worry us if we can 
recognise the possibility of actual norms being criticised and 
71 consider how norms may relate to non-human animals in Chapter 12. 
8 Critics of the SCAA Forum who say that empirical findings can not 
establish the correctness of norms are right; cf. TRAW p. 142. Whether 
such claims were actually made on behalf of the Forum is a different 
question. 
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changed in ways which will be seen as improvement. The 
objection to taking consensus as authoritative in the sense of 
establishing correctness will now be that to take it this way would 
be to insulate the norms against criticism. For morality(n) it is 
important that the possibility of criticism and change be retained, 
both because the actual norms recognised by a society at a given 
time may not be the ones that best serve the purposes of 
morality(n), and because even if they are the ones that best serve 
it at a given time, circumstances may change. I shall say more 
about the possible bases of criti cism in the next chapter. 
So, society is not the measure of right and wrong. We now need to 
consider the possibility that society nevertheless has authority in 
the second of the senses distinguished, namely the authority to 
tell people how to behave. We could unpack this in terms of the 
publicly recognised norms of a society being authoritative for the 
conduct of individuals - at least provisionally. By saying 'at least 
provisionally' we can recognise that the norms are subject to 
criticism and improvement, and still hold that - unless and until 
they are changed - people ought to abide by them. 
The analogy with law again 
It will perhaps be clear that we have returned to the analogy 
between morality(n) and law. The sort of authority we are now 
talking about is the kind of authority that can be attributed to the 
law. In broadly liberal -democratic societies, people do not 
generally think that there is some model of ideal law to which the 
actual law either does or does not correspond (or if they do think 
in this way, arguably this shows a certain deficiency in citizenship 
education); people can think that the law has authority over their 
conduct - that they ought by and large to obey 
the law - while 
acknowledging that it is subject to criticism and change. 
It is worth pursuing the analogy again, to see something 
further of 
the conditions on which law can have acknowledged authority, 
and whether these conditions do or can apply to the moral norms 
of society. 
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The law can appear to the people who are subject to it to be an 
alien force - something imposed from the outside. Morality can 
appear this w ay also. To people who are in any case in a position 
of a certain subordination to others - which to some degree 
applies to all school pupils - it may appear that the norms which 
others expect them to adhere to are nothing but disguised ways of 
saying 'we don't want you to do this; or even 'don't do this, or 
else'. 
And when it appears that there are no particular sanctions which 
follow violation of these norms - unlike legal ones - morality may 
appear to be not so much an alien force, as an alien presence 
which lacks any force. This is just the sort of condition which can 
contribute to a widespread scepticism about morality, to lip 
service at best, or to an alienated 'so whaff attitude towards 
moral norms. And this is the sort of way in which morality comes 
to have a bad name (Hare 1992; cf. Midgley 1991; and the passage 
from Standish in TRAW, p. 50, quoted in Chapter I above). 
The democratic tradition in politics over several centuries has - 
with varying success - worked against the sense of law as an alien 
power. In a. democratic system it is possible - though in the 
absence of an effective education for citizenship it will often not 
happen - for people to see themselves as subject, not to alien 
demands, but to a system which they themselves are part of. 
This is, I suggest, the sort of conception which moral education 
also needs to be aiming at, where people see themselves as on the 
inside of morality. If I am right that a language of norms allows 
more readily than a language of virtues for the public articulation 
of shared standards, there is a further reason here for giving 
priority to a language of norms. As Annette Baier (1997, p. 273) 
puts it, 'significant power is possessed by those shaping our 
conception of the virtues and expecting us to display them, 
approving when we do, disapproving and perhaps shunning us 
when we do not'. Baier thinks this power is less coercive than the 
power exercised by those setting up an ethics of norms one is 
obliged to follow. But it seems to me it could be the other way 
round; if the formulation and promulgation of norms is a public, 
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transparent process, there will be less danger of manipulation in it 
then in the attempt to bring people up as certain sorts of people 
(cf- TAV pp. 124 - 6, and my references to Patricia White in 
Chapter 5 above). 9 
What is involved in seeing oneself as on the inside of morality? 
One point is that one can see reason for the norms of morality (as 
one can see point in the law). This does not in itself mean that one 
will endorse those norms, but it is perhaps a precondition of that. 
This suggests that education needs to educate people about 
morality. Far from representing it as something mysterious (or 
ignoring it as too problematic) education needs to focus attention 
on the nature of morality(n). 1 0 
A second point, already made in Chapter 5, is that people are able 
to agree to norms, not just in the sense of agreeing that there is 
reason for them, but in the stronger sense of agreeing to adhere to 
them (I suggested in Chapter 5 that this is more practicable where 
morality is expressed in terms of norms than where it is 
expressed in terms of virtues). There is a partial model in the 
way that people, joining a particular club or association, will often 
not just acknowledge that its rules exist, or even just acknowledge 
that its rules have a point, but will agree to abide by its rules. 
For the law, an analogous position is possible though not often 
realised; one could imagine that people, perhaps on reaching the 
age of majority, undertake as citizens to adhere to the law (the 
closest to this that happens in practice may be when adult 
immigrants are granted citizenship of their new state). For 
morality, we can hardly imagine anything like a ceremony; but we 
can see it as a possible attitude that people can have towards the 
9 If one is worried about power relations within society, one may have 
some reason to be suspicious of the adage that morality is 'caught not 
taught'. At least the power relationship is more evident when 
something is taught rather than caught. 
10 In doing this I take it that the ideas teachers will be drawing on will 
not only be from philosophy, since a variety of empirical disciplines 
will be relevant. It is important that education should not present 
morality(n) as the only way of seeing morality; therefore, as part of 
their response to diversity, teachers need to recognise that, in an 
informal sense of the terms, morality means different things to 
different people. 
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norms of their society, that they have undertaken to live by those 
norms - though not, as we shall see, in an uncritical spirit. 
A third point, which can also use the analogy of joining a club, is 
that one may take the norms the more seriously to the extent that 
one does see oneself as belonging to and valuing the community 
whose norms they are. This is one reason why one of the most 
important tasks for education where morality is concerned is to 
try to overcome the alienation that many people may feel from 
their community (one of the respects in which it is important for 
liberals to learn from communitarianism). I do not have in mind 
here only the sort of notional sense of membership in a 
community which could go with, for instance, acknowledging 
oneself as a member of Kant's kingdom of ends (though for some 
people this might work; cf. Haydon 1999b). I mean that a society 
which wants people to take morality seriously has to tackle in all 
sorts of way - which will often be more directly describable as 
political and economic - the danger of people feeling left out of 
their society. 
This, coupled with the previous point, constitutes an 
acknowledgement of something that may seem to have been left 
behind in this discussion of the public face of morality - namely 
the affective aspects. Partly it is that the affective aspects of 
morality often attach to something other than morality(n); but 
even where morality(n) is concerned, a person can care about 
norms and care about adhering to them, if they are the norms of a 
community which he or she is part of and values. Then both the 
consciousness of the fact that these are shared norms (where the 
fact that a society has shared norms may itself be valued), and the 
consciousness of having played some part in the forming of a 
shared sense of norms, can be positive factors in motivating 
persons to take such norms more seriously, in the sense of seeing 
them as having authority over their own conduct. 
A fourth point is that people can see themselves as sharing with 
others a responsibility for the norms of morality(n) to 
the extent 
that they can participate in criticism and change of those norms. 
202 
Again the analogy is clear with the way in which democracy hopes 
that people will see themselves as part of the system because they 
are able to criticise and make changes within the system. 
If moral education can work with this sort of analogy, it will in 
effect be saying to young people: 
'This is the prevailing morality Of your society, on which people 
by-and-large do agree, even though they may have come to this 
consensus from different starting -points. Other people are not, on 
the whole, stupid, and the experience of society over generations 
is not irrelevant; though at the same time your study of history 
will show you that some moral ideas which hardly anyone would 
now accept were in their time surprisingly resilient, and would 
not have changed if they had not been criticised. So, given that 
you have the possibility of criticising the prevailing morality, and 
given that it can change as a result of criticism, it is reasonable for 
society to expect you, for the moment, to go along with it. Your 
criticism will have more weight to the extent that it based on an 
understanding of the reasons behind the prevailing morality, on 
your own experience of life, and on your reflective understanding 
of your experience and that of others. These kinds of 
understanding and experience are ones which we hope your 
education will help you to develop. ' 
It is important to this position that it is possible not only for the 
prevailing morality to be criticised, but also for it to change as a 
result of that criticism. This introduces a disanalogy between 
morality(n) and law. The democratic conception of the law holds 
that people are at liberty to campaign to get the law changed, but 
should abide by it (unless in exceptional circumstances) until it is 
changed. In the case of law there is a definite procedure of 
legislation. This makes it possible to say that a given law is in 
force at a given time - even until a precise time on a precise 
date - 
and that thereafter it is not in force. This in turn makes it 
possible to say to people 'you should go along with this law while 
it is in force, but if you, in conjunction with others, succeed in 
getting it changed, then once it is changed you need take no 
further notice of it'. If there were such a thing as moral legislation, 
we could transfer this model to morality. But there is no moral 
legislation as such. Does this make the whole process by which 
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morality is criticised and changed too fluid for the democratic 
analogy to be applied? 
We should not exaggerate the difference. Though laws can cease 
to apply or come into force at a given time, there is often lying 
behind such changes a more gradual process. Laws can come into 
disrepute, can cease to be enforced, can come to be ignored, before 
they are actually repealed. Legislation may be the 'outward and 
visible sign' of a change in popular thinking which has been going 
on for some time. Morality does not get changed by acts of 
legislation; nevertheless it does get changed. The sexual morality 
of Britain, for instance, is changing. 1 1 (It remains open to people 
to say from a universalist perspective, that sexual morality has 
not changed; it is just that people are behaving less morally. But a 
greater tendency for people to do, without thinking it wrong, what 
once was thought wrong; and a greater tendency, not just to 
tolerate conduct that once was condemned, but to think of it as not 
wrong at all, are precisely the kinds of change we are interested 
in). The important point here is that the morality of a society gets 
changed through processes which are intelligible and which it is 
possible for persons to participate in. That there is less deference 
to the views of certain social elites, and a wider dissemination of 
ideas and arguments, than there used to be, makes it easier to 
defend the idea that the prevailing morality has a provisional 
authority. For the processes by which morality changes are, 
increasingly, ones which are visible to all and available to all. 
The more we can see the influences on the changes as being ones 
to which everyone has access, the more we have an analogy 
between the processes by which law is changed (in principle, in a 
democratic society) and the processes by which morality changes. 
And the more we can say that people, as they become full 
II See Chapter 7 note 7 for my caution about the idea of 'sexual 
morality'. Some recent empirical evidence of change is presented 
in 
Young People, Politics and Citizenship: A Disengaged Generation? 
(Citizenship Foundation 1998), which is the report on a Colloquium 
held 
in December 1997. Unfortunately, this publication will not help to 
promote public understanding of morality(n), since changes in attitudes 
towards pre-marital sex are the only matters reported on under the 
heading 'Moral matters'. 
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members of the society, will have the opportunity to participate in 
such processes, the more we can say that, in the meantime, they 
should see the prevailing morality as having authority over them. 
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Chapter Twelve 
Criticism of norms and the scope of morality(n) 
It is essential to the understanding of the authority of morality(n) 
for which I argued in the last chapter that the content of 
morality(n) is subject to criticism and may change as a result. I 
have said little so far about what form such criticism may take. In 
attempting to round out the picture a little in this chapter I shall 
continue to assume that morality(n) is articulated primarily in 
terms of norms, but, as I have mentioned, similar questions would 
arise if some other language were primary. 
Criticism of norms 
Law can often be criticised by reference to moral norms which 
are publicly acknowledged. But it is not clear that any equivalent 
account can be given of criticism of prevailing moral norms. For 
(tautologously) there will not be any publicly recognised moral 
norms to appeal to outside those which are publicly recognised at 
a given time. So outside of the set of publicly recognised norms 
there will be no other authoritative reference point for criticism; 
but if that is so, it seems to leave the publicly recognised norms 
having not merely a provisional authority but an absolute one (if 
they have any at all). 
If my account leads into this impasse it is a serious problem. But 
the logical neatness of the argument just made conceals the fact 
that in the concrete situation there is a degree of flexibility which 
does in fact allow for criticism. The situation is one not 
unfamiliar to modern philosophy - it is the idea that criticism and 
improvement of beliefs does not have to have foundations to refer 
to. In that sense, there can be no appeal outside of shared 
understandings, though understandings can gradually change. But 
the field of actual and potential shared understandings is broad 
enough for there to be always possibilities of criticising some parts 
by reference to other parts; there does not have to be a firm 
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unchanging foundation at the bottom of it all (or above it all) for 
reasoned criticism and change to happen. 1 
It is not difficult to list several ways in which criticism can take 
place, though the list may not be exhaustive. 
1) The publicly recognised norms of one society are not - 
especially in the modern world - isolated from those of others. 
Criticism of the norms of one society will sometimes involve 
comparison with those of another. 
2) The publicly recognised norms of a society will not necessarily 
form a consistent set, nor (as I have pointed out in Chapter 9) will 
they all be at the same level. It will often be possible for criticism 
of certain norms to appeal to other norms which are also publicly 
recognised; for instance, criticism of a relatively specific rule may 
sometimes be criticised by reference to a broader principle. (This 
is not unlike the way in which legal argument can go on within a 
structure in which both temporary and local statute law, and also 
broader principles, are recognised). 
3) There can be appeal to how inclusive a perceived consensus 
actually is -a point which will be relevant when we consider 
below the scope of morality(n). 
4) There can be appeal to the underlying point of morality(n); 
that is, arguments may be made that currently recognised norms 
do not in fact tend to check undesirable motivations, or do this at 
unnecessary cost, or do not facilitate co-operation, and so on. 
(In 
line with my remarks above I do not see this as an attempt to 
find 
foundations by getting outside the sphere of public discourse to 
something incontrovertible, perhaps in evolutionary psychology; 
the appeal will still be to public understandings. ) It 
is plausible 
that as a general understanding of morality(n), in something 
like 
I The metaphor of Neurath's boat is a familiar one 
in this context. The 
same metaphor is used in the context of criticism and change 
in the law 
by Dworkin (1986) p. 111. 
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the terms in which I have described it here, becomes more 
widespread, criticism of this kind would become more common. 
In chapter 71 distinguished four sorts of relationship (actually 
points in a spectrum) in which norms might stand to the 
underlying point of morality(n). What happens to the authority of 
norms when these differences in terms of underlying rationale 
come to be explicitly addressed (as they inevitably would be in an 
education which seeks to promote both understanding of 
morality(n) and a reflective disposition towards it)? For my 
categories (1) and (4) at opposite ends of the spectrum there 
should be no special problems. The kind of fundamental rules to 
which White refers in TRAW (such as the prohibitions on killing 
and grievous bodily harm) should be able to retain as much 
authority as they have ever had; there is no reason, here and now, 
to suppose they will ever cease to be part of morality(n). 2 The 
taboos which have no underlying rationale should lose any vestige 
of authority. 
The case for the categories between is more difficult. Category (3) 
was of norms which give a particular shape to human life, though 
it can be recognised that there is no underlying argument for one 
shape rather than another. It is difficult to see how far norms in 
this category can survive critical reflection (a point related to that 
Williams (1985, Chapter 9) makes about the loss of ethical 
knowledge). I shall not attempt here to assess how far there is or 
is not significant loss; we may in any case have to accept that 
human societies are becoming, to stick to the metaphor, more 
shapeless than they used to be. 
Category (2) perhaps raises the greatest problems. These are 
cases where there are (or it is widely believed that there are) 
good reasons of a consequentialist kind for having certain norms, 
but where there are many cases (not just rare exceptions) in 
2 White includes the norm against stealing. Despite Biblical precedent, 
this does not seem to me to be in the same category, since it is 
conceivable that the conventions establishing a sense of property could 
change so much as to render this norm inapplicable. 
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which there seems no harm in someone going against the norms, 
and even many where it is (still on consequentialist grounds) 
better for individuals in particular circumstances if they don't 
adhere to the norms. Suppose, to take up again an example I used 
in Chapter 7, that things will go better overall if people in society 
in general adhere to traditional norms of monogamy, where these 
are taken to include a prohibition on pre-marital sex (whether we 
could reliably know this is a further question). What then would 
be the advice to be given to a person wondering whether there is 
any reason not to enter into what might be a short-term 
cohabiting relationship? Part of it might be this: 'Don't, because 
things will go better overall if people in society in general adhere 
to traditional norms of monogamy'. 3 But this seems unlikely to be 
a very convincing reason to the individual. 
Norms of category (2) are, then, may tend to lose their authority. 
But there may well be reasons, again of a consequentialist kind, 
for wanting them not to lose their authority too quickly. Society 
takes time to adjust; in the meantime there are different people 
trying to work to different norms, with consequent possibilities of 
confusion and conflict; and there are always the possibilities 
(mentioned in Chapter 8) of special pleading by individuals in 
their own interests - or to satisfy their own inclinations - 
sometimes at the expense of others. One factor that may help to 
moderate t he pace of change is a recognition of the provisional 
authority o f morality(n) as a whole. The idea here is that if people 
have some respect for morality(n) as a whole (respect for 
something they are involved in, as opposed to obedience to 
something alien), they will 'think twice' about going against 
it. 4 
We can realistically envisage a situation in which society's norms 
3 Notice the difference between this and instances in category (1), 
albeit the difference may be one of degree; it is important that in the 
case of killing and injuring we can give other kinds of reason than 
just 
'things will go better overall if people in society in general adhere to 
norms of not killing and injuring. 
4 The colloquial phrase is quite appropriate. The reflective individual 
will think both about the particular situation, with its context and 
consequences, and about the wider shared system of expectations. 
His or 
her decision may go sometimes in favour of adherence to recognised 
norms, and sometimes not. 
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are taken to have a provisional authority, but are not, as a body, 
expected to remain static. 
The scope of morality(n) 
In this section I want to address a criticism that might be made of 
the whole notion of morality(n) as I have developed it so far. 
Though the criticism needs unpacking, it is basically this: that the 
morality of a society as I have conceived it is rather narrow and 
inward-looking. At first sight this criticism falls into a different 
category from the forms of criticism I was looking at in the last 
section. There I was concerned with ways in which norms in 
actual society (outside the pages of this thesis) could be criticised. 
Here I am addressing a criticism of my own argument. But there 
is a link between these sections, in that criticisms of what I shall 
call the scope of morality(n) could equally figure within a society's 
ongoing discussion and attempt to reach consensus about 
morality(n). Indeed, part of my reply to the criticism of the 
possible narrowness of morality(n) is precisely to point out that 
societal discussion of morality(n) holds open the possibility of its 
limitations being appreciated and addressed. 
In what ways might morality(n) seem to be narrow and inward- 
looking? People sharing an understanding of morality(n) might 
think (i) that while they and their fellow-members are bound by 
the terms of this morality(n), it has no prescriptive force for 
anyone else. People might also think (ii) that the agreed norms 
tell them how to behave towards the fellow members of their own 
society, but do not tell them how to behave towards anyone else 
(let alone towards animals or the environment). And people 
might think (iii) that morality(n) predominantly requires them to 
hold off from interference with others, but does not make much 
demand on them to bring positive benefit to others. 
These three possibilities give us three questions worth exploring 
here. (i) To what range of moral agents do the norms of 
morality(n) apply, that is, who is subject to those norms? 
(ii) To what range of beneficiaries do the norms apply, that is, who 
or what needs to be taken into account in applying the norms? 
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(iii) Are the norms going to be minimal and predominantly 
negative, or more extensive and positive, in what they require? 
The conception of morality(n) which I have outlined could be 
construed in a way I would not myself want to endorse. There is 
(relating to the first question) a variety of relativism which says 
(for example) 'English people should behave in this sort of way 
but we can't say anything about how other people should behave'. 
Then (relating to the second question) there can be an 
ethnocentric or otherwise group-centred morality in which people 
think they should behave well towards their fellow group 
members but do not think it matters how they behave towards 
anyone (or anything) else. And (relating to the third question) 
there can be a minimal morality in which people think that 
provided they respect other people's basic (negative) rights, it 
doesn't matter whether they do any positive good in the world. 
I shall not attempt the empirical assessment which would be 
necessary to tell us how far such positions are widespread at the 
moment. The three positions put together may well form a 
picture the reader finds recognisable. But at the same time there 
are counterweights to those positions. Many people do think that 
basic moral norms apply to everyone, that they themselves should 
not just take fellow members of their group into account, and that 
they should positively help others. This mixed picture is the one 
that educators have to start from. My present question is whether 
the broad approach I am suggesting, working through criticism 
and the attempt to arrive at consensus, will inevitably tend 
towards an inward-looking and minimal sense of morality. 
An English morality? 
There is, if not a tradition, then at least a recent practice of certain 
educational initiatives being taken at national leveI5 - including 
5 For strong historical and political reasons, educational policies 
initiated by the British Government have usually been for England and 
Wales, with different provision for Scotland. For the public 
understanding of morality this might make particularly good sense, 
since there was once a strong Scottish tradition of public engagement in 
moral discourse (see Maclntyre 1987), and there have been numerous 
initiatives on values education in Scotland in recent years. More 
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the SCAA Forum. If the approach I am suggesting were to be 
encouraged and facilitated through the education system, this 
would be likely to give it a national focus. If there were an 
attempt, as English educational policy, to promote a public 
consensus on the nature and content of morality, it would be a 
consensus across the English public that such a policy would be 
aiming at. Does this mean that the consensus would be on 'English 
morality "? There are at least two aspects of my argument that 
might lead us to expect this. 
One is the point first made in Chapter 7, that many moral norms 
are not the only possible response to certain features of the 
human condition; they are norms that give a particular shape to 
what Standish calls our moral geography, where other shapes 
would also be possible. There is, then, room for a degree of 
relativity in morality, and we should expect this to be reflected in 
the public understanding which is already present or which is 
arrived at in different parts of the world. For instance, there 
appear to be strong norms of filial piety in many parts of East Asia 
(an observation supported anecdotally by acquaintance with East 
Asian students); and in terms of the purposes of morality(n) such 
norms make good sense as a response to human vulnerability with 
advancing age. A shared sense of morality(n) in Western societies 
will equally need to respond to that (and arguably to find rather 
better ways of responding to it than are widespread now). But 
ideas of filial piety are not the only possible response and with 
such traditions not now in place in Western societies it is to be 
expected that Western understandings of the requirements of 
morality(n) in this respect will not be identical with East Asian 
ones. That is why, though the notion of morality(n) does not itself 
contain any culture-relativity, it was possible to say in Chapter 7, 
pursuing the analogy with positive law, that any set of moral 
norms will be the norms of a society. 
A second element in the preceding discussion that could point 
toward a rather inward-looking understanding of morality is the 
recently still, there has been devolution to Wales. It is in recognition of 
these factors that I take England rather than Britain as my example 
here. 
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conception of moral authority that I have adumbrated. This is in 
line with the claim made in the Preamble of the SCAA Forum 
Statement (see Appendix 3), that the only authority claimed for 
the norms listed is 'the authority of consensus'. In the context, 
this can only mean 'consensus across our society'. Pragmatically, 
one can see how teachers and others involved in education may 
more confidently work with the understanding of the morality 
they are subscribing to as being that of their own society; they 
will seem to be making more modest claims if they are saying 
'This is our society's morality' rather than 'This is (universal) 
morality per se . 
The more modest claim also fits with the point made first in 
Chapter 5, and taken up again in the discussion of moral authority, 
that 'people can agree on norms, not only in the sense that they 
agree that certain norms would be a good idea, but in the stronger 
sense that they agree to act according to the norms'. There is 
something here of a social contract understanding of morality: for 
mutual benefit, the members of a society agree with each other 
that they will regulate their behaviour towards each other in 
certain ways. And indeed, given the importance of a shared sense 
of membership of a community to which I referred in the last 
chapter, I do think this is an important element in the shared 
moral understanding of a society. At the same time, many would 
want to claim more than local validity for the norms that may in 
fact be agreed across their society. To support such a wider claim, 
what is needed is not an appeal to an empirical consensus which 
could only be demonstrated locally, but an appeal to the 
underlying point of morality(n). 6 
6 One philosophical view is that empirical consensus cannot be a basis 
of any kind for validity. In my sketch of morality(n) I have tried to 
show how consensus can be taken as a basis, if not for validity, then at 
least for authority. But having made that move, I cannot claim that the 
authority is universal if the consensus itself is not. 
Smith and Standish in TRAW seem to have interpreted the SCAA Forum 
as claiming that a consensus found empirically in Britain somehow 
establishes universal validity. I do not think this was ever the 'official' 
SCAA position but it is possible that people speaking for or about the 
Forum have sometimes given this impression. Marianne Talbot, in her 
role as expositor of the Forum's work, seemed - until challenged - to slip 
into making the claim of universal validity on the basis of an empirical 
consensus (only demonstrable locally), at a meeting of the London 
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One needs, I think, both a recognition of local consensus and also a 
recognition that the norms on which there is consensus do not 
apply only to members of the group within which the consensus is 
arrived at. (It would be a good thing if English football fans 
undertook not to fight each other; but not so good if this goes with 
the idea that there is nothing wrong with fighting the fans of 
foreign clubs in the streets of French or German cities. ) 
Fortunately, there is no incompatibility here. There is no 
incoherence in the idea that an agreement with others of one's 
own group to observe certain norms in relation to each other can 
co-exist with a recognition that those same norms apply to 
members of the group in their relations to others outside the 
group. To take up Mary Warnock's example from Chapter 7, it is 
not, so far as I can see, absurd that there might be an agreed rule 
within a school that there is to be no bullying or theft within the 
school, co-existing with the recognition that there is to be no 
bullying of or theft from anyone outside the school either. Indeed 
this could also be part of what members of the school have agreed 
with each other. So also across a whole society, a shared public 
acknowledgement that theft is wrong will certainly be understood 
as implying that members of the society should not steal from 
each other, but will at the same time be a shared 
acknowledgement that stealing from anyone is wrong. (One 
implication of this is that if shame is to figure at all in people's 
motivation for observing the norms, shame before one's fellow 
group members may be felt not only for transgressing the norms 
against fellow group members, but for transgressing those same 
norms also against others. ) 
It will be part of the responsibility of educators to see that the 
developing understanding of morality on the part of their students 
does not become too inward-looking. They may do this in part by 
referring to the underlying point of morality(n). Since morality(n) 
is a response to elements of the human condition which are in no 
way limited by national boundaries, there is no inherent reason 
Branch of the Philosophy of Education Society at the Institute of 
Education, June 1997. 
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why its most important norms should not be universal ones 
(universal at least across human beings, rather than across 
rational beings as in Kant). Educators wishing to resist inwardness 
should very much be helped by the evident fact that cultures and 
countries are not in impermeable compartments. Cultures co-exist 
in a classroom and with increasing travel and through the media 
people who are not fellow-citizens are frequently encountered. 
Promoting within one society a shared sense of a morality which is 
not confined to that society ought to be easier now than at any 
time before. 
Only human? 
How far will the requirements of morality(n) be understood as 
applying to actions of which the major effects are not on human 
beings? There are several approaches which seem to be 
compatible with an underlying appreciation of the importance of 
morality(n). On some issues, where damage to the environment 
makes the world a worse place to live in, even from the point of 
view solely of human interests, the norms prohibiting that damage 
can be straightforwardly part of morality(n). Where that is not 
the case, some would see norms against harming animals or the 
environment as extensions to morality(n) - that is, part of an 
extended morality(n) - and ones which are from a logical point of 
view gratuitous, even though explicable. This is Mackie's (1977 
pp. 194-5) approach in relation to animals. 
Another possibility, which may more clearly apply to the 
environment than to animals, is to see the concerns for the non- 
human as not part of morality(n) at all, but as part of morality or 
ethics in a broader sense. On this view, taking action for the sake 
of the environment might be part of some people's conception of a 
good life but would not be a part of a shared morality(n). Griffin 
(1996 p. 127) takes this view. 
Others see norms against harming animals as rationally required 
extensions from an initial appreciation of the way 
in which 
morality(n) serves human interests; given that morality(n) 
requires norms against the causing of suffering, 
it is simply 
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irrational not to recognise that these norms apply to suffering as 
such, whether human or animal. This is Peter Singer's approach, 
anticipated by Bentham; and my approach in TAV (see p. 108, 
n. 4). Something different, however, needs to be said about the 
environment, which cannot in the same literal sense suffer. 
Yet another approach in applying norms to animals and the 
environment is to extend one's sense of the community of which 
one sees oneself to be a member. We are all - humans and non- 
humans - animals sharing the biosphere; for that matter, we are 
all - animals, plants, even mountains - part of the same common 
world (cf. TAV p. 96 n. 15; Clark 1977,1993). 
For my argument here, there is no need to decide for one or other 
of these approaches. They all exist, and not only among 
philosophers. They exist already within that public whose 
understanding of morality I am talking about. In any attempt, 
then, to arrive at a more widely and explicitly shared 
understanding of morality, these points of view would be 
represented. To speak only of England, it is unlikely that a shared 
sense of morality would not include norms on the treatment of 
animals and the environment. Certainly this held good of the 
SCAA Forum Statement, which includes a section on the 
environment within which animals are mentioned. The item 
relating to animals - that we should I understand our 
responsibilities for other species' - probably represents fairly well 
the present state of agreement. It does not attempt to say what 
these responsibilities are; but it does, importantly, rule out the 
idea that we don't have any responsibilities towards animals. 
That is enough to enable even this apparently rather vacuous 
prescription to function as a reference point in the way I 
suggested in Chapter 9. 
A minimal morality? 
The question of how minimal or otherwise a shared morality(n) 
may be cuts across the question about animals and the 
environment; there can, for instance, be a minimal conception of 
responsibilities towards animals - that we should not be 
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deliberately cruel towards an animal - or far more extensive 
conceptions. But it would apply also even within a morality in 
which no responsibilities were recognised towards anything non- 
human. The spectrum extends from the most minimal morality of 
a recognition of certain basic and negative rightS7 to the most 
extensive utilitarian conception - not actually held by most 
utilitarians - that everyone ought at all times, and at the expense 
of any projects of their own, to be doing all they can to promote 
human happiness. It will often be possible also to place 
conceptions of morality which are not expressed in a language of 
norms somewhere on the same spectrum. Various conceptions of 
virtue ethics will fall at different points between the extremes, 
depending on the virtues stressed and their interpretation, and 
especially on what weight is given to the virtue of benevolence 
and how that is interpreted. An ethics of care is likely to 
encourage people to 'put themselves out' for at least some others, 
but nevertheless it may fall towards the minimal end of the 
spectrum because caring is in the first instance a response 
towards the perceived needs of particular others who are 
immediately present. 8 Within philosophy of education, the issue 
of where our conception of morality should be placed on this 
spectrum has been extensively discussed by White (1982). 
It may seem that a consensus approach to the content of 
morality(n) will tend towards a conception of responsibilities 
which will do as much as, but no more than, is necessary to satisfy 
the interests of those who are party to the consensus. This is by 
no means necessarily so, since those who are party to the 
consensus need not be motivated only by self-interest. But 
suppose it is so; then the content of the consensus depends very 
much on how inclusive is the process by which the consensus is 
arrived at. People in comfortable circumstances might agree on 
norms which would require them to do little more than refrain 
from interfering with each other; a consensus which includes the 
7 See Appendix 4 for an argument that such a conception is too minimal 
to be viable as a basis for moral education. 
8 Cf. TA V p. 80. Also, cf. Peter Singer's (1972,1979) arguments on the 
obligation to relieve famine with Noddings (1984). (For a 
Kantian 
perspective on the same issue, cf. ONeill 1986). 
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homeless, people with disabilities, people with chronic illness, and 
so on, would be unlikely to be so minimal. 9 
Again, there are heavy implications for education. By its nature, 
compulsory formal schooling takes in a wide cross-section of any 
population. Apart from a minority whose parents choose to 
educate them at home, formal schooling takes in everyone at a 
certain stage in their life. So if there could be a consensus to 
which everyone in all the schools in a society had agreed, there 
could hardly be any way in which any more inclusive consensus 
could be arrived at. It should be possible in schools, if anywhere, 
to see that people do not grow up with a conception of morality 
which overlooks the needs of those who are less well placed than 
themselves. If, as a society, we do end up with a shared public 
understanding of morality which is minimal and inward looking, it 
will be at least in part because teachers have not taken up some of 
the opportunities which schooling makes possible. 
In Chapter 7, note 4, 1 referred to Cupitt's view that morality can 
for the most part be le ft to look after itself. I have shown, I think, 
that the evolution and renegotiation of the rules which Cupitt has 
in mind cannot be an automatic process; it is one that takes 
knowledge, intelligence, and discussion, and hence it is very much 
a process in which ed ucation, including formal education, has an 
important role. 
91 made a similar point in Chapter II when discussing whether 
consensus can ground the authority of norms. 
In various ways the same 
point is present, of course, in Habermas, 
Rawls, and Hare. 
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Chapter Thirteen 
The public understanding of morality as an 
aspect of citizenship education 
The need for an institutional basis 
I have sketched an understanding of morality(n) as having a 
provisional authority in being subject both to consensus and to 
criticism and change in a broadly democratic way. But I have also 
admitted that we lack the formal processes of criticism and change 
which exist for the law; there is not the obvious institutional basis 
for morality(n) that there is for law. At least two potential 
consequences of this fact are worth noting. One is that certain 
persons or groups may have disproportionate influence in the 
forming or changing of public understandings of morality and its 
content. The mass media, for instance, are channels of influence 
through which particular people may exercise influence out of all 
proportion to that which their views would have in a Habermasian 
ideal speech situation. A second potential consequence is a lack of 
any co-ordination in the 'message' that is getting across to the 
general public. This, as I mentioned in Chapter 9, is one reason for 
not relying on parents as the sole agents of moral education; for 
reasons I expanded on in that chapter, some degree of co- 
ordination is essential to morality(n). 1 
It should come as no surprise that I consider formal education - 
that is, schooling - could be the main channel through which the 
basis for a shared public understanding of morality can be 
institutionalised. No other social institution has as much 
opportunity - across generations - of reaching parts of society 
which other institutions cannot reach. This is indeed one respect 
in which critics of schooling such as Illich were right when they 
held that school has become the Church of our modern society; I 
am, if you like, trying to pick up one positive aspect of that 
11 do not wish to downplay the role of families, of the media, of 
politicians, and just of everyday interaction between adults, 
in 
promoting and maintaining the public understanding of morality. 
Education could not be fulfilling its own role in this respect if we 
did not 
find its 'message' reflected and reinforced in these other settings. But I 
do want to argue that a public educational underpinning is needed. 
219 
analogy. At the same time there are important differences 
between the way that the Church2 might once have promoted a 
shared understanding of morality and the way that one can now 
envisage schooling doing so. 
The most obvious difference is that the Church works with a 
broader interpretation of morality which refers to a quite 
different source of authority from that I have envisaged here. 
This difference in 'curriculum', though, could be exaggerated. In 
one direction, there has always been at least some overlap in 
content between the morality preached by the Church and any 
likely content of morality(n). In the other direction, it is no part of 
my argument that the only ethical or indeed spiritual concern of 
schools should be with morality(n). Schools should, as a Church 
does, have an eye to the broader ethical or spiritual development 
of their pupils; here the difference is, as I brought out in Chapter 
3, that secular schools cannot work to a single model of spiritual or 
indeed ethical development, given the scope for individual 
variation and choice. 
Having stressed that what I am talking about here is not the 
whole of a school's concern with 'spiritual, moral, social and 
cultural development', or with PSE, or even with moral education, 
I return to the responsibility of schools in maintaining morality(n). 
In this respect the most important difference between schools and 
Churches is, so to speak, in teaching method rather than 
curriculum. Churches have often been somewhat static and 
dogmatic in their teachings. I do not intend that as a criticism; it 
is arguable that static and dogmatic, in certain respects, is just 
what Churches should be. But I do maintain that static and 
dogmatic is what schools should not be in their 'moral teachings'. 
Why not? There are several reasons which I have already 
anticipated, so that I need only list them briefly here. 
2 To avoid complications in what is not a central part of my argument, I 
shall speak here in a way applicable to an established Church like the 
Church of England; what I say could generally be adapted to other 
varieties of organised religion and other religions. 
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1) There would be a risk that a certain norms would be set in 
stone when they ought to be open to criticism and revision. 
2) By seeking merely to promulgate a set of norms already 
decided on, schools would make it less likely that individuals 
would see these norms as having authority over them, for reasons 
I have set out in the previous chapter. In particular, any 
centralised procedure, through which some government body 
sought to promulgate norms through the schoolsý would be likely 
to reinforce the appearance of morality as a alien imposition. 
3) To put the same point in a social/political mode, the 
promulgation of a predetermined set of norms as if that were the 
last word would be undemocratic. A small body of people would 
be laying something down for the rest of their contemporaries in 
society (this is akin to White's (1998) complaint about 
sectionalism in the determination of the curriculum). Further, 
what was laid down would be expected to have force not only for 
the present generation but for the next generation and even (to 
the extent that the norms were set in stone) for further 
generations beyond. This is what I dubbed in TA V (p. 123) 
'generational imperialism' (see also Haydon 1993b). 
These are some reasons why the kind of education for public 
understanding of morality which I have in mind should not be a 
matter of the transmission of predetermined norms. But the most 
important reason why it cannot be just this, is that, recognising 
the diversity and confusion existing in people's thinking about 
morality in our society, education has to address the nature of 
morality itself. 
This is a point that I have made several times before, from 
Chapter 1 onwards. It should perhaps be unnecessary to repeat 
the point that I do not see it as the task of education to put across 
a particular understanding of morality as the correct one. It is not 
for politicians or for teachers in state schools to decide, for 
instance, that a secular naturalistic understanding of morality is 
correct and a religiously -based understanding wrong, or vice 
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versa. This would leave us in an impasse if different 
understandings of morality were mutually exclusive. But if it 
is possible for citizens in a plural society to converge on a certain 
understanding of morality which will be workable for certain 
public purposes, while not having to reject other understandings 
of morality, then it will be possible for education actively to 
promote a certain understanding of morality, without excluding or 
downgrading other viewS. 3 
The idea of morality in the narrow sense, as I have outlined it, 
would not be an unfamiliar one to many people. While that is not 
helpful to any claim I might want to make to originality in this 
thesis - any originality has to lie in the use I make of the idea in 
the overall argument, not in the idea itself - it is actually 
important to my overall argument that the idea is one that can be 
widely intelligible and widely seen to have point. I have tried to 
expand sufficiently on the idea of morality(n) to show that it does 
not obviously collapse before worries about moral motivation or 
moral authority. And I have tried to do all of this in language and 
arguments which do not rely on specialist philosophical 
understanding. 4 
I could reinforce this point pragmatically by appealing to the 
constraints under which the professional education of teachers 
now operates. 5 One might well argue that all persons entering 
into the teaching profession should be encouraged to reflect on the 
problematical nature of morality. But one also has, to some extent, 
3 On p. 36 1 said that ideas about morality co-existing in our society 
6are 
by no means all compatible with each other'. My present point 
does not 
contradict this; it requires that the understanding of morality(n) 
be 
compatible with a variety of other ideas about morality, 
but not that all 
of those other ideas be compatible with each other. 
4 Again, that means that I cannot claim originality in any contribution 
I 
may be making to moral philosophy as such; but 
it is important to my 
position that there should be a workable conception that can 
be articulated 
in non-specialist language and arguments. (There 
is a sense, then, in 
which philosophical depth or metaethical subtlety would actually 
be 
undermining my own purposes here. ) 
5 For more on the deficiencies of professional education in respect of 
teachers' role in values education, and on what could 
be done, see below, 
and Haydon (1996b) and 
TAV Ch. 13. 
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to proceed from where we are and accommodate to the climate of 
the times. That we are living in an age of performance indicators, 
succinctly expressed targets, measurement of competences, etc., 
etc., is too familiar an idea in the educational world to need 
documenting. My accommodation to this is to say to the powers 
that be, in effect: 
'You apparently want teachers to have some sort of responsibility 
for the moral state of the nation. You ought to realise that 
teachers are likely to be just as confused about morality as anyone 
else in our culture. But it is not going to happen that all teachers 
become moral philosophers. So here is a workable way of 
understanding morality which you can induct teachers into and 
expect them to pass on to their pupils. Just one piece of subtlety 
is required, which is vital, but should not be too difficult for 
anyone to grasp: namely that this understanding of morality is 
not to be put across as the single correct one; there is to be no 
authoritative suggestion that this is all there is to morality, or that 
other ways of conceiving of it are wrong. It is to be put across in 
a pragmatic spirit, as a workable conception on which citizens in a 
plural society ought to be able to converge. Since your educational 
policy is pragmatic through-and-through, you shouldn't find this a 
problem. ' 
Where in the curriculum? 
It is in a similar pragmatic spirit that I think it worth asking 
(starting from where we are now, in the English schooling system) 
though which part of the curriculum an understanding of 
morality(n) is to be 'delivered6. Of course, there are things to be 
said, which I shall not be saying here, about the overall 
organisation and ethos of the school, and about co-ordination of 
what is to be dealt with in different parts of the curriculum. But 
English educational experience over the last decade suggests that 
if there is some particular area of understanding that needs 
attention, it will need a location in the curriculum, and perhaps 
even in the timetable. I want to argue in this section that the 
appropriate curricular location for a focus on morality(n) is within 
citizenship education; and citizenship education itself provides 
6 'Delivery' is a piece of contemporary education-speak which seems to 
me to demand scare quotes, but I shall follow the convention 
below and 
use it straight. 
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supporting evidence for the difficulty of working in a cross- 
curricular way. The original National Curriculum as established by 
the ERA of 1988 was supposed to contain cro ss -curricular themes, 
one of which was citizenship. But in many schools, given the 
demands of teaching the compulsory subjects, very little was done 
about a 'theme' like citizenship which was not itself to be treated 
as a subject. 
The revised National Curriculum which is shortly to be introduced 
will make citizenship education, in secondary schools, compulsory. 
At the same time PSHE will be recognised as something which all 
schools are expected to engage in, and primary schools will be 
expected to include the preparation for citizenship which is 
appropriate for their age range within PSHE. Meanwhile, religious 
education remains (almost, in legislative terms, as a hang-over 
from an earlier age) as a compulsory part of the curriculum. Some 
other countries have a part of their curriculum labelled 'moral 
education' or 'ethics' or something of that sort. In those countries, 
that part of the curriculum would be a prime candidate for 
attention to morality(n). But in England now it seems to me we 
have three main candidates: RE, PSHE, and Citizenship Education. 
RE is worth mentioning in this list just because its claims are likely 
to be too easily dismissed within much of philosophy of education, 
where it has been almost an orthodoxy for some years that 
morality had better be treated in a secular spirit and not muddled 
up with religion. Unfortunately this view, which in many ways I 
share, has not been supported systematically within the practice 
of teaching, and of teacher education in particular. Most teachers 
have little or no training in teaching about morality or moral 
issues (even though it may turn out that they are expected to 
contribute to PSHE); 7 the teachers who can be expected to 
have 
some such training are those of RE. Thus an argument can 
be 
made that the people best equipped to deal with questions of 
7 There seems to have been rather little co-ordination on this matter 
between the TTA and bodies such as SCAA, QCA and OFSTED. 
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morality are teachers of RE. 8 But there are at least two 
difficulties with this view. One is that, even though individual 
teachers of RE may be of any faith or none, and may see it as part 
of their professionalism that they are not setting out to promote 
religious belief, the public understanding of morality(n) will not 
be clarified if it is seen as tied up institutionally with the teaching 
of religion. If RE teachers are at present the people best equipped 
to teach about morality, it would be better if they did it under a 
different name. A second difficulty is that RE teachers will, quite 
rightly, be concerned with morality or ethics in a broader sense 
than morality(n). 
If RE is put on one side, this leaves PSHE and Citizenship 
Education. Since these two are meant to be combined in the 
primary school, it is only at secondary school that they could be 
either complementary or alternative routes for the delivery of an 
understanding of morality(n). This is significant, because it is 
especially at secondary level, I suggest, that what we might call 
the ethos of these two areas of concern will begin to diverge. 
The ethos of PSHE is very often one in which the 'personal' is 
dominant over the 'social'; the informed choice of individuals is 
central. 9 Thus on matters of sexual behaviour and of substance 
abuse the emphasis is often, not to bring pre-existing norms to 
bear as constraints, but to try to ensure that individuals know 
what they are or might be doing, understand the consequences, 
and make their own decision. I am not criticising this emphasis; 
indeed I think it is essential. My point is only that the ethos of 
PSHE may be one in which talking about morality, without 
appearing to moralise, may be quite difficult - unless morality 
itself is treated in terms of individual informed choice. 
8 Janet Orchard, a research student at the Institute of Education, made 
this argument forcefully to me in relation to the teaching of citizenship 
generally. 
9 The coincidence in terminology with an idea which is central to much 
of health care ethics (in liberal societies) is not accidental; 
indeed given 
that choices liable to affect people's health are an important concern of 
PSHE, it is essentially the same idea we are dealing with. 
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The ethos of citizenship education, in this country, does not yet 
exist, and is thereby still open to influence. I see no reason why 
citizenship education should not, as much as PSHE, encourage 
respect for the autonomy of individuals. But while in PSHE 
individual choice may be central, citizenship education will 
more naturally interpret autonomy within a democratic model, 
recognising that the power of one can restrict the autonomy of 
another, and seeing the maintenance of autonomy for all as 
dependent on practices in which decision-making and 
responsibility can be shared. It is within this way of thinking, 
it seems to me, that the notion of morality(n) more readily fits. 
In Chapter 11 noted opposing tendencies in discourse about 
morality. On the one hand the 'personalisation' of morality, the 
idea that ultimately morality comes down to individual choice; 
on the other, appeals to morality in public discourse which 
presuppose that there is something objective or at least 
intersubjectively shared to be appealed to. One could almost say 
that we have a PSHE model of morality and a citizenship model of 
morality. Both have something importantly right about them, 
each can be supported philosophically (except to the extent that a 
philosophical defence of either has to recognise the force of the 
other). The PSHE model might draw (rather selectively) from Hare 
(especially his earlier writings) and John Wilson (e. g. 1973 p. 21) 
to support the idea that an individual's morality is what 
ultimately matters most to that individual, what he or she chooses 
to live by, so that pursuing pleasure or money could - if they 
could stick to it consistently - be the basis of someone's morality. 
The business of education would be to try to see that the 
individual's choice is informed by knowledge of the consequences 
of one kind of choice or another, including the likely consequences 
for others. The citizenship model might be supported by 
arguments (which could draw again on Hare among othersl 
0) in 
defence of norms to guide choice, and for the importance of shared 
norms. What I have been emphasising in this thesis is clearly the 
citizenship model. It sets out to make morality a shared 
10 It is Hare's (1981) distinction between two levels of moral 
thinking 
which makes it possible to draw on 
his work in support of both models. 
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enterprise, in one sense existing as a system independent of the 
individual, yet - like the law on a democratic model - not alien. 
Provided these ideas are not pushed too far in the direction of 
arbitrary choice on the one hand, or of alienation with no personal 
involvement on the other, they are not contradictory. But there is 
the possibility in practice of their coming apart. There is even a 
possibility, if no attempt is made at co-ordination across a school, 
that the understanding of morality could fail to be addressed at 
all. For suppose the teachers of PSHE happen, as individuals, to 
subscribe to a citizenship model of morality, and thus think that 
talking about morality is not part of their business as PSHE 
teachers. And suppose that the teachers of citizenship subscribe 
to a PSHE model, and thus think that citizenship is a matter of law 
and politics and has nothing to say about morality. Then pupils 
could go through a school encountering no serious consideration of 
morality at all. 
Admittedly haphazard arrangements would be unlikely to fall out 
with such neat alignments. But the point stands that in schools as 
they are there may be no systematic attempt to address ideas 
about morality at all. In this thesis I have argued that there is 
indeed a diversity of ideas about morality in our society. If we 
think of morality in a broad sense, or the whole area that some 
philosophers would prefer to label ethics - the area which deals 
with the question of how one is to live, and all the values and 
choices which that calls into play - then we could reasonably 
expect both PSHE and RE to be making a contribution to 
individuals' development in this respect. But there is a twofold 
task which relates rather closely to citizenship. It is 
in part to 
ensure that citizens are aware of the diversity of understandings 
about morality within their society; this is what 
I argued for in 
Chapter 2. And it is also to support a particular understanding of 
morality - morality(n) - which 
is itself important to citizenship. 
(The two parts of this task are complementary, 
because teachers 
could hardly delineate morality(n) without reference 
to ways in 
which it differs from other ideas of morality. 
) I am not arguing 
that this task could not be undertaken if there were no area of 
the 
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curriculum labelled citizenship education; but given that we are to 
have such a subject, and that its content is still to some extent to 
be determined, it makes sense to advocate the inclusion of 
morality(n) within its subject matter. 1 1 
The role of teachers 
It is not uncommon for a thesis in philosophy of education to 
conclude with suggestions about ways in which the practices of 
teachers would need to change to take account of the arguments of 
the thesis. Little attention may be paid to any ways in which the 
arguments might actually come to have an influence on the 
practice of teachers. 
An earlier draft of this thesis had a role for a quango charged with 
promoting the public understanding of morality, and called, by 
analogy with several existing bodies, the Public Understanding of 
Morality Authority - the PUMA. I liked the conceit, and it played 
a certain structural role in the argument. But it was clear that 
actually advocating the setting-up of such a body would be a non- 
starter. The general public would see such a body as an attempt 
by government to impose a certain idea of morality, and teachers 
would see it - in addition - as yet another imposition on their 
workload. These reactions would be quite understandable. If the 
public understanding of morality is to be promoted, something a 
little more subtle - yet open - will be needed. I suggest 
in this 
section that the task could be taken in hand by teachers 
themselves. 
Many teachers feel both that heavy demands are being made on 
them as moral educators, and that the part they are already 
playing in this respect is not being recognised. Among other tasks, 
they are expected to maintain discipline in the classroom and its 
surroundings, to transmit society9s norms, to have some concern 
for the moral development of individual pupils, to promote 
respect and tolerance for differences, and to encourage 
11 The arguments of this section are relatively underdeveloped and 
undersupported. In the gestation of the thesis 
this is the most recently 
developing part. I hope to take it further in a 
forthcoming pamphlet in 
the Philosophy of Education Society's IMPACT series. 
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understanding and reflectiveness about values. (These items are 
listed in no particular order, and questions could clearly be raised 
about their compatibility with each other. ) If teachers feel that all 
these demands are being made on them, then asking them to put 
across some particular understanding of morality could be 
perceived as just one more demand. 
To avoid this impression it is important to make clear that the 
kind of understanding of morality I have been talking about can 
be helpful in making sense of and integrating the apparently 
multifarious demands mentioned. If I am right about the 
possibilities of confusion and cross-purposes in understandings of 
morality in the wider society, there is no reason to think that 
people who go into teaching are immune. Nor is there, at present, 
any expectation that teachers as they emerge from their 
professional education will share any particular understanding of 
morality. Indeed, the majority of teachers in their training are 
probably given little if any encouragement even to clarify their 
own understandings in this respect. Individual views about 
morality may, after all, be considered to be part of teachers' 
personal life, which it is not for professional training to concern 
itself with. 
Yet even as things are now, these same people will be expected, as 
part of their professional role - albeit an ill-defined part - to have 
some dealings with questions of morality in the public context of 
education. It would not be surprising if many teachers felt even 
more confused than the representative member of the general 
public. And it would be still less surprising if many felt, if asked 
explicitly to promote the public understanding of morality, that 
they were being asked to impose something alien on pupils, and 
wished to have nothing to do with it. 
If they did nothing else, the arguments of this thesis might offer 
to teachers a way of understanding morality which they could feel 
they could work with. But similar arguments should be able also 
to help teachers to see the relationship between various of the 
demands on them. Passing on from one generation to the next a 
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knowledge of and commitment to the norms of society is one of 
the functions of education, because morality in the narrow sense 
requires a degree of stability in its norms. But the stability is not 
absolute and the commitment is provisional. So - in addition to 
whatever value is assigned to individual autonomy or critical 
thinking for its own sake - it is important that teachers encourage 
pupils to think about the point of society's norms. Since the 
continuing function of morality(n) requires a degree of consensus 
and the possibility of change through a changing consensus, it is 
important that teachers initiate pupils into the processes by which 
criticism can go on and changes can come about. Since all of this 
happens in a context of considerable diversity of ideas about 
morality and of values of other kinds, it is important that pupils 
are made aware of the diversity. And since teachers have to be 
able to talk to their pupils, and pupils talk to each other, in ways 
that all can understand and which are not split off from the wider 
language of public discourse, it is important that teachers are able 
to work with a variety of languages of evaluation, including 
particularly a language of norms and a language of virtues. 
All this clearly would make heavy demands on the professional 
preparation which teachers need for their role. Even supposing 
that some changes do come about, there are still many teachers in 
post who will have had little or no preparation for a role in the 
promotion of the public understanding of morality. Even to such 
teachers, as individuals, I hope that the ideas I am putting 
forward will help them to see that it is possible to have a 
conception of morality which people could converge on, without 
particular metaphysical commitments, without hypocrisy, without 
authoritarianism. And the contribution of any individual teachers 
towards spreading such an understanding will be valuable. 
Nevertheless, it will not be possible for such an understanding to 
become general across the profession without some institutional 
means of co-ordination. 
If teachers are liable to be suspicious of anything which might 
seem to be imposed by some body or agency 
from outside the 
profession, there might still be another possibility. 
If an 
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understanding of morality, which teachers could feel comfortable 
with, could initially be shared across the teaching profession from 
within, then the profession itself, through education and without 
imposition, could try to spread that understanding more widely 
through the general public. This could not, of course, be achieved 
without channels of communication and policy-making existing for 
the profession as a whole. There would have to be a professional 
body working in such a way that teachers could feel themselves to 
be part of a single profession sharing certain commitments and 
understandings; it would also have to be able to listen to and 
respond to the general public. 
There is to be, for England, a General Teaching Council, a 
professional body playing roughly the role for teachers that the 
General Medical Council plays for doctors. 1 2 Quite how it will 
interpret its role remains to be seen, but among its other tasks 
will be that (already performed for many other professions by 
their appropriate professional bodies, but so far lacking in 
teaching) of drawing up and promulgating a code of conduct for 
teachers. It is possible to envisage that the GTC could extend this 
part of its remit to take on board the development of a shared 
professional understanding of teachers' role in promoting an 
understanding of morality. This would be a plausible extension 
for two reasons: first, because a shared professional code of 
conduct within a profession is in some ways analogous to a shared 
morality(n) within the wider society, and can be expected to 
overlap though not to coincide in its content. 1 3 If one is asking 
teachers to consider the function and content of a professional 
code, it is not a large step to asking them to think about the 
function and content of morality(n) within society in general. 
The second reason why the extension is plausible presupposes a 
difference between a professional code and morality(n). A shared 
12 It will commence 
designate has been 
13 There are many 
professional codes of 
Williams (1995) and 
1996a). 
its work on I September 2000. Its chief executive 
appointed. 
relevant discussions of the relation between 
ethics and morality or ethics in general. See, e. g., 
Koehn (1994), and my review of Koehn (Haydon 
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morality(n) will probably not, in a liberal society, include an 
articulation of some collective overall goal'14 whereas a 
professional code often will include an articulation of overall goals 
in the light of which particular norms are to be understood. Thus, 
in broad terms, an understanding of and positive evaluation of 
health will often form the focus of codes of ethics in the health 
care professions, and more particular articulations of the goal and 
of the responsibilities of the practitioners in relation to that goal 
will be one of the factors distinguishing, say, the code of ethics of 
doctors from that of nurses. For teaching, an articulation of an 
overall goal will presumably mention education, but is likely to 
unpack that idea further in multifaceted ways. It should, I would 
argue, include an acknowledgement of the role teachers have in 
the public aspect of moral education. 
John Tomlinson, one of the authors of a draft Code of Ethical 
Principles for the Teaching Profession'l 5 and an advocate of the 
GTC, has written: 
'teachers .... discharge public responsibility for the socialisation 
and value-world of the next generation. They must be expected to 
encourage personal and social responsibility in their learners, and 
accept it for themselves. ' (Tomlinson 1995 p. 185). 
Part of the role of the GTC will be to articulate this expectation on 
behalf of the profession as a whole. Tomlinson's wording 
6encouraging personal and social responsibility in their learners' 
might be interpreted as referring particularly to PSHE, but my 
suggestion is that this expectation should be expanded, and that 
one recognised aspect of this expanded expectation should be the 
promotion of the public understanding of morality as an aspect of 
14 Tony Blair's call for a new 'moral purpose' for the nation (mentioned 
in Chapter 1) is liable to introduce further obfuscation into the present 
state of the public understanding of morality. Quite apart 
from the 
tendency to tie moral questions rather closely to matters of sexual 
activity (which clearly Blair avoided in the case of 
Kosova), we can ask 
what the shared purpose is supposed to be. Might it 
be the maintenance 
of morality(n) itself? The debate between liberalism and 
communitarianism is relevant here, since these positions often 
differ 
on whether a society is to be seen as having some shared moral purpose. 
15 Published by UCET. 
232 
citizenship education. In this way (within the relatively open 
framework of National Curriculum citizenship education as 
currently envisaged) the profession could take the initiative and 
would have a good chance of taking individual teachers along 
with it. 
2ý3 
Epilogue: The moral development of society 
I finished Part IV in a rather pragmatic spirit; here, as befits a 
conclusion, I shall be more ambitious and upbeat, discussing 
nothing less than the moral development of society. I do not, 
however, want to leave behind my background in analytic 
philosophy and indulge in flights of fancy; I want to give an 
intelligible sense to the idea. 
I have stressed that what I am discussing in this thesis does not 
address all aspects of moral education, let alone all aspects of 
personal and social education or of a school's concern for spiritual, 
moral, social and cultural development. In so far as this is a thesis 
about moral education, it differs from most such theses in that it 
says little about the moral development of individuals, and in 
certain ways is more concerned with society than with the 
individual. In Chapter 31 sketched a rather crude notion of moral 
development by which it could be said that someone has 
developed morally to the extent that he or she has come to share 
the values which are central to a given society. That way of 
conceiving of moral development, even where the focus is on 
individuals, leaves out a great deal; it says nothing, for instance, 
about individual attitudes and feelings towards others or about 
the degree of responsibility the individual takes for his or her own 
behaviour. Even from the more specific standpoint of the account 
of morality(n) outlined here, an interpretation of development 
which turns on adherence to shared norms would have to be 
expanded to include the development of the capacities which 
individuals need if they are to engage in the processes of criticism 
and consensus-building. But rather than build up the notion of 
individual moral development, what I want to do here is to shift 
the focus onto the development of society. 
To see why this may be worth doing it is interesting to contrast 
talk of moral development with talk of moral decline. 
While the 
former usually refers to the development of individuals, the 
latter 
is more likely to be predicated of society as a whole; 
indeed the 
thought that our society is in some sort of moral decline 
is quite a 
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common one. Smith and Standish, for instance, refer to the Bulger 
and Lawrence murders as 'symptomatic of a more general moral 
destitution in our society' (TRAW p. vii). The thought here is not 
simply that people, individually, are behaving in a less moral way 
than people used to (indeed Smith and Standish rightly show that 
we could argue the other way). It is the thought of something 
lacking 'in the moral as well as the social fabric of society' (p. viii). 
When people subscribe to such notions of moral decline, it is not 
uncommon for them to suggest (though Smith and Standish are 
exceptions) that the solution to the decline is to be found in the 
moral development of individuals, understood in something like 
the limited way to which I have referred: that is, that we have to 
find ways, through moral education, of getting individuals to 
behave better (as judged by widely agreed norms). So the moral 
development of individuals seems to be regarded as the cure for 
the moral decline of society. There is at least an asymmetry here 
that invites examination. 
Interestingly, though it is often forgotten, the ERA of 1988 
required schools to have a curriculum which would promote 'the 
spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of 
pupils at the school and of society' (my italics). On the face of it, a 
contribution from schools to the moral development of society, not 
only of individuals, could be just what is needed to counteract a 
moral decline of society - if, that is, we can make sense of the idea 
of the moral development of society. 
Interpretations of the development of society 
I shall try here to bring out what we might understand by the 
moral development of society, by taking up again the contrast I 
made in Chapter 3 between spiritual and moral development, but 
now transposing each of these onto a social plane. I argued there 
that there is more likely to be social agreement on what 
constitutes moral development than on what constitutes spiritual 
development of individuals. Does the same apply when the 
development of society is in question? We need first to see how 
we can make sense of the idea of any kind of development of 
society. 
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I suggest that we can interpret the idea of the development of 
society in two ways, reductionist and non-reductionist. In a 
reductionist sense, the development of society is nothing over and 
above the development of individual members of the society. 
Consider one of the other categories in the 1988 Act: physical 
development. If we can make sense at all of the physical 
development of society, it is probably only in the reductionist 
sense, in which that development is nothing over and above the 
physical development of (all, or most, or many) individual 
members of the society. Similarly in a reductionist way it would 
be possible to speak of the economic development of society and 
mean nothing but the fact that (all, or most, or many) individuals 
were becoming better off. 
But such thoroughly reductionist interpretations do not look 
plausible for most categories of development. Economists 
speaking of economic development are not in fact using the notion 
in a reductionist way; they will have in mind many processes - 
trade, banking and so on - which are inherently social processes. 
And with the rather notional idea of the physical development of 
society we can contrast the idea that a society is becoming 
healthier. This certainly includes the idea that individual 
members of the society are likely to be healthier than individual 
members of the same society at some previous time, but it is 
doubtful whether it can be reduced purely to that. For instance, a 
society which has introduced clean air legislation, in which 
smoking in public places comes to be frowned on and in which 
provision is made for safe cycling and walking to school and work 
might be judged to have become a healthier society. This 
assessment might be made even without detailed knowledge of 
trends in individual health, because part of what constitutes a 
change to a healthier society would be a change in public attitudes 
and Policy. 
In Haydon (1994), discussing secularisation, I followed Hirst in 
describing this process as involving 'a decay in the use of religious 
concepts and beliefs'. It is individuals who have or don't have 
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beliefs and who use or don't use concepts. But suppose that very 
many individuals suffer a loss of faith but keep this to themselves7 
while continuing in all their interactions with others to express the 
same beliefs as before and use the same concepts. Publicly, little 
would have changed, so there would not in fact have been a 
secularisation of society. Now suppose the opposite: that 
individuals carry on privately, in their own thinking, having a 
religious faith and using religious concepts, but that these beliefs 
only get expressed in private to like-minded others and that 
religious concepts fall out of use in public discourse. This would 
be a case of the secularisation of society. In other words, 
secularisation is a change in society - and at least in an 
evaluatively neutral sense a development in societyl - which 
cannot be reduced to changes in the thinking of a multiplicity of 
individuals. It is, above all, a change in public discourse. 
Development of society: spiritual and moral 
How does the reductionist/non-reductionist distinction apply to 
the ideas of the moral and spiritual development of society? The 
limited notion of moral development to which I referred above 
would fit easily with a reductionist interpretation of the moral 
development of society. A society will be developing morally just 
to the extent that the individuals within it tend to behave better 
(from the standpoint of publicly agreed norms). Many of those 
who call for moral education to counteract violence, teenage 
pregnancy, and other perceived ills in society, and thus to reverse 
the perceived moral decline, may recognise nothing but this 
reductionist idea of the moral improvement of society (and it is an 
interpretation which is compatible with the little that has been 
said about the moral development of society in official 
1 In the evaluatively neutral sense a change can be described as a 
development whether it is considered to be for better or for worse 
(there may be certain other conditions of a factual rather than 
evaluative nature which a process of change has to meet if it is to be 
appropriately described as development, but these are not my concern 
here). In an evaluatively positive sense of development, secularisation 
will only be counted as development by someone who sees it as a change 
for the better; to the opposite point of view it will be a matter of decline 
rather than development. Indeed secularisation might to such a 
viewpoint be a case of the spiritual decline of society. 
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documents). But it is a crude account, and there is room for a less 
reductionist one. 
A reductionist interpretation also appears possible for the 
spiritual development of society: a society will be developing 
spiritually to the extent that individuals within it are developing 
spiritually. But in this case, since we would have no observable 
criteria and no shared standpoint as to what constitutes 
improvement, we would not in fact - in a plural society - be able 
to apply such a notion of the spiritual development of society. A 
reductionist interpretation in this case would amount to no 
interpretation at all. But it is also not clear - in a plural society - 
whether any non-reductionist account is available. To see 
whether a non-reductionist account is possible, both for spiritual 
and for moral development of society, we need to look to the 
nature of public discourse. 
Bringing together the points made so far, I can suggest that the 
moral development of society will be a matter of changes for the 
better in the moral aspects of the public discourse of a society; and 
similarly for spiritual development of a society. This is still to use 
the minimal evaluatively positive notion; but how do we know 
what to count as a change for the better within public discourse? 
Here it will be helpful to introduce a somewhat richer 
interpretation of development - not because such an 
interpretation is necessarily required by all uses of the word, but 
because it brings out a relevant continuity between the kinds of 
case we are interested in here. 
Often when we use the notion of development in an evaluatively 
positive way, we have in mind that the development of X involves 
the attainment or maintenance of some sort of unity or coherence 
in X. The development of an argument, for instance, results in a 
position which hangs together rather than falling apart. Similarly 
for a person, we would see the attainment of integrity and a sense 
of identity as development, but going to pieces mentally is not the 
sort of thing we mean by personal development. Moral 
ctevelopment of the individual is in most accounts (if they go 
238 
beyond reference to observable behaviour) a development which 
results in some sort of coherent set of values and a consistent way 
of exercising them; whether we follow Kohlberg, or an Aristotelian 
virtue ethic, or a feminist ethic centred on caring, we will consider 
that the morally developed person has 'got it together' to a greater 
extent than the less developed. In discussions of spiritual 
development there is often the idea of a person attaining some 
sort of coherent sense of his or her place in the world - which is 
contrasted with the kind of floundering in which people have no 
idea of who or what they are, and perhaps change their ideas from 
one day to the next. Of course, a lot of floundering may take place 
along the road of spiritual development, but it's not the kind of 
thing that would be seen as a desirable end-point. 
If this is the way we are using the notion of development, then 
the moral or spiritual development of society would also be a 
development towards some sort of coherence or unity - and that 
would have to be, not just within individual members of the 
society, but across the society. 
For spiritual development, at the level of the whole society we 
would be looking for an analogue of a person's having a coherent 
sense of his or her place in a wider scheme of things. It is also 
important, and in line with a number of accounts in the literature, 
that in the individual case we would expect that this sense of 
4place' - which we could also call a sense of 'meaning' - would be 
both cognitive and affective, and that the two elements would be 
integrated. Thus while it is a possible condition that someone has 
an intellectual sense of their place in the universe but feels 
alienated from it, we would expect spiritual development to be 
towards a more integrated outlook in which reason and feeling do 
not come apart. 
If this kind of account is right, there are two reasons why it is 
difficult, in a plural society, to use the notion of the spiritual 
development of society. First, in such a society there will not be a 
shared understanding, even on a verbal level, of the human 
condition and of the place of persons within some wider scheme of 
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thingS. 2 Secondly, if affective experience is indispensable to 
spiritual development, then the relevant shared understanding 
across a society would have to be not just cognitive but affective 
also. Is such a thing possible? 
In certain conditions, it probably is. We can talk of people sharing 
an experience, in a sense that involves mutual recognition and 
empathy: the sense, roughly, in which two people who know each 
other well, sitting in the same room listening to a piece of music, 
may be sharing the experience of that music, whereas two 
strangers, in different rooms, listening to the same piece of music 
on the radio, are not sharing the experience of it. 3 Extending that 
sort of case, we could probably make sense of the idea that a 
community of worshippers could develop spiritually not just as 
individuals but as a group. But such development would depend 
crucially on both shared background assumptions and shared 
experience - just the elements which are missing across the life of 
a whole society in modern conditionS. 4 
The moral development of society 
I suggest, then (though I have not tried to argue the point in 
detail) that we have to reach a negative conclusion about the 
possibility of the spiritual development of a modern plural society. 
But it does not follow that the conclusion about moral 
development will be negative. To the contrary, there are at least 
21 am not suggesting that such a shared understanding is an 
impossibility in all places and at all times; it may have been present in 
the past in certain societies with a strongly held and shared religious 
faith. 
3 Cf. Taylor (1989a) p. 169 
4 It may be true that many people shared in the experience of grief 
after the death of Diana, Princess of Wales. More would be needed 
before we could say (as was suggested by some commentators) that this 
experience contributed towards the spiritual development of the nation. 
We would need some idea of how widely the grief was in fact shared; 
media reporting may have been misleading in neglecting the numbers 
who remained relatively indifferent. We would also need to know more 
of the character of what was experienced; given the scope for 
different 
interpretations of the significance of the life and death of Diana, was it 
the same experience that was shared by so many? In any case, one 
shared experience would not constitute a development of society unless 
it had lasting effects which were not reducible to the effects on the 
individuals concerned. 
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two complementary reasons for distinguishing the cases. First, to 
repeat a point I made in Chapter 3, we do not have to give a 
central place to the affective in all interpretations of moral 
development. At the level of public discourse the more cognitive, 
linguistically expressed aspect of morality can, so to speak, take on 
a life of its own, so that what there is convergence on at that level 
is not dependent on each individual party to the public discourse 
having the same feelings, or any particular feeling. 
Secondly, there are in fact several possibilities for convergence 
at the level of public discourse where morality is concerned. 
Reviewing these here will also serve as a summary of some of 
some of the points for which I have argued in this thesis. 
1) Though it may sound paradoxical to start with this, there can 
come to be greater mutual understanding of differences in values 
and in conceptions of morality. As I argued in Chapter 2, one of 
the educational tasks in relation to values is to promote 
understanding of the diversity found within modern societies. In 
such societies there are likely in the foreseeable future to be 
different conceptions of morality co-existing (secular and religious 
understandings, for instance), not to mention different values 
across the whole broader field of values. The existence of such 
differences is not, of course, a case of convergence; but there could 
be convergence towards a shared understanding of the differences 
which exist. Within an understanding of the human condition in 
both its biological and cultural respects it is understandable that 
there will be differences in beliefs and values. A society in which, 
through education, such an understanding is promoted will in one 
sense be a better educated society, and is likely to be a more 
tolerant society, than one in which people find the values of others 
unintelligible. 
2) Even while different values and different understandings of 
morality in the broader sense co-exist, it should be possible for 
people to share an understanding of morality(n). (This especially 
brings out the difference between the spiritual and moral cases; 
while in a plural society there will not be convergence on the 
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meaning of 'life, the universe, and everything', there could be 
convergence on the meaning of morality(n). ) It may be that 
already many people do think of morality in something like this 
way, but such an understanding co-exists with a variety of other 
beliefs and attitudes about morality. I have argued that 
educators, while not denying and certainly not attempting to 
suppress other understandings, can quite consciously seek to 
promote a shared understanding of the nature and importance of 
morality(n). 
3) If society is to converge on a shared understanding of 
morality(n), then it needs a common language in which to 
articulate that understanding. Actually it is not strictly true that 
there must be one common language; there could be a plurality of, 
perhaps overlapping, languages, provided that each is understood 
by all. And I have in fact suggested that there is a role in public 
discourse for both a language of rules and principles and a 
language of virtues. I have also suggested that we are at present 
some way off having a shared language of virtues, and that a 
language of rules and principles has a certain priority in the 
articulation of morality(n). 
4) For morality(n) , 
people to recognise 
which to articulate 
there be at least a 
morality(n), though 
and change. 
-o fulfil its function, it is not sufficient for 
the concept and have a common language in 
their understanding; it is also necessary that 
degree of consensus on the content of 
this consensus needs to be subject to criticism 
All these forms of convergence, then, can be seen as constitutive 
of the moral development of society: that a society comes to share 
an understanding of its differences, to share an understanding of 
the idea of morality(n), to have a common language for the 
articulation of morality(n), and to agree - at least to some extent - 
on the content of morality(n). I shall pause at this point to 
consider briefly whether we have any reason to think the 
fourth 
kind of convergence is likely. 
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Many people would suggest that modern societies have been 
changing in exactly the opposite direction, away from agreement 
on any moral norms (and my own stress on diversity might 
superficially seem to be endorsing this). Yet there are some areas 
in which, plausibly, certain substantive moral positions are much 
more widely held no w than used to be the case: the mo ral 
wrongness, for instance, of discrimination on grounds of race. The 
appearance of great diversity may in part be the result of our 
failing to make the distinction between morality(n) and other 
fields of values. 
It might be objected that convergence of this kind is in what 
people say, not necessarily in their private opinions or their 
actions. But this is part of the point: there has in certain matters 
been convergence in public moral discourse, on what can 
acceptably be said and on what must be taken into account. And 
in all sorts of social and political ways, that itself is morally 
important. It is morally important, for instance, that there be a 
public recognition of equality across ethnicity and gender, even if 
that recognition is not shared privately, or on an affective level, 
by all members of the society (cf. White, P. 1996ý p. 73). And it is 
morally important that there be a public recognition that certain 
sorts of behaviour are not to be tolerated. 
So this convergence at the level of public discourse on certain 
values is one aspect of the moral development of a society. It is 
important too that people become aware of their convergence - it 
is not just that as a matter of fact individuals become less inclined 
to say certain things and more inclined to say others, but that 
people are mutually aware of this fact, and take it into account in 
their own speech and action. We could say, rather high -falutingly, 
that this is a development in the moral self-awareness of a 
society. 
The forms of convergence I have picked out so far have not 
included the idea that people will behave better - even according 
to norms which are publicly agreed. I have not stressed this point 
so far because I wanted to distinguish my understanding of the 
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moral development of society from the purely reductionist notion 
which would have it that this moral development consists simply 
in people behaving better. But having seen that there are various 
possibilities of convergence at the level of public discourse that 
can be constitutive of the moral development of society, it is not 
unreasonable to ask whether these kinds of convergence, up to 
and including agreement on norms of conduct, would do anything 
to make it likely that people would actually conform to the norms 
on which they agree. Of course, convergence in public discourse 
cannot guarantee anything about what people will do; nor can any 
aspect of moral education or citizenship education, though we can 
reasonably expect that a mixture of approaches, provided they are 
not incompatible with each other, will have more effect than any 
single approach. 
That said, there are grounds for thinking that convergence in 
public discourse will make a difference to individuals that will, for 
many of them, go beyond lip-service. Moral ideas and moral 
language, and thoughts expressed in such language, will make a 
difference to people's conduct to the extent that people take these 
ideas seriously. 5 People are more likely to take these ideas and 
this language seriously if they can see themselves as involved in 
morality, rather than perceiving morality as an alien imposition on 
them. My stress on understanding and - where appropriate - 
convergence at the public level, and hence my concern for 
education towards this public understanding, has been motivated 
by the concern that we should be able to continue to take morality 
seriously. 
5 Iris Murdoch - whose main preoccupation was not with morality(n) - 
makes a similar point: 'Lip service 
is not to be despised. The triumph of 
good causes partly depends on people, at some point, 
becoming ashamed 
of saying certain things. 
' (1993, p. 358) 
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Appendix I 
Review of Smith & Standish (eds. ) Teaching Right and Wrong: Moral Education in the Balance 
(This review was published in Cambridge Journal of Education 
28-2 June 1998) 
This is a collection of predominantly philosophical papers that 
claims particular topical relevance at this time. The immediate 
historical context is the two year period that began with a SCAA 
conference on moral and spiritual development in January 1996, 
leading via the deliberations of the National Forum on Values in 
Education and the Community, to the formulation of guidance for 
schools which is now being piloted. 
Two years would not have seen most books from conception to 
publication. So congratulations are due to the editors and 
publisher on getting the book out quickly enough to comment on 
the SCAA - and now QCA - initiative while it is still continuing. 
The inevitable downside of this same success is that the targets of 
criticism are receding into history even as they are aimed at. 
Nigel Blake effectively demolishes the discussion paper which 
reported on the January 1996 conference; but that paper is 
probably already among the ephemera on the shelf. There is 
something of a preoccupation in several papers with issues about 
relativism and absolutes which figured in Nick Tate's speech to the 
1996 conference but which the Forum (of which I was a member) 
had already put behind it. What probably will be less ephemeral - 
if only because it forms a small part of the guidance to schools - is 
the Forum's Statement of Values, with its preamble. That is 
helpfully reprinted here, together with an explanation and 
defence by Marianne Talbot and Nick Tate, but the contributors 
who are critical of the Forum's general approach miss the 
opportunity to comment in detail on the published text, which 
teachers may well have to refer to. Does the preamble make 
misleading claims about the status of the values in the list? Could 
the items in the list be intended as absolute rules? More 
problematically, are they all intended as moral values or are they 
more miscellaneous? 
In the end, then, only two cheers for immediate topicality. But, as 
the editors say, the matters discussed are in one sense timeless. 
If there is a common view here it is that the moral life is 
complicated, that there are no quick fixes; above all that morality 
cannot be taught as a separate compartment of life because it is 
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interwoven with our everyday concerns. Perhaps this common 
theme itself could have been subjected to closer scrutiny. Of 
course morality is not a watertight compartment; but neither is it 
just an arbitrary selection out of a sea of undifferentiated values. 
(Smith and Standish themselves - p. 141 - clearly acknowledge 
that moral values are not just any values). 
So what is special about morality? As the editors don't comment 
on individual papers, apart from that by Talbot and Tate, the 
reader will be left to discern whether there is a common answer 
among the contributors; I suspect there is not. If there is one kind 
of voice missing from the collection, it is one that would elaborate 
and defend the view that we can draw and should stress the 
distinction between a morality which is binding on all and the 
wider sphere of the ethical in which there is room for different 
choices. ' The 'seamless web' view of the all-pervasiveness of 
morality tends to downplay such a distinction. 
The emphasis on the interweaving of morality within everyday 
life will also give little reassurance to those who are asking 'Does 
moral education have any power to save us from the worst 
extremes of human behaviourT Though there are several 
references to the murders of Jamie Bulger and Philip Lawrence, 
John White tells us (though I am lifting the remark out of context): 
'killing a human being belongs to the realm of the unthinkable'. If 
only it did. The psychoanalytic approach by Michael Rustin comes 
closer to addressing this concern. 
Apart from Rustin's paper, most are by prominent members of the 
British philosophy of education community, or by other 
philosophers well known to that community (Midgley, Skillen). 
So is the collection worth reading? Of course it is. I have already 
recommended it to my students. 
GRAHAM HAYDON 
Institute o Education, University of London ýf 
1 Note added to Appendix: Given that John 
White in his chapter 
distinguishes basic moral rules from virtues it may be that 
his should be 
counted as such a voice. Cf. my comments on 
White's position in Chapter 
7, note I 
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Appendix 2 
The SCAA Forum 
SCAA's interest in values education seems to go back to the 
organisation's inception (when it took over from the NCC), and to 
be due perhaps in large part to the concerns of Nick Tate, Chief 
Executive of SCAA. During the Autumn of 1995 SCAA was 
planning a conference on 'Education for Adult Life', to take place 
in London in January 1996. Between the planning and the event 
the London headteacher Philip Lawrence was murdered by a 
teenager outside the gates of his school; as a response to the 
murder there were calls in the media for renewed attention to 
moral education in schools. But for that, possibly the conference 
itself might have escaped public notice, but it was in fact quite 
widely reported. 1 
The proposal to set up a National Forum on Values was made at 
the conference and adopted. An attempt was made to make the 
membership of the Forum representative of a wide range of 
opinion, not by random sampling but by drawing members - 150 
in total - from a wide range of organisations, faith communities 
and interest groups. It was deliberate that the Forum did not 
represent only 'Edu cation' but also the 'Community' - though in 
John White's view (1998 p. 17) it nevertheless had a 'heavy 
weighting towards the educational world'. 
The Forum was given a dual remit: to see whether there were any 
values upon which there was agreement across society; and to see 
how schools could be supported in their task of promoting pupils' 
spiritual, moral, social and cultural development. The two parts of 
the remit were addressed sequentially. The first stage of the 
work lasted for about a year from Spring 1996; only after a 
Statement of Values had been drawn up was the second part of 
the remit addressed. 
The Statement of Values was divided into four contexts or 
domains: 'the self' , 'relationships', 
6society' and 'the environment'. 2 
Marianne Talbot and Nick Tate, referring to these events in their 
contribution to TRAW, say that the conference 'coincided' with 
Lawrence's 
murder (p. 2); it was actually about a month later. Nigel 
Blake is mistaken, or 
at least misleading, in saying in the same volume (p. 
120) that 'the 
conference.... was a conscious and explicit response to' the murder. 
Much that 
was said at the conference may have been an explicit response 
to the murder, 
but the conference had been planned some time 
before. 
2 The Forum's Statement of Values, including its Preamble, is included here 
as Appendix 3. 
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Where did these come from? As White (1998 p. 17) correctly 
surmises, 'once the Forum began to meet there must have been 
some way of managing its deliberations so as to eventuate in the 
neat, four-category list of values. ' He goes on to ask: 'What part 
did SCAA officials and consultants play in this? How far did they 
regiment what must have been pretty diverse and diffuse data 
into more manageable categories unconsciously reflecting their 
own value-preferences? ' (ibid. ) 
Certainly the initial getting together of a draft was not the work of 
the whole Forum collectively. The 150 members were divided 
into 10 groups, each made up of people sharing certain interests (I 
was in an 'academic and researchers' group). All but one of these 
groups had three meetings during the Spring and Summer of 
1996. After the first meeting of each group, the group came back 
for its second meeting to consider a draft, which was further 
revised before the next meeting, and so on. One SCAA official 3 
attended virtually all of the meetings and, as I understand it, was 
largely responsible for the drafts which were written, circulated, 
criticised and revised during the first round of three meetings for 
each group. The set of four categories was settled during this 
period though not from the beginning; I recall that at one stage 
'family' and 'community' were candidate categories. Presumably 
the categories were intended to reflect the concerns which were 
actually coming out of the groups; beyond that I have no way of 
answering the questions 'how much regimentation did the writer 
of the drafts doT and 'how far was it according to her own value- 
preferences? '. 
The general outlines of the Statement had been completed by the 
end of the Summer of 1996. During the Autumn the Statement 
was put out to consultation and into the public domain. It was 
then further revised on the basis of the consultation. What was 
very nearly the final version was agreed by a plenary session (the 
only meeting of the whole Forum together) in January 1997. The 
final report from SCAA to the Secretary of State for Education of 
the Forum's work on the first part of the remit was delayed until 
after the general election of May 1997. 
Formally speaking, the Forum as originally constituted, having 
agreed the Statement of Values, then gave SCAA the authority to 
take the work forward so as to address the second part of the 
remit. After that the original Forum as such had no 
further 
3 Barbara Wintersgill, whose background was as an adviser on religious 
education. (The philosopher Marianne 
Talbot, of Brasenose College, Oxford, 
came on the scene as a consultant a 
little later). 
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meetings, though many of the same 150 individuals were 
consulted - along with many new contacts - in the next stage of 
the work. 
In responding to the second part of the remit, SCAA had to come 
up with guidance for schools which in some way addressed the 
OFSTED categories of development - spiritual, moral, social and 
cultural. Even if these had not been written into the original 
remit, it would have been difficult for any guidance to be taken 
seriously by schools if it did not make use of the categories on 
which the schools were to be inspected. So (whether by oversight 
or design is unclear to me) SCAA had the task of reconciling the 
four contexts of values in the Statement - self, relationships, 
society and environment - with the OFSTED categories. The way of 
doing this, depending on how you look at it, was either brilliantly 
simple or simply simple-minded. Construct a four-by-four grid. 
Along the top enter the OFSTED categories, in the form 'pupils 
develop spiritually by ..... ; pupils develop morally by ..... ; and so 
on. Down the left-hand side enter the Forum Statement contexts, 
expressed as '... learning to value themselves [in the following 
ways]....; learning to value relationships ....... ; and so on. Then you 
have 16 boxes, ready to be filled in with detailed statements of 
objectiveS. 4 
Notice that given this cross-cutting of the two sets of categories, 
the category of moral development now involves all four contexts 
of self, relationships, society and environment. And this indeed 
might be what we would expect. But then each of the other 
categories of development - spiritual, cultural and social - is also 
supposed to involve values in all four contexts. At this point one 
may well wonder whether any clear conception is operating of 
what constitutes the moral (or, for that matter, the spiritual, 
cultural or social). 
Even in an appendix, I shall spare the reader details of how the 
four-by- four grid became a six-layered three dimensional matrix, 
thereby containing 96 boxes. Before the guidance was piloted in 
schools this had been mercifully simplified (somewhat); I have 
said more about the form of the guidance in Haydon(1998). 
The piloting began in Autumn 1997 and was due to last two years. 
At the time of writing (now Autumn 1999) 1 have heard little 
41 was one of those invited to help fill in the 
boxes, in a process lasting 
over several months from April 1997. The 
basic form of the grid was 
already at that point a fait accompli, apparently agreed at 
a conference 
somewhere around March 1997. 
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more about the piloting exercise, but I gather that a reduced 
version of the guidance on SMSC development is to be produced. 
Meanwhile we now know that the National Curriculum as revised 
from 2000 will contain explicit attention to values under the 
headings of PSHE and Citizenship Education. Each of these areas 
has had a separate working party looking at it. The work of the 
SCAA Forum, then, will at most be one among several influences 
on the way in which education after 2000 deals with matters of 
values. The new rationale for the school curriculum (DfEE website, 
Autumn 1999), under the heading 'Values and purposes 
underpinning the school curriculum' contains a footnote reading 
'In planning their curriculum schools may wish to take into 
account the statement of values (May 1997) finalised after 
widespread consultation by the National Forum for Values in 
Education and the Community'. It is unclear as yet whether the 
Statement will make any further appearance in the documentaton 
on PSHE and Citizenship. 5 
5 White says (1998 p. 16) that 'SCAA's search 
for shared values has been 
translated directly into policy decisions. ' 
This now seems an overstatement. 
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Appendix 
The 'Statement of Values' produced by the SCAA Forum 
for Values in Education and the Community 
(circulated by SCAA in 1997) 
The Preamble to the Statement of Values' 
The National Forum for Values in Education and the Community 
was set up by the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority to: 
1. discover whether there are any values upon which there is 
common agreement within society; 
2. decide how schools might be supported in the important task of 
contributing to pupils' spiritual, moral, social and cultural 
development. 
The Forum identified a number of values on which members 
believed society would agree. Extensive consultation showed 
there to be overwhelming agreement on these values. 
The second part of the remit was met by the recommendation that 
SCAA produce guidance for schools on the promotion of pupils' 
spiritual, moral, social and cultural development. This guidance, it 
was recommended, should be structured around the contexts of 
value, build upon current good practice, encourage rigour and a 
whole-school approach to work in this area and be supported by 
booklets of case studies, a directory of resources, a glossary of the 
terms commonly used in this area and guidelines for community 
service. It was also recommended that the guidance include 
suggestions on how the school might involve the local community 
in work in this area. SCAA was also asked to use the statement of 
values nationally to instil confidence, trigger debate and elicit 
support for schools in the vital task of promoting pupils' spiritual, 
moral and social development. This work is currently being 
planned. 
It is important to note the following points: 
The remit of the Forum was to decide whether there are any 
values that are commonly agreed upon across society, not 
whether there are any values that should be agreed upon 
[GH: j This Preamble is probably the work largely of Marianne Talbot. 
Note 2 below is part of the Preamble. 
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across society. The only authority claimed for these values, 
accordingly, is the authority of consensus. 
These values are not exhaustive. They do not, for example, 
include religious beliefs, principles or teachings, though these 
are often the source from which commonly-held values derive. 
The statement neither implies nor entails that these are the 
only values that should be taught in schools. There is no 
suggestion, in particular, that schools should confine themselves 
to these values. 
Agreement on the values outlined below is compatible with 
disagreement on their sources. Many believe that God is the 
ultimate source of value, and that we are accountable to God for 
our actions; other that values have their source only in human 
nature, and that we are accountable only to our consciences. 
The statement of values is consistent with these and other 
views on the sources of value. 
Agreement on the values is also compatible with different 
interpretations and applications of these values. It is for 
schools to decide, reflecting the range of views on the wider 
community, how these values should be interpreted and 
applied. So, for example, the principle 'we support the 
institution of marriage' may legitimately be interpreted as 
giving rise to positive promotion of marriageý as an ideal, of 
the responsibilities of parenthood, and of the duty of children 
to respect their parents. 
The ordering of the values does not imply any priority or 
necessary preference. The ordering reflects the belief of many 
that values in the context of the self must precede the 
development of the other values. 
These values are so fundamental that they appear 
unexceptional. Their demanding nature is however 
demonstrated both by our collective failure consistently to live 
up to them, and the moral challenge which acting on them in 
practice entails. 
Schools and teachers can have confidence that there is general 
agreement in society upon these values. They can therefore 
Note 
2 In British law, marr iage is defined as 'the voluntary union for life of one 
man and one woman to the exclusion of all others'. 
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expect the support and encouragement of society if they base 
their teaching and the school ethos on these values. 
The Statement Of Values 
The Self 
We value ourselves as unique human beings capable of spiritual, 
moral, intellectual and physical growth and development. 
On the basis of these values, we should: 
develop an understanding of our own characters, strengths 
and weaknesses 
* develop self-respect and self-discipline 
clarify the meaning and purpose in our lives and decide, on the 
basis of this, how we believe that our lives should be lived 
0 make responsible use of our talents, rights and opportunities 
strive, throughout life, for knowledge, wisdom and 
understanding 
* take responsibility, within our capabilities, for our own lives. 
Relationships 
We value others for themselves, not only for what they have or 
what they can do for us. We value relationships as fundamental 
to the development and fulfilment of ourselves and others, and to 
the good of the community. 
On the basis of these values, we should: 
* respect others, including children 
e care for others and exercise goodwill in our dealings with them 
* show others they are valued 
* earn loyalty, trust and confidence 
* work co-operatively with others 
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0 respect the privacy and property of others 
0 resolve disputes peacefully. 
Society 
We value truth, freedom, justice, human rights, the rule of law and 
collective effort for the common good. In particular, we value families as sources of love and support for all their members, and 
as the basis of a society in which people care for others. 
On the basis of these values, we should: 
9 understand and carry out our responsibilities as citizens 
refuse to support values or actions that may be harmful to 
individuals or communities 
0 support families in raising children and caring for dependants 
0 support the institution of marriage 
recognise that the love and commitment required for a secure 
and happy childhood can also be found in families of different 
kinds 
* help people to know about the law and legal processes 
* respect the rule of law and encourage others to do so 
* respect religious and cultural diversity 
* promote opportunities for all 
support those who cannot, by themselves, sustain a dignified 
lifestyle 
promote participation in the democratic process by all sectors 
of the community 
contribute to, as well as benefit fairly from, economic and 
i 
cultural resources 
40 make truth, integrity, honesty and goodwill priorities in public 
and private life. 
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The Environment 
We value the environment, both natural and shaped by humanity, 
as the basis of life and a source of wonder and inspiration. 
On the basis of these values, we should: 
accept our responsibility to maintain a sustainable environment 
for future generations 
e understand the place of human beings within nature 
0 understand our responsibilities for other species 
* ensure that development can be justified 
a preserve balance and diversity in nature wherever possible 
o preserve areas of beauty and interest for future generations 
repair, wherever possible, habitats damaged by human 
development and other means. 
255 
Appendix 4 
Morality(n) and the language of rights 
Stout (1988) has described our contemporary condition as a moral 
Babel, in which there are many co-existing but not necessarily 
compatible moral languages. As Stout points out, some people 
believe that the best recourse in such conditions is to some thin 
language which can serve as a 'moral pidgin' or 'moral Esperanto'. 
The language of rights can seem to offer such a moral Esperanto, 
especially perhaps if one follows the Germanic tradition in treating 
morality(n) as the morality of Recht (see the reference to Lukes on 
Marx towards the end of Chapter 4). 
In particular, the notion of human rights has been catching on as 
providing a basic code of conduct within plural societies. In 
discussions of moral education and citizenship education, I 
encounter people who seem to believe that while the idea of 
morality (and hence moral education) is irredeemably subject to 
problems of authoritarianism, relativism and so on, the idea of 
human rights (and hence an education which insists on these 
rights) is unchallengeable bedrock. Such people would perhaps 
prefer to give up talking about morality altogether, except as a 
subjective matter for individual or cultural choice. For them, in 
effect, the function of morality(n) could be served purely by a 
language of rights; nothing else would be necessary. It is this kind 
of view that I want to examine, and reject, in this appendix. 
In speaking now of a language of rights we are not talking just of 
any discourse in which mention of rights could feature. There is a 
sense in which virtually any norm for conduct could be expressed 
in terms of rights. 'Try to develop understanding and tolerance of 
other people's point of view' could be expressed (though not 
without some change in sense) as 'people have a right that others 
try to develop understanding and tolerance of their point of view'. 
Or in a legal context, where talk of rights is often less strained, the 
law which says one should drive on the left could 
be interpreted 
as establishing that drivers have a right not to be stopped 
by the 
police for driving on the left. If, however, a 
language of rights is 
to do some job which could not be done by a language of norms 
more generally, it will need to function by picking out some set of 
rights which can be seen as basic or fundamental, perhaps 
in the 
sense of pre-existing any particular norms which might 
be 
established to protect that right. Clearly the right not 
to be 
stopped for driving on the left is not 
basic or pre-existing in that 
sense; if the law in question does protect some 
basic right this will 
be something like the right of road users generally 
to security of 
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life and limb. And the norms of tolerance and understanding 
might be seen as protecting some more fundamental right, 
perhaps the right to be treated with respect. It is clearly at this 
sort of level that talk of human rights is often seen as appropriate. 
Let us say that the language of rights seems to serve the same function as morality(n) inasmuch as it serves to protect or 
promote vital interests. This is not uncontroversial. There are 
views by which rights-language essentially protects a sphere of an 
individual's choice, or a sphere within which the individual's own 
will can be exercised. But if the rationale for a language of rights 
is to be consistent with morality(n), the exercise of individual will 
or choice will be protected only insofar as this is seen as a 
protection of interests, though the notion of interests need not be 
narrowly interpreted. And there are at least two ways in which 
the exercise of choice can be seen as an interest needing 
protection: either it is taken to be a basic interest of human 
beings, being the kind of creatures they are, that they should be 
able to make some decisions for themselves and have some 
control over their own lives; or less ambitiously, it can be seen as 
a necessary interest of human beings within a certain kind of 
society that they should have this sphere of choice. 1 Mill, for 
instance, in Utilitarianism Ch. 5, saw the recognition of rights as 
quite compatible with utilitarianism, so that the language of rights 
did not need to appeal to what he called in On Liberty 'the idea of 
abstract right, as a thing independent of utility: rights protected 
the human interest in security. 
The way that rights (for convenience, I shall not always unpack 
this as 'the language of rights') function to protect particular 
interests is that they can block decision-making in terms of the 
overall balance of interests. That is, in Dworkin's (1977) metaphor, 
rights are trumps. It may seem paradoxical that a practice which 
can be used by or on behalf of individuals to block decision- 
making in terms of the overall balance of people's interests can 
nevertheless be defended in utilitarian terms; but there is a 
considerable body of work which does just this (in addition to Mill 
himself, see e. g. Gray 1984). 
I see no reason why such a notion of rights might not be 
recognised within morality(n). A variety of welfare rights might 
also be recognised. What is very doubtful is whether the language 
of rights could function as the whole of morality(n). 
It seems just 
I Cf. the argument, referred to in Chapter 2, 
by which Raz 1986, p. 391, 
and White 1990 pp. 103-4, defend the value of autonomy. 
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too minimal; or more accurately, does not even provide the 
minimum that morality(n) needs. We can see this if we think 
within an educational context. 
Suppose we try to postulate a moral system composed of nothing 
but rights. We can call the advocate of such a position a rights- 
minimalist. Such a person could give an account of the content of 
the public understanding of morality: it would consist in 
knowledge of what rights people have, together with an 
understanding of the rationale for these rights. But what account 
can the rights -minimalist give of moral upbringing and education, 
especially where relatively young children are concerned? 
It is going to be relevant, within the rights-minimalist position, to 
ask whether children themselves do or do not have rights. This is 
not the place to enter into a general discussion of children's rights. 
The topic has been much debated, but, significantly for the 
present discussion, the debate has gone on within an assumption 
that the language of rights exists alongside other languages of 
evaluation. 2 Within a broader understanding of the kind of moral 
considerations available, even a denial of rights to children does 
not mean that children are left outside of moral consideration 
altogether. (A similar point holds for animals if animal rights are 
denied). In contrast, within a morality in which there is no 
language but that of rights, children (like animals) must 
themselves have rights if they are to have any place within the 
moral system at all. 
What kind of rights might they have? Minimally, they might have 
only certain welfare rights -a right to be cared for when unable 
yet to care for themselves. But this would be an unstable position 
within a rights-morality which allots to adults various rights of 
control over their own lives. For if a person is, as a child, brought 
up in a way that predetermines the choices he or she will make in 
his or her later life, that person's right of control, as an adult, over 
his or her own life seems to have been prejudiced (since it will be 
as if someone else has exercised control over the adult's life, albeit 
from a certain temporal distance). This is, of course, a formulation 
of the classic liberal objection to indoctrination. It has led many 
liberals to uphold what Feinberg (1980) labelled 'the child's right 
to an open future, a right which is violated if influences are 
brought to bear on the child which effectively prevent him or 
her (perhaps at a much later date) from making important 
determining choices in his or her own life. 
2Cf. Wringe (1981); and commenting on this, Haydon (1987c). 
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Suppose, then, that rights- mini mali sts would want to uphold a 
child's right to an open future. They would then have to ask, 
about any proposal for moral upbringing, whether such an 
upbringing was compatible with the child's right to an open 
future. Insofar as moral education consisted simply in giving a 
child knowledge and understanding about his or her rights and 
those of other people, this would seem to be unproblematic (in 
fact, it might well be said that the child has a right to that 
knowledge and understanding). 
But a moral education, compatible with the function of 
morality(n), could not plausibly consist only in knowledge and 
understanding. It matters not only that people know what rights 
others (and they themselves) have, but that they take them into 
account in their own conduct (there is no point in people being 
said to have rights if no one takes any notice of them). So if we 
are to have a workable system we have to postulate also 
something like appropriate responses to rights: I shall speak of 
'respect for rights' as a shorthand. That gives us the idea of a 
morality which contains rights and respect for rights, but nothing 
else. Though it looks thin, the import of such a morality is by no 
means negligible; it would be the sort of morality that Kant refers 
to, but does not endorse, when he says in the Groundwork 
... if such an attitude were a universal 
law of nature, mankind 
could get on perfectly well - better no doubt than if everybody 
prates about sympathy and goodwill, and even takes pains, on 
occasion, to practise them, but on the other hand cheats where he 
can, traffics in human rights, or violates them in other ways. ' 
(19489 p. 86). 
The problem about early moral upbringing now is whether the 
promotion of a respect for rights would not itself be a violation of 
the rights of the individual child. If we put great weight on the 
individualism of rights, where rights function only to 'ring-fence' 
the interests of each individual, it might even seem that the only 
kind of moral education strictly consistent with the rights of each 
child would be an education that gives her the 
determination to 
defend her own rights at all costs (for why should 
it necessarily be 
in her own interests that she should respect the rights of others? 
). 
It might be possible to argue our way around this 
kind of extreme 
individual perhaps by an ism argument similar to that of Gewirth 
(1977) to 
, 
the effect that if one claims one's own rights one must 
recognise those of others (for criticism of 
Gewirth see MacIntyre 
1981 pp. 64-5; Williams 1985 p. 210). But would 
it be clear even 
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then that giving a child a rights-minimalist upbringing would 
avoid any violation of the child's own rights? 
it is no doubt true that liberals of an individualist or libertarian 
tendency have been attracted towards forms of moral upbringing 
as minimalist as possible, for fear that anything more will involve 
moulding the child according to society's interests. And a system 
that, if it has to instil or inculcate anything, instils or inculcates 
nothing but respect for rights, seems to fit the bill. But 
appearances may be misleading. The rights -mini mali st 
upbringing must try to ensure that each individual takes the 
language of rights seriously. What is presupposed in taking this 
language seriously? One of two things: either the individual has to 
believe that there really are such things as moral rights - where 
this is some kind of metaphysical, ontological claim; or the 
individual has to believe that there are good reasons for using this 
kind of language even though in a metaphysical sense moral rights 
do not really exist. 
The first approach to a rights- minimalist upbringing requires the 
educators to ensure that people come to hold certain beliefs which 
are in fact eminently debatable - as is shown both by the fact that 
many cultures have apparently managed without such beliefs 
(though they were not without morality(n)), and by modern 
philosophical debate. To MacIntyre (1981 p. 67), a claim that 
human rights exist is an ontological claim on a par with a claim 
that unicorns or witches exist. If a rights-minimalist upbringing 
really has to ensure that everybody holds such a belief, then it 
begins to look much less minimal after all; it begins to look as 
indoctrinatory as is (to many liberal educationalists) an 
upbringing which commits the individual to believing in God. If on 
the other hand a rights- minimalist education, putting the rights of 
the individual educatee first, were to encourage critical thinking 
about the existence of rights, it might well turn out that most 
people would end up as sceptics. 
The alternative approach looks more plausible - that individuals 
be educated so that they come to believe, not that rights are 
actually existent entities of some kind, but that talk of rights 
has 
its place in a social practice, and that there are good reasons 
for 
engaging in this practice. But again, if children are not to 
be 
indoctrinated into accepting without question that they must 
engage in this practice, that is, actually take the rights of others 
into account, they must be allowed to question that very 
proposition. And rights-minimalism in 
itself will have given no 
one any basis other than self-interest on which 
to answer his or 
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her own questions, once s/he begins to ask 'What reason is there 
for me to engage in this practice, rather than free-riding on other 
people's willingness to engage in iff. 
The problem here is that rights- minimalism in itself cannot 
assume anything like a benevolent disposition on the part of each 
person. This means that a strictly minimalist upbringing which 
consists of nothing but initiation into a practice of rights cannot 
guarantee that it will not be self-defeating. It might give children 
as they grow up nothing but a knowledge of the language of 
rights, without their having any tendency to take that language 
seriously to the extent of actually respecting the rights of others, 
or the seriousness of the claims of others upon them. Thus, in the 
realm of public understanding, mere knowledge of the language of 
rights would not - without appropriate underlying dispositions 
ensure the survival of a practice of rights. It appears then that 
the person who takes rights seriously must support a form of 
moral upbringing that goes further than the rights- minimalist 
position, in that it encourages the development of benevolent 
dispositions. If that is correct, then public discourse about 
morality - even where this is explicitly restricted to morality(n) 
cannot reasonably be restricted to a language of rights. 
Another way of showing this is by reflecting on the idea that 
people may in certain circumstances - indeed in many 
circumstances in a society which is at all liberal - have a right to 
make their own moral decisions, and more generally to lead their 
own lives, provided they do not violate the rights of others. We 
could argue that if people do make their own decisions, they will 
sometimes (inevitably) make decisions which are not, morally, the 
right or best ones. Thus if people have a right to make these 
decisions and put them into practice, there is a sense in which 
they have the right to make decisions which are wrong. This is 
sometimes referred to as a right to do wrong (a right to do 
something wrong might be better). Some find this idea 
impossibly 
paradoxical (cf. Brown 1986 p. 106); others have 
defended it in an 
explicitly liberal spirit (cf. Waldron 1993 Ch. 
3; Dworkin 1977 pp. 
188-9). It seems to me right to defend it, because if we say that, 
on occasions when people in fact make a wrong 
decision, they 
have no such rights, then we are in effect saying that people 
have 
in certain areas the right to make their own 
decisions provided 
they make the right decisions - to do their own thing provided 
they do the right thing - and that empties the notion of such a 
right of content. 
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Why might we think it important that people should have, across 
much of their lives, this right to lead their own moral lives? It 
may be for some people a rather specifically Kantian idea that 
heteronomous action cannot be moral at all; for others it may be 
part of the recognition of the value of autonomy in a not-very- 
Kantian sense. But it may also be because we recognise that many 
situations in which moral thinking has to be done are situations of 
great complexity (cf. Chapter 8) in which factors of many different 
kinds have to be considered. Only the individual most directly 
concerned may be able to see and appraise all the factors - or at 
least may come closer to being able to do this than anyone else. 
So in recognising people's right to make their own decisions we 
are at the same time recognising that the moral life contains more 
than just considerations of rights. 
Having recognised a plurality of kinds of moral consideration, we 
can also recognise that the language of rights is not just thin but 
may also in some cases act as a distorting lens. Midgley (1991b, 
p. 105, italics in original) says 
'This is simply the most competitive and litigious of moral 
concepts. If rights appear to clash, then one of them must give 
way. The legal model, which is very close here, dictates a zero- 
sum solution. If I win, you lose. There is a conceptual deadlock; 
the losing party must simply leave the court. ' 
As regards the legal model, this may be one of the places where 
we do not need to go all the way with the analogy. Though in TA V 
I took the same line as Midgley, claiming that in using the rights 
orientation 'the assumption is implicit that the solution must be all 
or nothing, one way or the other' (p. 71) this is to ignore 
complexities to an extent that even the legal analogy does not 
mandate (the legal system is, after all, capable of adjudicating in 
some, pretty complicated issues, and compromises are not 
unknown). As Archard (1992) points out in response to 
Midgley, 
in a real controversy in all its complexity (the issue 
in question is 
the one of parental rights and child abuse) even using the 
language of rights does not commit one to a zero-sum solution 
(one does not have to say that parents have either absolute rights 
over their children, or none at all). But the general point still 
stands, that using this language does predispose 
those using it to 
seeing issues in a conflictual way: a point made, even 
if sometimes 
overstated, by many defenders of an ethic of care against 
the 
justice-and-rights orientation in moral thinking (See also TA V 
p. 7 1). To that extent, an over-reliance on 
the language of rights 
could actually be antithetical to morality(n). 
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Appendix 5 
Violence and the language of norms 
In Chapter 6, by way of illustrating the importance both of a 
language of norms and of a language of virtues, I argued that we 
do need norms relating to violence. It is not part of my argument 
that the content of such norms is obvious. Within a shared 
understanding of the nature of morality(n), they would continue 
to be open to argument. 
In his discussion in TRA W, for instance, White does not speak of a 
rule against violence as such; he sees the basic moral rules as 
ruling out 'injury' or, later, 'grievous bodily harm'. Violence, even 
violence which is unambiguously physical, does not always cause 
injury, and injury is not always grievous. The ruling out of 
violence as such would not be so uncontroversially part of the 
framework of basic rules to which White refers. 
Publicly acknowledged norms, however, have to draw lines, and 
the lines have to be recognisable and applicable in practice. A line 
between some acceptable level of hurt and some unacceptable 
level of injury as a result of physical violence is going to be too 
easily blurred. Any physical violence, even if not intended to 
have serious results, runs the risk of doing so. And any physical 
violence at least raises a presumption that those on the receiving 
end are not being respected. There is reason, then, for erring on 
the side of caution and drawing the line against physical violence 
as such. 
It is difficult, however, to rule out physical violence without ruling 
out more than that. Some schools have rules saying 'We keep our 
hands, feet and objects to ourselves' (cited by Skillen 1997 p. 376, 
but by no means unique to his children's school). This may 
indeed, as Skillen suggests (ibid. p. 381) 'suppress... the very 
impulses of friendship'; but it is presumably an attempt to set up 
the sort of norm which will at least ensure an absence of physical 
violence, until more subtle nuances can be appreciated. 
The initial 
improvement in subtlety needed here would be the realisation 
that it is possible for norms to refer to motivation (as in Griffin's 
example 'don't be cruel') and not only to the outwardly observable 
aspects of action. 
If some sort of ruling out of interpersonal physical violence 
is 
taken here as basic and minimal, then there is a question of how 
far shared norms would go beyond the minimal. 
There are 
several ways in which the scope of norms against violence can 
be 
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understood more broadly. One question is whether the same 
norms apply in institutionalised contexts, of the police and 
military, for instance, as in 'private' interpersonal contexts. This is 
a question which in educational contexts provides ample scope for 
the kind of thinking about justification and criticism to which 
I referred in Chapter 12. 
Probably more problematic, because it will seem to many to call 
into question the meaning of the word 'violence', are questions 
about what sort of actions and states of affairs, other than 
deliberate use of physical force by persons against persons with 
intent to hurt or harm, are to be brought under norms against 
violence. It is possible to give reasons for using the term 
4violence' in a broader way (see VVV Ch. 1). But this is not just a 
question of semantics; the primary question is about the norms 
which are to constitute the content of a publicly shared 
morality(n). How a particular word is to be used, while far from 
unimportant, is - or can reasonably be treated as -a question 
about how our norms can best be articulated. 
Norms that refer to the outwardly observable aspect of actions 
and norms that refer to motivation categorise conduct in different 
ways. The notion of violence cuts across both categorisations, 
which is one reason why it is so problematic. 'Keep your hands 
and feet to yourself', as Skillen notices, puts blows intended to 
hurt in the same category (probably unintentionally) as friendly 
pats on the back or hugs. 'Don't be cruel' puts blows intended to 
hurt in the same category as words intended to hurt. If 'don't be 
cruel' means something like 'don't cause pain for your own 
satisfaction', this can apply to the causing of emotional as well as 
of physical pain. If the cruel infliction of physical pain counts as 
violence, then so can the cruel infliction of emotional pain, which 
may or may not accompany physical pain. Thus it is possible to 
count some verbal attacks as violence, in a way fully compatible 
with what I said in Chapter 6 about the link between anger and 
violence: 
This kind of verbal violence frequently goes with anger and 
shouting, often directed at someone not in a position to answer 
back. The aim is to hurt the other person emotionally, to cause 
them mental pain and anguish. This can substitute 
for, or 
supplement, the causing of physical pain 
by bodily means. it 
can, indeed, be worse in its effects than passing physical 
violence. (McGinn 1992, p. 41). 
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What is important here, morally speaking, is that people should 
not do this sort of thing - in other words, a norm against behaving 
in a certain kind of way. Whether we call or don't call this way of 
behaving violent is surely not a question of great interest in its 
own right - other than a specialist lexicographical question - independently of the moral questions. One could argue the 
question of terminology both ways. On the one hand, if 'violence' 
is restricted to the physical variety, then 'don't be violent' sets up 
a clear line which people know they are not to transgress. Maybe 
in certain circumstances it is justifiable or excusable to get angry 
and to express the anger - and it may not be easy to stay on one 
side of the line between expressing justified criticism and being 
angry - but at least you know you must stop short of hitting the 
person. But by the same token, if you think that the most 
important thing is that you should not attack physically, you may 
feel justified in any amount of verbal attack, and go too far in that 
way. If we put great weight on a norm ruling out physical attack, 
we also have to accept a responsibility to moderate the forms of 
verbal assault we use. 
Though the norms in such cases refer to the agent's motivation, 
they do also refer to harm done. Notice, for instance, that McGinn 
in the passage above does not simply equate the motivations 
behind certain verbal and physical attacks; he also points out that 
the effects of the one can be worse than that of the other. More 
generally, as I pointed out in Chapter 6, thinking in terms of 
norms for conduct does tend to direct our attention towards the 
consequences of actions. If we object to action which will cause 
injury, and object to this not because of the motivation of the 
agent, but because of the injury itself, then we have reason for 
objecting, not only to deliberate cruelty, but also, say, to the state 
of affairs which allows so many people to be killed and maimed in 
road accidents. If we count among physical harms, not only such 
things as being hit, stabbed or shot but also, say, dying of cold and 
hunger, then we have reason to object to the state of affairs which 
allows old people in affluent countries to die of cold in the winter, 
and many thousands in less affluent parts of the world to die of 
hunger. Since these are harms which could be avoided or at the 
very least mitigated through deliberate human action, it is not 
extending the meaning of the term unintelligibly to speak in such 
cases of violence by some people against others. 
In that kind of case the extension of meaning putatively goes 
through because the causing of physical harm - or responsibility 
for avoidable physical harm - is still there. But the notion of 
psychological violence already shows that the element of physical 
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harm is not essential to the notion of violence. So the way is 
opened for a notion such as that of systemic violence (Chapter 6, 
text to note 1) which can refer to any 'institutional practice or 
procedure that adversely impacts on individuals or groups by 
burdening them psychologically, mentally, culturally, spiritually, 
economically or physically' (Epp and Watkinson, 1996, p. i), or the 
rather similar notion of structural violence which was probably 
first used by the peace researcher Galtung (1969). 
At this point it should be clear that we have arrived at a notion 
rather close to that of injustice or oppression. My own feeling 
about this (which I do not take to have any argumentative or 
evidential value) is that at some point in the gradual extension of 
the meaning of 'violence' we have come too far from its central 
meaning. But the extensions are not arbitrary. It is worth 
remembering that, given the vulnerable physical nature of human 
beings, many forms of injustice and oppression do have physical 
effects in the end; the poor are more likely to get ill and do not 
(statistically speaking) live so long. (This is one of the main 
planks of Honderich's (1980) comparison between violence and 
injustice, though he himself keeps to a fairly restricted use of the 
term 'violence'). And there are strong arguments from moral 
philosophers (e. g. Glover 1977) for thinking that ordinary moral 
thinking puts too much weight on the distinction between acts and 
omissions. 1 
How violence is to be defined is not, to my mind, a question to be 
settled by philosophers; it is one to be worked out within the 
public sphere, as we try to articulate the norms by which we wish 
to and are prepared to live. There are in the public sphere 
sufficient arguments, difficult enough to ignore, in favour of 
expanding our understanding of violence, for it to be likely that 
the boundaries around a narrow understanding will not prove 
impregnable. This is something on which neither philosophers nor 
educationalists can legislate, though we can add our voices to the 
public discourse. To some degree we are observers, but we can 
remain ready to help people to think clearly and not to 
be misled 
by their language. 
Will it then be an irrevocable loss of clarity if the term 'violence' 
comes to incorporate categories which our ancestors would not 
have recognised as violence? It will not, provided a 
degree of 
self-consciousness and reflectiveness about 
language can be 
I Coady (1986) is a useful discussion of the arguments over the meaning 
of 'violence'; Coady himself 
defends a fairly conservative position. 
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retained (which points to a task for education). Will there be an 
irrevocable loss of moral clear- sightedn es s? Not necessarily; 
indeed it may be the other way round: we may be helped to see 
clearly wrongs that we might have overlooked before. 
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Acknowledgements, and sources of this thesis in my own 
earlier work. 
The first fairly complete draft of this thesis was written in the 
summer of 1998, during a term's study leave from the Institute 
of Education, and the vacation following. At that stage John White 
read the draft and made comments which have been helpful in 
the subsequent restructuring and clarification of the argument. 
During the autumn of 1998 1 used the first draft as a basis for 
Values, Virtues and Violence. Following the completion of that, I 
have rewritten the thesis, incorporating new material and making 
numerous small alterations in the chapters used in VVV. 
The result is that while there is considerable overlap between the 
thesis and VVV, the shared material is put in the content of a 
broader argument, set up by the Prologue and Chapters 1 and 2, 
which do not feature in VVV at all, and roun ded off by newer 
points abo ut citizenship education in Chapter 13. Where the 
material is common to both, most of it (with the exception of 
Chapter 6 and Appendix 5 of the thesis) was written first for the 
thesis. 
The Prologue contains a paragraph or two from Haydon (1999d), 
Chapter 1 is partly derived from Haydon (1999c), Chapter 2 is 
partly derived from Haydon (1995), Chapter 3 and the Epilogue 
are developed from a talk given at the Department of Educational 
Studies, Oxford University, in November 1997. 
Chapter 13 has some overlap with VVV, and also draws on 
conference and seminar presentations given at the Institute of 
Education in July 1999 and October 1999, and in Cambridge in 
September 1999. 
Appendix 4 draws on, and adds to, Haydon (1993c). 
Appendix 5 is adapted from part of Chapter 14 of VVV. 
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